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LIMINAL SUBJECTIVITIES IN CONTEMPORARY FILM AND LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis discusses the intersection of subjectivity and the liminal in contemporary literary 
and filmic texts. 
 
In discussion of eight texts, the thesis weighs the dual meaning of “liminal subjectivities” – 
the liminal space between subjectivities, and the condition of subjectivity as it negotiates 
the liminal. It aims to explore how liminality manifests in manners both universal and 
specific to the literary or filmic form, in the embodiments of characters, and the rhythms 
and poetics of the text. It considers the liminal a privileged trope of destabilised 
subjectivity, a space of suspension and potentiality, and explores how the liminal functions 
as an interface between haecceity and otherness; whether it binds together or holds apart; if 
it is a space between oppositional states or a continuum of specific sites of intensity. 
 
The eight texts discussed are The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo (W. G. Sebald), Sputnik 
Sweetheart, Kafka on the Shore, and After Dark (Haruki Murakami), Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind and The Science of Sleep (Michel Gondry), My Own Private Idaho (Gus Van Sant). 
The work of Sebald and Gondry is considered in translation from the original German and 
Japanese. The thesis considers both literary and filmic texts to contrast the salient 
modalities of subjectivity that each form constructs.  
 
Each chapter considers how liminality manifests at the surface of the text, how a liminal 
agency operates to interrupt, destabilise, and displace subjectivity in the spaces between 
languages, genre, form, voice, states of consciousness, word and image, facticity and 
fictionality, and cinematic and literary tropes and modes. The discussion explores how this 
is reflected and expanded upon within the text, in liminal embodiments, intensities, and 
motifs, such as the hypnagogic, rites of passage, the uncanny, home, the vespertine, night, 
metamorphosis, carnival, as well as issues of space – the non-place, the extraterritorial, and 
nomadic space. 
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CONTENTS 
 
 
Introduction          1 
  The texts        2 
The liminal subject        4 
Critical orientation        8 
The influence of Sebald        13 
 
 
Chapter One            17  
W. G. Sebald  
The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo    
 
Textual subjectivities       23 
Translation        23 
Word and image        24 
Author/narrator        25 
Narrator and narrated       28 
Polyphony       32  
Intersubjectivity       36 
 
Liminal motifs        38 
The hypnagogic and the vertiginous      41 
The nomad and the extraterritorial     50 
 
 
Chapter Two           56 
Haruki Murakami  
Sputnik Sweetheart, Kafka on the Shore, and After Dark   
 
The other side         61 
 
Textual subjectivities       68 
The narrative subject      69 
The core self        73 
Division, displacement      77 
 
Liminal motifs        82 
Hypnagogia       83 
The night       87 
Rites of passage       91 
The nomad       95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
Chapter Three          100 
Michel Gondry  
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind 
  and The Science of Sleep    
   
Textual subjectivities       105 
 Filmic modes and diegeses      105 
 Extended liminal moments     110 
 Diffusion and deconstruction     115 
 Polyphony       118 
 Intersubjectivities       119 
  
  Liminal motifs        126 
   Liminal objects       128 
   Extraterritorial space      131 
 
Chapter Four           136 
Gus Van Sant  
My Own Private Idaho 
 
  Narcolepsy        139 
 
  Textual subjectivities       147 
The text and the protagonist     149 
Polyphony       152 
Visual modes       155 
Dialogue, narrative, and structural modes    158 
   Intersubjectivities       162 
   
Liminal motifs        163 
     Home        164 
Rites of passage       168 
The nomad       173 
   The non-place and the extraterritorial    175 
 
 
Conclusion          180 
  Betwixt and between        180
  The focalising lens       182
  Homecomings        183 
  In dreams begins responsibility      185 
Oscillations        187
    
 
Bibliography          189 
 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
My interest in liminal subjectivities emerges from a collision of pre-existing critical interests 
and an observation of particular characteristics in recent narrative film and literature. As I 
began this project I had come to see an aggregation of preoccupations, themes, and motifs 
in certain texts, presenting a kind of lacuna or open question – a question of the subject’s 
negotiation with otherness, and of the space that lies between here and there. In the 
representation of the subject and its navigation of liminal space, I became aware of 
paradoxes, of particular vulnerabilities or instabilities of subjectivity. This seemed to be an 
emergent characteristic in both literature and film, occurring at the fringes of each field yet 
also exerting an influence upon the mainstream. I began to see in these texts new modes of 
articulating the liminal subject. These modes are diverse, some universal and some salient 
to the literary or filmic form; the common feature is the manner in which vulnerabilities 
and instabilities are elevated to the surface of the text in the construction of narrators and 
protagonists, as well as embedded in the text in interdependent motifs of liminal instability. 
In the early stages of my research I was predominantly concerned with issues which 
coincided with my critical interests in postmodernism, in particular with deconstruction 
and Deleuze and Guattari. As I will come to discuss, the project began to reorient itself as I 
integrated these issues and saw patterns across very diverse sets of texts. My mode of 
questioning “tipped over,” as Brian McHale might put it1, from ontological to 
epistemological, and then negotiated an uncertain path between the two. This path has 
been instinctive and tremulous, and has come, inadvertently yet very aptly, to reflect the 
paradoxes of liminality that I sought to unpick. At times I have wished (for my own sake) 
that my approach had a more consistent grounding, though I do not believe a more 
formulaic approach would have led to such a generative discussion, nor would have prised 
open the critical concerns which hold these texts together and present a clear picture of the 
phenomenon of liminal subjectivities manifest in texts of the contemporary moment.  
                                                 
1 McHale argues that modernist and postmodernist modes of questioning have an interdependent dynamic: 
“Intractable epistemological uncertainty becomes at a certain point ontological plurality or instability: push 
epistemological questions far enough and they “tip over” into ontological questions. By the same token, push 
ontological questions far enough and they tip over into epistemological questions – the sequence is not linear 
and unidirectional, but bi-directional and reversible.” McHale 1987: 11. 
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The texts 
Each chapter takes as its focus a writer or filmmaker within whose work I have identified a 
play of liminal subjectivities; these are W. G. Sebald, Haruki Murakami, Michel Gondry, 
and Gus Van Sant. The texts I have selected span not only a division of literature and film 
but also of genre and tone, and of high and low art. Each was chosen for the particular 
ways it intersects with my questions of liminal subjectivities, with my interest in the 
contemporary moment, and in particular for a reciprocity with my critical orientation. 
Indeed, the development of my approach has narrowed a wider field of texts as I began to 
note certain links and patterns between these texts, a process precipitated by my reading of 
Sebald.  
The texts which I eventually came to are W. G. Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn2 and 
Vertigo3, Haruki Murakami’s Sputnik Sweetheart4, Kafka on the Shore5 and After Dark6, Michel 
Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind7 and The Science of Sleep8, and Gus Van Sant’s My 
Own Private Idaho9. The Sebald and Murakami novels are considered in translation (the 
Sebald by Michael Hulse, and the Murakami by Philip Gabriel and Jay Rubin). All eight 
novels and films are from the last twenty years. Of the earliest texts, Sebald’s Vertigo was 
first published as Schwindel. Gefühle, in 1990, its translated counterpart following in 1999, 
and Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho was released in late 1991. Of the later texts, Rubin’s 
translation of Murakami’s After Dark was published in 2007 (its Japanese publication being 
in 2004), and Gondry’s The Science of Sleep was released in 2006.  
I have chosen to discuss both literary and filmic texts to explore the contrasting 
and interlinking ways in which subjectivity is constructed across these forms. In Sebald and 
Murakami subjectivity is constructed through linguistic signifiers, through literary and 
narrative modes, and across pages and chapters, whereas in Gondry and Van Sant, 
subjectivity is constructed at an intersection of the audio, visual and temporal, through the 
composition and editing of shots, and through the performance of actors. In this sense, the 
filmic text is already a more polyphonic means of production, with a greater breadth of 
creative input, albeit one in which these many voices are attempting to create a centred 
                                                 
2 Sebald 1998 [1995], trans. Hulse, M.; hereafter cited as TROS.  
3 Sebald 1999 [1990], trans. Hulse, M.; hereafter cited as V. 
4 Murakami 2001 [1999], trans. Gabriel, P.; hereafter cited as SS. 
5 Murakami 2005 [2002], trans. Gabriel, P.; hereafter cited as KOTS 
6 Murakami 2007 [2004], trans. Rubin, J.; hereafter cited as AD. 
7 Gondry 2004; hereafter cited as ESOTSM. 
8 Gondry 2006; hereafter cited as TSOS. 
9 Van Sant 1991; hereafter cited as MOPI. 
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textual subjectivity. Taking this distinction as a given, I have also selected these texts to 
consider the different ways in which subjectivity is constructed within a single form, and 
how parallels emerge across the divide of form, something also apparent in liminal motifs 
within the texts. For example, I note particular similarities in the construction of 
subjectivities between Sebald and Van Sant, which do not exist between Sebald and 
Murakami, nor Van Sant and Gondry. Correspondingly, the motifs I identify in Murakami 
ramify with those of Van Sant, while those of Gondry refer back to Sebald. It is also 
notable that these particular texts are rich with intertextualities which transcend form. The 
narrative voice of Sebald’s novels, in conjunction with the images present in the text, may 
be “heard” as a kind of voiceover. Similarly, the first person plural narrator of Murakami’s 
After Dark reflexively constructs a “visual” gaze with which to “observe” the characters. My 
Own Private Idaho not only references Shakespeare; its narrative structure relies heavily on 
Henry IV (though, strictly speaking, a dramatic rather than purely literary text). It also 
draws, less overtly, from Dostoevsky, from both Crime and Punishment10 and The Idiot11, as 
well as from Eliot’s Silas Marner12. 
I discuss Sebald, Murakami, Gondry, and Van Sant in turn across four chaptes, and 
I delineate the discussion into sections entitled Textual subjectivities and Liminal motifs13. Each 
chapter approaches the discussion of textual subjectivities in differing and interconnecting 
ways, according to the modalities of subjectivity presented in the work of that writer or 
filmmaker. All of the texts discussed engage in complex negotiations with the liminal, 
instituting dynamics of haecceity and otherness, exploring the fissures of truth and fiction, 
and deploying character dynamics which seek to challenge notions of stable, whole, or 
discrete subjectivity. Crucially, I aim to explore the construction of narrators and 
protagonists and the production of textual subjectivity, and as such these sections focus on 
the surface of the text and how the liminal manifests in the spaces between the constituent 
voices of polyphonies, between cinematic and literary tropes and modes, between word 
and image, between languages, genres, and states of consciousness. 
                                                 
10 Dostoevsky 1991.  
11 Dostoevsky 2004.  
12 Eliot 1996.  
13In addition to the of delineation of textual subjectivities and liminal motifs, the chapters on Murakami and Van 
Sant open with particular discussions of themes which come to condition the texts discussed. Murakami’s 
novels are notable for the author’s construction of the “other side”, a particular plane of space or 
consciousness which institutes a clear dynamic of haecceity and otherness, and postulates a liminal space in 
between. The protagonist of Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho suffers from narcolepsy, a condition which 
causes the sufferer to fall asleep without warning and which causes hallucinations in wakefulness. Thus the 
confusion of hallucination and reality comes to dominate the text, and, like Murakami’s other side, to 
construct a particular liminal space between consciousnesses.  
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The discussion of liminal motifs aims to consider how the liminality present at the 
surface of the text is reflected within it. I identify intensities, embodiments, and 
aggregations of liminality within the narrative, and search out reverberations of these 
motifs across otherwise highly contrasting texts. These motifs include the hypnagogic, the 
vespertine, the carnivalesque, the uncanny, metamorphosis, notions of adolescent 
liminality, of languages, of nomadism, and of extraterritorial space. Here I draw special 
attention to the hypnagogic, a key trope of the texts discussed; the theme of sleep is 
prevalent across all four chapters, and the dynamic of sleep and wakefulness is central to 
my question of liminal subjectivities.  
 
The liminal subject 
The notion of the supposedly stable subject in peril is vital to these texts; indeed, the 
instability of subjectivity is what first draws my attention. My understanding of the subject 
sees an inherent tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces – the struggle to achieve 
and maintain a centred if illusory wholeness set against agencies which expose this illusion 
and destabilise wholeness – and I perceive the liminal to be a key trope of destabilised 
subjectivity. The liminal occurs at the interface of systems of meaning – temporal, spatial, 
or theoretical. As the subject enters the threshold space, it is placed in a crosswind of 
tensions, frictions, and collisions. Centrifugal forces are exacerbated as a liminal agency 
brings about interruptions, destabilisations, and displacements of subjectivity.  
I employ the term “liminal subjectivities” for its dual meaning, of the condition of 
subjectivity as it negotiates the liminal and becomes other, and of the liminal space between 
distinct subjectivities and the liminality inherent in the ambiguities of subject and object. 
The texts here employ a narrator or protagonist to approximate an apparently singular 
voice14, and through a succession of liminal engagements this singularity is encroached 
upon by otherness – it is never permitted stasis, nor is it ever stable or whole. In this sense, 
the construct of a literary or filmic voice simulates subjectivity. The theoretical ideal of the 
subject is the absolute embodiment of haecceity – a discrete entity, stable and whole; such a 
subject is not only unaffected by otherness, it is oblivious to otherness. Similarly, an ideal 
of textual subjectivity would be a discrete and singular narrative voice or filmic protagonist 
                                                 
14 The Murakami novels provide an exception to this rule, though each engages with the construction of 
voice in reflexive and idiosyncratic ways which complements the discussion in other chapters.  
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which presents an illusion of wholeness15. As with the construct of individual, the illusion 
of a stable textual subjectivity is undermined by an imbalance in the tension of centrifugal 
and centripetal forces which maintain the subject’s apparently stable position. Such an 
imbalance in these texts may be accorded to an engagement with otherness, an engagement 
which necessitates entry into the liminal.  
 The space between subjectivities may become destabilised through the institution 
of a polyphony, as the subjectivity of a haecceitic narrative voice is destabilised through a 
negotiation with the otherness of a polyphony of voices. In the literary texts, this may be 
through a multiplicity of voices that the narrator engages with, or an array of interrelating 
storytelling modes. In the filmic texts, this may be through the use of multiple filmic modes 
to construct a diegesis. In each instance, the originating narrative voice either strives to 
maintain its haecceity through a mastery of these other voices, a process of assimilation and 
subjugation, or opens itself up to deconstruction and enters into an open dialogue with 
these other voices, allowing or even welcoming the threat to its haecceitic authority. In 
some cases this occurs to such a degree that the notion of any such “originating” voice is 
undermined and replaced by the suggestion of a continuum of ever-shifting haecceity – a 
perpetual becoming.  
The other notion of liminal subjectivities, that is, of subjectivity entering into or 
engaging with a liminal site, sees a recurrent insistence upon deconstructions, 
destabilisations, deterritorialisations, which may or may not resolve with subsequent 
reconstruction, restabilisation, reterritorialisation. This poses the question: what becomes 
of the deterritorialised subject? What happens when the subject abandons or is abandoned 
by stability, when it does not pass through and exit the liminal phase but remains in a state 
of instability, uninscribed by a new discourse or system of meaning? How may we theorise 
the perpetual chrysalis, perpetual adolescence, or the never-ending bridge? Such notions 
would appear to present a contradiction in terms – a bridge is not a bridge unless it links 
two locations; yet these images posit the idea of leaving behind a certain state of stability 
with no definite other state as goal. Equally, even when the equation contains two 
contrasting states between which we would expect straightforward transitions – sleep and 
wakefulness for instance – the possibility for uncertainty exists. The perpetually 
                                                 
15 It may also be said that the apparent haecceity of textual subjectivity is disrupted by the role of voice in the 
interface of reader and text. In this engagement the voice is a kind of liminal space in itself – it is the 
threshold of the text and the reader, being both of the text when the reader comes to it, and of the reading 
experience. From the reading perspective, the dynamic of haecceity/otherness here is self-evident; the reader 
represents a haecceity and the text an otherness, with voice the mediating liminal factor. 
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hypnagogic, as manifest in the condition of narcolepsy, resists the definitive and resonates 
with the nomadic. This posits a further question: without the cloak of stability and 
wholeness, can the subject still be considered “the subject”? If meaning may not exist 
beyond the articulation of language, how may the individual exist beyond the articulation of 
subjectivity? 
This paradox is at the core of the lacuna or open question which I observe in these 
texts. With “lacuna” I mean to suggest not merely an absence, but a perpetual space of 
undecidability, a space of suspension rich with potentiality, which cannot be “known” in 
the way that the states it bridges can be known; it is an impossible space – it is the cannot-
be-known, the anti-definitive. This refusal of the definitive is a distinctive characteristic of 
the texts discussed and has clear ramifications with Eco’s theory of the “open text”16 and 
Barthes’ Death of the Author17. However, these texts are distinctive in that, rather than 
allowing for the myriad interpretations of the reader, there is a tendency to actively direct 
the reader toward a particular reading of openness, of no resolution18. This is true to 
varying degrees of the texts discussed here; some direct the reader very precisely, and flirt 
with tropes of narrative obfuscation, while some are intent on radically disorientating the 
reader or viewer.  
Correspondingly, I employ the term “open question” to imply an absence of 
definitive answers, and to again invoke the notion of undecidability. The open question 
may be in the context of the narrative, for example, in an open narrative which resists 
resolution; it may be in the context of a playful ambivalence of facticity and fictionality; it 
may be in the enigma of the uncanny, the telepathic, or the intersubjective; it may be in the 
wide open postulation of an unknowable otherness. This theme of otherness predominates; 
it is a bright thread running through all of these texts, negotiated in different and often 
highly contrasting ways, and it remains elusive and ever-shifting. In each instance, 
otherness presents a supplement which destabilises haecceitic primacy. The texts 
acknowledge this problematic; each text asserts and insists upon an otherness, which seems 
to imply a provocative gesture towards its potentiality – the acknowledgement that what 
lies beyond, and in between, never fails to destabilise that which is present.  
                                                 
16 Eco 1979. 
17 Barthes 1977: 142-48. 
18 In this sense, we may in fact be dealing with closed texts, or perhaps a third category of text which resists 
designation as either closed or open – inside out texts, perhaps? 
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The particular way in which these texts present their “open question” is why I have 
chosen each for discussion. As I have suggested, my field of chosen texts has narrowed, 
corresponding to a reciprocity with my critical approach. I have come to view these texts as 
being at a vanguard in the representation of subjectivities, and I hope to go some way to 
explaining why this is so. It is of note that although each of these writers and filmmakers 
has an international reputation, perhaps only Murakami has wholly penetrated the 
mainstream (and only very gradually), yet each has long been a leader in his chosen form, 
and exerted a notable influence upon the mainstream19.  
The mainstream flirts with this particular facet of these texts – the open question, 
the lacuna – yet resists assimilating it wholesale. It would seem that something of these 
texts “sticks in the throat”, precluding straightforward consumption or digestion. These 
texts react against a readership or spectatorship which demands certainty and resolution 
and instead present the reader or viewer with something uncertain, something unknown, a 
liminal space that the text is unable or unwilling to define, be it in the relationship between 
sleep and wakefulness, facticity and fictionality, or reality and hallucination. The form – 
narrative film and literature – for the most part remains familiar and accessible, yet it holds 
something partially inaccessible, something irrevocably other. This suggests the unheimliche20, 
and resonates clearly with Nicholas Royle’s account of Freud’s concept as, “a feeling of 
something not simply weird or mysterious but, more specifically, as something strangely 
familiar.”21 This uncanniness disconcerts; the instability at the threshold of home and not-
home (haecceity and otherness) threatens the stability and safety of home itself. The 
persistent refusal of the definitive disallows the dispersal of this uncanniness; it remains 
uncanny and cannot be assimilated. It is always partially other. This paradox is a key facet 
of the treatment of otherness in these texts. Though it is impossible for haecceity and 
otherness to coincide, the boundary between appears to be ever-shifting and porous – it 
would seem that otherness is not always discrete.  
 
 
                                                 
19 I would argue that this is so, but my argument may be disputed. Sebald’s critical reputation is certainly 
superlative, and as the project of this thesis draws to a close, Gondry has moved towards Hollywood action 
hero films with The Green Hornet (Gondry 2011), and Van Sant’s reputation continues to grow following the 
success of Milk (Van Sant 2008). 
20 Freud 2003: 121-162. 
21 Royle 2003: vii 
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Critical orientation  
As I have suggested, my critical approach to these texts and to my questions of liminal 
subjectivity has been serendipitously uncertain. Early in my research I identified my 
approach as poststructuralist. This emerged from prior deconstructive work on other 
liminalities, in particular liminal sexual identities, a subject area well-suited to 
deconstructive readings led by Derrida, Judith Butler, and queer theory. As I began my 
research here I was confident in my critical allies of Deleuze and Guattari22, and Bakhtin23, 
and sought also to draw on theories of translation, the hypnagogic, and on the 
anthropological models of Victor Turner24 and Marc Augé25. As my research progressed, 
some of these models became less applicable than others; in particular Deleuze and 
Guattari, and Bakhtin, played less of a role than I first imagined. Moreover, the 
introduction of Sebald to my selection of texts cast a new light on my critical approach and, 
as I have suggested, in shifting my focus toward an examination of textual subjectivity, I 
found new tensions in my approach, between the epistemological and the ontological – 
modernist and postmodernist modes of questioning26. Translation and hypnagogia remain 
strong and consistent model throughout, and I will seek to summarise each here, before 
discussing the influence of Sebald, and hopefully offering some further insight into how my 
uncertain critical orientation developed, and to the questions posed by this approach.  
                                                 
22 Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of deterritorialisation, becoming-other, and the nomad, offer an 
accommodating model of liminality (Deleuze and Guattari 1983; Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986); while other models present as a singular site which is passed through, theirs offers a perpetual 
continuum of intensities. Deterritorialisation emancipates the subject from a particular discourse through an 
engagement with an other discourse; relative deterritorialisations resolve in reterritorialisation, while absolute 
deterritorialisations construct a plane of “consistency” or “immanence” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 41), a 
nomadic subjectivity. Such subjectivity can be theorised as either immobility or as absolute fluidity.  
23 Bakhtin’s theories of polyphony and carnival (Bakhtin 1984a; Bakhtin 1984b) offer a model to articulate 
the liminality inherent between the voices that constitute a textual subjectivity, literary or cinematic. Such a 
model suggests that a range of modes may be deployed to construct a polyphony of contrasting and 
democratic voices, or may be deployed to speak as one. The polyphonic might be said to be a liminal space in 
itself; it insists upon otherness, upon creating a channel between haecceity and the other. The carnivalesque 
proposes that polyphony may engender a democratic space, and asks what the boundaries and conditions of 
this space may be.  
24 Turner develops Arnold van Gennep’s research on the liminal phase of rites of passage (van Gennep 
[1909] 1960; Turner 1969), referring to the liminal subject, “being reduced or ground down to a uniform 
condition to be fashioned anew,” and to being, “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between” 
(Turner 1969: 95). 
25 With his theory of the non-place Augé proposes non-anthropological space (Augé 1995: 78), a space not 
inscribed by history or identity, passed through rather than inhabited. It carries the implicit suggestion of 
“non-people” and may be reclaimed as an ulterior anthropological space – a space of movement which is not 
necessarily passed through, but which becomes an ongoing plane. The paradox inherent here would seem to 
restate the question of how the individual may exist when subjectivity is perpetually dispersed. 
26 In Postmodernist Fiction (McHale 1987), McHale charts the emergence of postmodernism, delineating 
modernist and postmodernist poetics as, respectively, epistemological and ontological. 
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It is appropriate to address the issue of translation in its own right, given that the 
first two chapters focus on English language texts translated from, respectively, German 
and Japanese. The transition of meaning and voice from one language to another creates a 
problematic liminal space; Susan Bassnett describes translation as “a process of decoding 
and recoding,”27 which would seem to suggest the existence of a mid-point at which 
meaning has been decoded but is yet to be recoded. This idea opens up a seemingly 
paradoxical liminal space, a site at which meaning has not ceased to exist but lies beyond 
the matter of language. The translation model differs from other models of liminality in 
that poststructuralist theories suggest that meaning cannot exist beyond language, hence a 
space which is both post-decodification and pre-recodification may never truly exist. 
Meaning which cannot be articulated by language becomes hermitic and ceases to be 
meaning, which resonates with the problematic of how the perpetually destabilised subject 
exists beyond the articulation of subjectivity.  
 There exists a notion of “adequate” translation28, that is, a translation which 
conveys meaning from one language to another with a minimal loss of meaning and 
minimal interference by external factors. Such factors are omnipresent; languages are never 
truly parallel and the liminal space of translation necessitates loss and reinvention; meaning 
emerges from translation reconfigured, both linguistically and culturally. Bassnett 
distinguishes between these two factors of untranslatability – the linguistic, when there is 
no lexical or syntactical substitute, and the cultural29.  
In his essay on translation30, Walter Benjamin suggests that “the notion that a 
translation does not exist to give readers an understanding of the ‘meaning’ or information 
content of the original.31” He continues:  
 
translation exists separately but in conjunction with the original, coming after it, emerging 
from its ‘afterlife’ but also giving the original continued life.32  
 
                                                 
27 Bassnett 1991: 16. 
28 Munday 2008: 114. 
29 Bassnett 1991: 32. Linguistic untranslatability is addressed by imposing (in this instance) an English 
sentence structure onto a foreign language – simply restructuring the word order of the sentence as 
appropriate to the syntax of the given language. Cultural untranslatability has more far-reaching ramifications. 
Bassnett cites the untranslatability of personal experience as one such problematic and attributes its 
untranslatability to its “uniqueness,” (Bassnett 1991: 36). 
30 Initially published as an introduction to his translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens (1923). 
31 Benjamin 1968: 77; Munday 2008: 169. 
32 Benjamin 1968: 77; Munday 2008: 169. 
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This idea gives credence to the notion that the subjectivity manifest in the English 
translations of Sebald and Murakami is other to that in the original German and Japanese. 
The translated text is a polyphonic text; it is a reconstruction of the original text’s voice and 
meaning, and contains the original author’s intent, though it is the construction of an 
interloper, an agency rebuilding voice and meaning in an absolutely other system of 
meaning. It could be argued that the translator has a very central stake in the subjectivity of 
the translated text.  
Benjamin’s idea that translation “exists separately” from the original would seem to 
suggest that the translated text is fundamentally other to the source, in that there is a 
rupture in the continuity of meaning between the source and the translation. In this sense, 
we might consider the text of German and Japanese originals, and of the English 
translations as distinct entities; the former is unequivocally the “original” though the 
existence of the supplementary translation unsettles the notion that it is stable and whole. 
Both Sebald and Murakami have been translated into many languages; it follows that there 
are manifold supplementary texts, all bearing a meaning which corresponds to the singular 
original, all having passed through a process of decoding and recoding. This co-existence 
of original and translated texts is a key condition to the translation model of liminality. 
This presents a hybridity, a notion which is pursued in systems theories of 
translation such as those developed by Itamar Even-Zohar, which see, “translated literature 
as a system operating in the larger, social and historical systems”33. Even-Zohar’s theory 
places less emphasis on the text in its original language – in the author’s intent in that 
language – and instead considers the metamorphosis of the text and its subsequent hybrid 
status34. Gideon Toury develops these theories to consider the stability of the source of 
meaning, suggesting that the process of translation destabilises the notion of an original 
message with a fixed identity35. This would seem to in turn suggest that any text which has 
been translated or is even yet to be translated lacks a singular identity; the process of 
reconstructing a text in another language multiplies the potentiality of its meaning. The 
existence of other versions of a text renders impossible the notion of a singular meaning or 
identity. As such, translation becomes a deconstructive process; although the “original” 
text retains a temporal primacy, there is no primacy beyond this. Every translation becomes 
                                                 
33 Munday 2008: 107-8. Munday comments that, “translated literature had up to that point [the 1970s] been 
mostly dismissed as a derivative, second-rate form,” (Munday 2008: 108), and polysystem theory was 
instrumental in positing translated literature as a valid literary genre 
34 Even-Zohar 1979: 237-310. 
35 Toury 1980; cited in Gentzler 2001: 133; Munday 2008: 115. 
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equal and no singular identity remains, and while the “original” text and the translated text 
exist separately, they can also be seen as a single entity, a meta-text, which becomes “the 
integration of both the original text and the translated text in the semiotic web of 
intersecting cultural systems.”36 
With regard to the thesis, such theories have ramifications beyond the translation 
of Sebald and Murakami’s novels into English, and towards other modes of language 
present in these texts, such as moments in which characters negotiate with foreign 
languages, and also the collision of other systems of meaning which might be considered 
language – filmic language for example, or other complex systems of language, such as 
those which consist of both word and image, as exemplified by the Sebald texts.  
Hypnagogia, the site between sleep and wakefulness, provides a model of liminality 
which has wide-ranging applications across all of the texts discussed. The term was coined 
in 1848 by Alfred Maury37, and Andreas Mavromatis’ Hypnagogia38 is regarded as the 
definitive text on the matter, simply because it is the only book-length text. Very little 
research has been dedicated to hypnagogia, and what has is often regarded circumspectly39. 
Mavromatis describes hypnagogia as: 
 
hallucinatory or quasi-hallucinatory events taking place at the intermediate state between 
wakefulness and sleep… Similar phenomena occurring at the other end of sleep are called 
‘hypnopompic’, that is, coming or leading out of sleep.40 
 
However, he does not make a strong distinction between the phenomena, citing Havelock 
Ellis, who protested that such a differentiation is “pedantic” and “unnecessary” 41. 
Mavromatis himself sees no “strong phenomenological [or] physiological criteria for their 
distinction,”42 and uses the term “hypnagogia” to refer to both states.  
Mavromatis’ (and other practitioners’) study of hypnagogia focuses largely on the 
hallucinatory content of these stages of consciousness, whereas the thesis is more 
concerned with the liminal dynamic of the shift in consciousness. The existence of these 
states suggests an intermediary vantage point from which a deconstruction of the 
                                                 
36 Gentzler 2001: 133; Munday 2008: 115. 
37 Maury 1848: 26-40. 
38 Mavromatis 1987. 
39 Jeff Warren describes Mavromatis’ text as, “a frothy combination of rigorous scientific research, trippy 
illustrations, and high-end speculation.” (Warren 2008: 28-9). 
40 Mavromatis 1987: 3. 
41 Mavromatis 1987: 3; Ellis 1897: 283-7. 
42 Mavromatis 1987: 3. 
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“absolute” states of wakefulness and sleep may begin. In this binary, wakefulness is 
ascribed a primacy and the deconstructive approach of the thesis seeks to unsettle this.  
The process of hypnagogia ramifies with the process of translation. With reference 
to Bassnett, hypnagogia may be considered a site of untranslatability. At the threshold of 
consciousness subjectivity enters a process of translation, from a system of wakefulness 
regulated by the ego, to a system of sleep and dream. As with the linguistic model, these 
states are not truly parallel and corruptions occur, manifesting in the hypnagogic 
phenomena of hallucination.  
I am particularly interested in Mavromatis’ suggestion that ego boundaries become 
loosened in these transitions of consciousness43. Laplanche and Pontalis describe the ego as 
“the defensive pole of the personality [which] brings a set of defensive mechanisms into 
play,” and “the ‘binding’ factor in the psychical processes.”44 In wakefulness the ego 
defends the subject from external factors of otherness which might unsettle the illusion of 
unity it seeks to uphold. These factors might include the alternative systems of meaning 
which operate within sleep, or the unconscious, or fantasy. If the ego embraces these 
factors, as happens at the threshold of consciousness, their influence might effect a 
dissolution of this unity, leading to a radically mutable subjectivity, which allows access to 
more than one system of meaning and places the subject in the liminal space – the interface 
of these systems.  
While such a relinquishing implies an emancipation of a kind, being within this 
state of liminality would not be the equivalent of being able to speak two languages (we are 
all bilingual in this sense – we are “fluent” in the states of both sleep and wakefulness, 
though separately) but rather of being in the predicament of attempting to speak, or listen 
to, two languages concurrently. Such liminal states can become prolonged in conditions 
such as narcolepsy and sleep paralysis. Sufferers of narcolepsy, as I will discuss in relation 
to My Own Private Idaho, negotiate with this otherness almost perpetually, being at the 
threshold of sleep and wakefulness much more often than non-sufferers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Mavromatis 1987: 12. 
44 Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 130. 
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The influence of Sebald  
I applied my initial critical approach – Deleuze and Guattari, Bakhtin, Turner, Augé, 
translation theory, and hypnagogia – to the Murakami, Gondry, and Van Sant texts, as well 
as novels and films by Ali Smith45, Richard Linklater46, Douglas Coupland47, Jonathan 
Coe48, Banana Yoshimoto49, Richard Kelly50, and a play by Kevin Elyot51. The result was 
not without merit but seemed, to my mind, insubstantial – neither cohesive nor 
compellingly scattershot – and while the conclusions I draw from the research presented 
here are certainly open-ended, I found in my first approach of these texts very little that 
satisfied my initial research questions. Firstly, these texts were too numerous and perhaps 
disparate in way that could not be reconciled. More pertinently, I had not found a way of 
interrogating these texts which yielded a discussion that I found substantial or worthwhile, 
or which opened up the texts in a new critical light. My decision to tackle Sebald was one 
of instinct. I did not believe it would necessarily bear fruit, and I did not, at first, expect to 
include a reading of his work as a chapter of the thesis. Initially I expected to use him as a 
“pointer”, as it were, a kind of lens to bring the debate into focus, perhaps giving over a 
section of my introduction to show how he draws texts together to create something of 
substance – how he finds the connections and patterns that I thought my own work was 
missing.  
 In re-reading The Rings of Saturn I found many of my preoccupations reflected back 
at me. I recognised liminal motifs in the narrator’s accounts of the Suffolk shoreline, tidal 
surges, and hypnagogic reveries. Moreover, I discovered a new appreciation of his narrative 
technique. I read on, into Vertigo, The Emigrants52, and Austerlitz53, and I began to consider 
the texts I had already covered in light of (as I identified it) a form of liminality I had not 
yet addressed – a production of textual subjectivity through the particular construction of 
the narrative voice. In Vertigo and The Rings of Saturn the narrator is embedded in the 
identity of the author, somewhat questionably, and also, as the text progresses, becomes a 
conduit of multifarious other voices. This creates a play of oscillating haecceity and 
                                                 
45 The Accidental (Smith 2005). 
46 Waking Life (Linklater 2001). 
47 Girlfriend in a Coma (Coupland 1998). 
48 The House of Sleep (Coe 1997). 
49 Asleep (Yoshimoto 2000 [1989]). 
50 Donnie Darko (Kelly 2001). 
51 Forty Winks (Elyot 2004).  
52 Sebald 1996 [1992]. 
53 Sebald 2001 [2001]. 
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otherness, which produces a thoroughly unstable subjectivity, both of the narrator as 
character, and of the text itself.  
 I was also struck by the tone of both Vertigo and The Rings of Saturn (and for that 
matter The Emigrants and Austerlitz). The narrators of each text are never content or happy, 
their expeditions never satiated. Inherent to each is a particular anxiety, a seeking to make 
sense, to find order amidst chaos, alongside the tacit acknowledgement that such a task is 
impossible. This frustrated desire resonates strongly with liminality; it suggests a being 
bound within the liminal, never able to complete the task, trapped in perpetual motion on 
the never-ending bridge. There is also light in this approach in the form of hope, of a kind, 
in recognising the patterns that emerge from this chaos; that is, that amidst the chaos there 
is at least the possibility of connection, perhaps with people, and very certainly with 
literature and history. These novels carry the suggestion that if we cannot have faith in 
humanity (I believe Sebald would argue that sometimes we can, often we cannot), we can at 
least have faith in literature.  
 This observation ramified with certain aspects of the texts, especially My Own Private 
Idaho with its protagonist’s fruitless search for his origins, but moreover it struck a chord 
with my approach to the texts. Thus far my findings, if I could call them that, were chaotic. 
Latterly I realised that perhaps, to use McHale’s economy of poetics, my mode of 
questioning had been too ontological in its reliance on postmodernist critical strategies. 
Sebald’s approach appeared to offer a return to modernism. This is not to say that his 
novels are purely modernist but there is a sense that he is wary of postmodernist surfaces, 
that his mode of questioning is epistemological above ontological. His work is claimed by 
both modernists and postmodernists alike, and there is an undeniably postmodernist 
influence to his style. His intertextuality is almost always unreferenced and eludes certain 
epistemological aspects; as I have stated, his narrator is a conduit of other voices and does 
not draw the boundaries that formal citation would incur. There is an argument to be made 
that these voices thus lose an element of original authorial meaning, becoming more a 
glancing surface, or one of a fast-moving series of surfaces.  
In his account of the emergence of postmodernist literature, McHale cites Roman 
Jakobson’s account of the dominant54: 
 
within the set of poetic norms valid for a given poetic genre, elements which were 
originally secondary become essential and primary. On the other hand, the elements which 
were originally the dominant ones become subsidiary and optional.55 
                                                 
54 Jakobson 1971: 105-110; cited in McHale 1987: 6-8. 
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McHale applies Jakobson’s thesis to the shift from, as he sees it, an epistemological poetics 
in modernist texts to an ontological poetics in postmodernist texts, and suggests 
interrogating texts “with a view to eliciting the shifts in the hierarchy of devices.”56 
Therefore we may see a co-existing epistemological poetics and ontological poetics within a 
single text, but there will be a hierarchy to these, and a greater urgency to the dominant 
poetics. There is of course the possibility of no dominant, of an irresolvable tension 
between the epistemological and ontological, recalling McHale’s suggestion of each set of 
poetics “tipping over” into the other57, perhaps even a series of such tumbles, or a 
perpetual to and fro. Ultimately there is such an irresolvable tension in Sebald, and 
similarly, my uncertain critical orientation owes much to this notion – a never-ending series 
of tumbles back and forth. I am concerned with the ontological issues addressed in these 
texts, and I do wish to ask those questions, to engage with those aspects of these texts that 
bear a postmodernist poetics. But, like the Sebaldian narrator, I wish to find order amidst 
the chaos. I concede the impossibility of this, but the desire remains nonetheless.  
My reading of Sebald became the first chapter of the thesis, and subsequently I 
began to discard texts from the project. I came to settle on Murakami, Gondry and Van 
Sant not merely for the ways in which each mirrored Sebald, but for the multifarious ways 
each engaged with his concept of narrative. In particular I began to question the 
production of textual subjectivity across the other texts, considering how narrators and 
protagonists were positioned at the surface of the text as an interface with the reader or 
viewer, yet were also radically destabilised. The resulting textual subjectivities are diverse, 
presenting a range of modalities, both universal and particular to each form, though from 
each I was able to trace a link back to Sebald. Patterns emerged across all four sets of texts, 
both synergistic and antagonistic, and astoundingly vivid. Often these patterns were, as 
occurs in Sebald’s texts, frighteningly synonymous.  
To foreshadow a striking example, I saw the Sebaldian narrator reflected in the 
protagonist of My Own Private Idaho, a character far from the narrator of Vertigo, yet 
nomadic and anxious in much the same way, his narrative a picaresque fever dream, a quest 
for the unfindable. These quests coincide as each finds himself in Italy, Milan Cathedral 
and Rome’s Piazza del Popolo respectively, waking into a reality and attempting to navigate 
through a new alien language. Although one character is a middle-aged and (though he 
                                                                                                                                               
55 Jakobson 1971: 108; McHale 1987: 7-8.  
56 McHale 1987: 8.  
57 McHale 1987: 11.  
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might suggest otherwise) respectable European, and the other a homeless, American youth, 
the similarity of these scenes, one literary, one filmic, is uncanny.  
In closing, I state that these texts are rich with connections and patterns and I am 
to exploit this in the hope of drawing meaning and substance to my discussion. I emphasise 
again that my approach is not so much a fair and even balance of contrasting poetics, more 
an uneasy co-habitation, oscillating and vacillating, sometimes an alliance, sometimes 
antagonistic. The presence of a dominant poetics varies across the texts, though it is 
perhaps the uncertainty of such a presence which makes these texts so responsive to such 
an approach, and which makes such an approach not only necessary but, I hope, 
invigorating.  
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One 
 
W. G. Sebald 
The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo 
 
The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo are, ostensibly, novels. Each draws together threads of 
fiction, memoir and travelogue, and takes a very playful and reflexive approach to the 
tropes of each genre, resulting in a kind of hybrid – a text which is simultaneously an 
assemblage of pre-existing genres, and an entirely new genre in itself. These novels employ 
images as part of the text which, with reference to Barthes’ “reality effect”58, present what 
is at once a definitive record, and something that can be misappropriated or misconstrued. 
If there is a central idea to be drawn from the Sebaldian project, it is how the attributes at 
play in the space between truth and fiction conditions this notion of believability. These 
novels negotiate this space through the construction of a narrative voice which pertains, 
implicitly, to be the voice of the author. Furthermore, this voice posits an embodiment of 
itself as a character within the text, a kind of avatar, alienated twofold by the construct of 
the narrator, and narrator’s use of the past tense to differentiate the narrative voice and that 
which it recalls. This ambiguous distance between author and narrator is teased via a series 
of collisions, notably the inclusion in Vertigo of facsimiles of Sebald’s identification papers, 
and biographical detail which in turn confirms and disputes such speculation.  
These novels are also of note in that each is a travelogue, and depicts the narrator 
in configuration with particular landscapes – the Suffolk coast in The Rings of Saturn, and 
Austria, northern Italy, and southern Germany in Vertigo. The narrator’s account of the 
landscape triggers recollections and reveries, of events and figures connected to that 
landscape (a sea battle off the coast of Suffolk; Casanova in Venice), and sometimes 
completely unconnected to the landscape, and sometimes partly or perhaps entirely 
fictional, such as, in The Rings of Saturn, the narrator’s account of staying with a family in 
Ireland59. Through these recollections and reveries, the narrator encounters an otherness, 
                                                 
58 See “The Reality Effect” in The Rustle of Language, (Barthes 1989: 141-148). 
59 TROS: 209-222. 
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exemplified in the voices with which he interacts, the historical detail he presents, and the 
images placed alongside the narrative account. All of these things lie outside of and beyond 
the subjectivity of the narrator as we, the reader, come to understand it, yet each lies within 
the text, and the liminal space between the narrator and otherness comes to unsettle the 
textual subjectivity. Noam Ellcott comments that, “Sebald does not tell stories so much as 
retell, augment, comment, and, most of all, collect them,”60 and this notion of collection is 
key. The narrator insinuates himself into these stories, collapsing the space between himself 
and the other to draw stories (and images, and objects) toward him.  
Alongside these destabilisations, each novel presents an aggregated theme of liminal 
images and motifs. In The Rings of Saturn the image of the shoreline is almost always 
present; the narrator’s journey takes him along the coast, and only occasionally does he 
stray inland. The image of metamorphosis is key also, with repeated references to Kafka 
and Gregor Samsa, and an extended meditation on the cultivation of silk worms and their 
chrysalis state. The title of Vertigo reflects its narrator’s recurrent condition – a fear of 
falling, of tipping into something unknown, a dizziness and disorientation which emerges 
from encounters with or fear of the other. These themes, in conjunction with the radically 
unstable condition of the text, present rich ground for discussion of liminal subjectivities.  
 
The texts 
Both The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo are travelogues, fictional or otherwise. Each narrative 
gives an account of the narrator, his interactions with the environment he passes through, 
his thoughts, and his state of mind. Alongside this, the text offers a document of the 
journey or journeys in the form of images – photographs, facsimiles, newspaper clippings, 
and so on.  
The Rings of Saturn documents the narrator’s walking tour of the Suffolk coast in 
August 1992, beginning with an account of his immobility and hospitalisation a year later, 
which he believes was brought on by the journey and, “the paralysing horror that had come 
over me at various times when confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching far back 
into the past, that were evident even in that remote place.”61 Over the course of the 
narrative the narrator recounts his journey, and diverts into subject matter, historical and 
                                                 
60 Elcott 2004: 203. 
61 TROS: 3. 
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personal, as he sees fit, often precipitated by the landscape or by a specific event. Most of 
this subject matter refers to death, destruction, and the decline of civilisation. The narrator 
holds much of humanity in contempt, including often himself, and at times his despair 
becomes palpable and overwhelms both him and the narrative.  
Recalling a sandstorm, the narrator notes how the wind blows “dust across the arid 
land in sinister spirals,” bestowing a malign agency upon the elements, and describes the 
storm’s encroaching darkness as “like a noose being tightened.”62 “Even in my immediate 
vicinity,” he writes, “I could soon not distinguish any line or shape at all.” This episode is 
one of only a few which see the narrator engaging with his present moment and nothing 
else and, as with other such moments, it gives form to a sense of despair and 
disorientation. It offers an acute metaphor for the textual affect – of being overwhelmed, 
choked even. “I walked the rest of the way in a daze,” the narrator says63 and the reader too 
is left with a sense of being dazed, and a fear of other sudden imminent destructions.  
Vertigo consists of four stories or chapters, two of which offer accounts of episodes 
in the lives of, respectively, Stendhal and Kafka, and two of which feature a typically 
Sebaldian narrator, who may or may not represent a consistent narrative subjectivity across 
all four stories. The first and third stories (Beyle, or Love is a Madness Most Discreet; Dr K. 
Takes the Waters at Riva) feature no narrating “I” (the former features a “we”) but the 
poetics of the text are interchangeable with the second and fourth stories (the effect of 
Michael Hulse’s translation should be noted here64). There is a definite correlation between 
the narrator of the second story (All’estero) and fourth story (Il ritorno in patria); the second 
concludes with the narrator in Verona in the summer of 1987; the fourth begins, “In 
November 1987, after spending the last weeks of the summer in Verona.”65 All’estero gives 
an account of the narrator’s 1980 trip to Vienna, Venice, and Verona, and a 1987 repeat 
trip which also takes in Milan and Riva, while Il ritorno in patria is an account of the 
narrator’s visit to his home town, referred to as “W.” 
There is not so much an accumulation of horror in Vertigo as in The Rings of Saturn, 
rather a recurrence of anxiety and paranoia – the vertigo of the English title. In All’estero 
the narrator often becomes confused and disorientated, paranoid that he is to be the victim 
of serial killers, or thought a paedophile, and more than once believes he sees historical 
                                                 
62 TROS: 229. 
63 TROS: 229. 
64 I will discuss further the ramifications of Hulse’s translation process below. 
65 V: 171. 
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figures in the present day (in Vienna he gives chase to Dante; Elizabeth of Bohemia joins 
his train at Heidelberg66). In Venice, considering the imprisonment of Casanova, he feels as 
trapped as his subject; in Milan he suffers a panic attack while visiting the cathedral which 
leaves him bewildered and unable to remember where he is, or even if he is still alive. He 
struggles with bouts of insomnia, and in one instance in Verona, suffers an experience akin 
to narcoleptic hallucination. In addition to this, issues of identity are further teased and 
confused; he checks into hotels under assumed names, and at one point he loses his 
identity as a hotel clerk mistakenly gives his passport to another departing guest. 
Both novels are journeys, continuous or fragmented, and the journey-as-narrative 
form presents a familiar literary trope. The cinematic equivalent, the road movie, is well 
defined, but the literary travelogue lacks such distinct generic boundaries, despite such 
founding texts as The Odyssey and The Aeneid. It might be considered related to the 
bildungsroman in that the narrative usually affects a shift in the protagonist leading to a 
development of sense of self; the journey sees an ongoing engagement with otherness 
which necessitates change. The Sebaldian narrator exceeds this notion of change and 
counters any kind of development; travel becomes trauma, as over the course of the 
journey the narrator experiences what is perceived as a violent threat to the self, in the 
form of the former novel’s despair and the latter’s disorientation. However, there is never a 
sense that he would feel safer, or more himself, were he at home. In The Rings of Saturn 
home is a site under threat and damaged by a great storm67. In Vertigo, the narrator’s 
current home is not referred to; his visit to his hometown offers no sense of home but 
instead provides an uncanny sense of separation, and a wish to be beyond the notion of 
territory. 
 
Textual subjectivities and liminal motifs 
As specified in the Introduction, each chapter is delineated into sections headed Textual 
subjectivities and Liminal motifs. The former section is approached in differing and 
interconnecting ways according to each set of texts, so as to consider how modalities of 
subjectivity manifest in particular filmic and literary devices, while the latter discusses how 
the inherent liminality in these devices finds form in particular intensities, embodiments 
and aggregations within the narrative.  
                                                 
66 V: 254. 
67 TROS: 265-268. 
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In Sebald, the discussion of textual subjectivities begins with the fact of translation; 
the texts I discuss are Hulse’s English translations of Sebald’s German “originals”. I discuss 
how the process of translation installs a new or additional textual subjectivity; the narrative 
content may be that of the author but the syntax and diction of the English text are 
constructed by Hulse. I discuss how the use of images within the text also impacts upon 
textual subjectivity, primarily in its deployment of a reality effect which collapses and 
problematises the distance between memoir and fiction. The most prominent example of 
the collapsed space is that between the author and narrator, though a comparative 
secondary space also exists between the narrating voice and the character of the narrator. 
Further narrative space is opened up (and collapsed) as other voices enter text; here, no 
clear differentiation is made between the voice of the narrator and the new voice; the 
narrative “I” remains present and the reader infers from context alone that the speaker has 
changed. This seems to imply that the narrative voice is, to a degree, permeable and able to 
negotiate and assimilate other voices. It also presents an illusion of polyphony, though 
ultimately, it would seem, a tonal homogeneity takes hold as the narrator (or author? or 
translator?) asserts a mastery over the text.  
The liminal motifs presented in Sebald are delineated here into categories of the 
hypnagogic/vertiginous, and the nomad/extraterritorial. The former is represented by 
certain engagements with the liminal which manifest in the narrator either physically or in 
terms of consciousness. These include straightforward evocations of hypnagogia, the 
intersection of hypnagogia and language perception, and the notion of a continuum of 
sleep and wakefulness upon which the hypnagogic is merely one position. Vertigo 
manifests through both physical and existential sensations; in each case the sensation posits 
an imaginary threshold, a tipping point, perhaps between balancing and falling, waking and 
sleeping, or life and death. The negotiation of this threshold also ramifies with a sense of 
the subject being able to position itself (or not) in relation to the threshold at a given 
moment; that is, if the narrator is able to perceive and convey where or who he is, or if he 
is not.  
The Deleuzoguattarian concepts of the nomad and the extraterritorial are 
embodied in very literal and physical terms in the Sebald texts. The narrator is a nomadic 
presence, always in motion, though often fails to categorise himself as such, preferring to 
denote those he encounters as nomadic, thus attempting to other the concept (this is ironic 
given that these nomads are most often encountered in stasis by a narrator in motion). As 
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prefaced, the extraterritorial is embodied in the image of the shoreline, omnipresent in The 
Rings of Saturn, and alluded to in discussion of Venice in Vertigo. This image may be viewed 
as an archetype of liminality; it is perpetually shifting, always indefinable – the epitome (if 
such a thing is possible) of liminal space.  
 
Critical work on Sebald 
In the few years since his death in 2001, Sebald’s work has become the focus of much 
critical discussion. Given the narrative content of his other novels, The Emigrants68 and 
Austerlitz69, it is unsurprising that this discussion is often within a discourse around what is 
reductively termed “Holocaust literature”. However, discussion of his work is diverse and 
invigorating. It is often considered within the framework of history and in particular the 
Second World War, including but not limited to the Holocaust. For instance, the final 
section of Vertigo recalls the post-war years in Germany, and this is reflected in critical work 
on the novel.  
In English language criticism, Mark McCulloh’s rich and comprehensive 
monograph Understanding Sebald70 remains the only book-length critical work on Sebald by a 
single author. Alongside this, there are several volumes of essays on Sebald, notably J. J. 
Long and Anne Whitehead’s W. G. Sebald: A Critical Companion71, Scott Denham and Mark 
McCulloh’s W. G. Sebald: History – Memory – Trauma72, and Anne Fuchs and J. J. Long’s W. 
G. Sebald and the Writing of History73. In addition, Sebald’s work is widely discussed in 
periodicals spanning discourses of literature, critical theory, history, psychoanalysis, and 
German Studies (the Summer 2004 issue of The Germanic Review is given over entirely to 
discussion of Sebald’s work74). The critical work I draw on here is from a cross-section of 
these texts; in particular, I owe a debt to the critical work of John Beck, John Domini, 
Noam Elcott, Anne Fuchs, Richard Gray, Christopher Gregory-Guider, Russell Kilbourn, 
Massimo Leone, Mark McCulloh, Ann Pearson, Todd Samuel Presner, Bianca Theisen, and 
John Zilcosky.  
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Textual subjectivities 
This section focuses on the surface of the text to consider a succession of divisions 
between haecceity and otherness, and the liminal space between each – between the 
German and English languages, between word and image, the author and the narrator, and 
in the management of other subjectivities within the text.  
 
Translation 
The first factor to consider is that of translation. The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo are 
translated texts. Sebald’s Die Ringe des Saturn and Schwindel. Gefühle become The Rings of 
Saturn and Vertigo through the intervention of Hulse’s translation. A very definite space 
exists between the German and English texts. The former texts may lay claim to being the 
“original” and the translation presents a supplement which unsettles the primacy of the 
source. The aesthetics of the original are of Sebald’s construction, whereas the aesthetics of 
the translation are of Hulse; whether or not he approximates the style of Sebald’s German 
prose, the style manifest in the English translation is Hulse’s own.  
As I will come to discuss, Sebald has installed in these texts a polyphonic narrative 
subjectivity (or an approximation of) with a collection of voices from history, literature, 
and characters of the author’s invention, albeit a collection rendered with a certain 
homogeneity of register. These voices become one and equal with that of the narrator; 
however, it may be argued that the voice of the translator takes precedence. This voice may 
be seen as a kind of moderating presence, a central stake in this group subjectivity. Hulse is 
an interloper, yet he becomes the nominal centre of this subjectivity. It may be that the 
homogeneity is a construct of Hulse, or it may be that Hulse has purposefully constructed a 
homogeneity he identifies in Sebald’s German text.  
Ultimately, the subjectivity manifest in The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo is other to that 
in Die Ringe des Saturn and Schwindel. Gefühle. Susan Bassnett’s argument that personal 
experience is unique and so, in essence, untranslatable75, lends weight to the argument that 
it is Hulse we hear, through the sheer fact that it is impossible to hear Sebald. Hulse’s 
translation imposes a radical dislocation from the narrator’s subjectivity as manifest in the 
German source, which in turn suggests a new meaning and subjectivity is constructed in 
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the English text. Noam Elcott suggests this is a key facet of Sebald’s appeal to an English 
readership, suggesting he is, “nurtured by the lingual abyss called translation.”76  
Elcott notes how the German originals feature passages of English text (sometimes 
very brief, with abrupt transitions between German and English), which present a harsh 
juxtaposition of languages and serve to heighten the ramifications of differences between 
them. A prominent example is the narrator’s quotation of Michael Hamburger’s account of 
his family’s exile from Germany and their arrival at Dover in November 193377. Amongst 
the German text in Die Ringe des Saturn is the English sentence, “How little there has 
remained in me of my native country,”78 which suggests a fissure of translation much 
deeper and more violent; as Elcott writes, “The violence of exile is inflicted on the 
tongue.”79 Elcott comments that Hulse’s reproduction of these passages is “naive,” in that 
it “steamrolls over the jagged text,” and “flattens” the swings between German and English 
in Sebald’s text. He suggests that, “[t]hese silent harmonies rob the English reader of 
Sebald’s most daring linguistic device.”80  
 
Word and image 
Elcott cites Sebald’s use of images as a crucial component of the textual surface, suggesting 
that Sebald, “lives in the contradictory and overlapping spaces between text and image.”81 
This notion of contradictory and overlapping space is a direct evocation of the liminal, and 
the particular relationship between word and image in these texts contributes to the 
destabilisation of narrative subjectivity, especially in the reader’s approach to the text as 
either fiction or memoir. The inclusion of images is a constant across the German, English 
and all other translations of Sebald’s work. These include reproductions of paintings, 
drawings, facsimiles, etchings, newspaper cuttings, print advertisements, photographs of 
statues, landscapes, buildings, people (though not often – a photograph of the poet Ernst 
                                                 
76 Elcott 2004: 204. Elcott also comments that, “Hulse’s widely lauded translations elegantly transpose the 
poetry of Sebald’s prose,” suggesting that the textual effect evident in Hulse’s translations is in fact present in 
Sebald’s German text (Elcott 2004: 206). 
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Herbeck crops out his face, and each of the two texts contains a single picture of the 
author, one of which, in Vertigo82, is partially obscured).  
The images included as part of the text approximate a document of reality, a record 
of something beyond the text itself, which serves to create a reality effect, as described by 
Barthes83. The content of the images corresponds to the content of the adjacent written 
content, and presents a document, a record of presence, as if to illustrate and purposefully 
convince the reader of particular narrative points. As such, these images are open to being 
both misappropriated by the author and misconstrued by the reader. Citing Barthes, Todd 
Samuel Presner describes how Flaubert and Michelet, “deployed certain narrative strategies 
to achieve a level of “aesthetic verisimilitude” in their descriptions of real events, objects, 
and people.”84 Presner notes how Sebald similarly deploys textual strategies to achieve such 
a verisimilitude, his key strategy being the use of image.  
 
Author/narrator 
The central ambiguity in Sebald’s deployment of the reality effect is the relationship 
between the identities of the author and the narrator. Critics such as Mark McCulloh, J. J. 
Long, and Anne Fuchs85 are notably careful in making a distinction between author and 
narrator; McCulloh states that the narrator of Vertigo is, “ostensibly fictional”86. The reader 
of Vertigo receives contradictory information which at once serves to conflate and separate 
the narrator and author; the inclusion of photographs of the author is the most prominent 
factor of this ambiguity. Page 102 carries a reproduction of the narrator’s identification 
papers – mentioned adjacently in the text – which bear the name “Sebald”, and page 114 
features a reproduction of the narrator’s temporary passport, which bears Sebald’s 
signature and a photograph of the author. The inclusion of these reproductions leads the 
reader to equate the narrator with Sebald the author, who is ostensibly non-fictional. 
Bianca Theisen comments that:  
 
In Vertigo, the autobiographical narrator provides the times and places of his travel in 
northern Italy and recounts a visit to his native W. (Wertach), highlighting the apparent 
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authenticity of his account with photographs, souvenirs such as entrance tickets or 
restaurant bills, and reproductions of artworks studied at tourist sites such as Verona and 
Padua. The acute reality effect of Sebald’s prose meets the generic characteristics of the 
travelogue, whose narrator coincides with the traveling protagonist and who, giving the 
genre its autobiographical twist, corresponds to the author.87 
 
It may be argued that in both The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo, Sebald’s first person narrator 
functions as a kind of avatar88, a temporary and textually bound embodiment of the author. 
Whether considered novels, memoirs, or travelogues, there is no reason why these texts 
should preclude the appearance of fictional characters, nor of a representation of Sebald 
himself. The unnamed narrators bear close resemblance to the author; they are men of 
Sebald’s age and, in The Rings of Saturn the narrator is a German émigré academic living in 
Norfolk as Sebald was at that time. However, any such definitive statement is deftly 
sidestepped, and the author and narrator must be considered as separate entities, though 
not necessarily discrete. Yet the identification is courted, and thus the reader is asked to 
consider the liminal space between author and narrator, and the thresholds of each. What 
occurs would appear to be a becoming-other of author and narrator.   
However, other information imparted by the narrator contradicts this assumption. 
The second section of the book, All’estro, begins as follows: 
 
In October 1980 I travelled from England, where I had then been living for nearly twenty-
five years…89 
 
This suggests that the narrator had been living in England since 1955 or 1956. The narrator 
of The Rings of Saturn states that he moved to England in 196690, a claim reflected in official 
accounts of Sebald’s biography91. Thus the biographical discrepancy affected in Vertigo 
posits its narrator as other to Sebald the author.  
 Similarly the first section of Vertigo features discrepancies regarding the biography 
of Marie Henri Beyle. The narrator never refers to Beyle as Stendhal, and focuses on 
Beyle’s life as opposed to his writing, so that the literary figure of Stendhal is rendered 
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89 V: 33. 
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invisible. This has the effect of demarcating the subject of the narrator’s story from the 
literary figure of Stendhal, a separation which is heightened in another temporal 
discrepancy regarding Beyle’s age and date of birth: 
 
And so now, in 1826, approaching forty, he sat alone on a bench in the shade of two fine 
trees…92 
 
The speculative nature of this description marks it as clearly fictional, which makes the 
discrepancy seem all the more deliberate. Beyle was born in 178393, and so was forty-two or 
forty-three years old at this time. The fictionalised Beyle is set apart from the biography of 
his real life counterpart, and there comes to exist a multitude of Beyles – the real life figure, 
his literary avatar Stendhal, and Sebald’s Beyle. As the contemporary reader has no access 
to the “original”, his or her conception of Beyle is via textual representation alone. Thus 
the figure of Beyle, distinct in these separate entities, becomes a composite of multiple 
conflicting representations.  
Ann Pearson suggests that even the photograph of Sebald on his identification 
papers is intended to obscure rather than confirm an identity. The image bears a vertical 
black line through the subject’s face, a “cancelation mark,” which suggests a “kind of 
negation.”94 It suggests that, even if the identification papers show Sebald as the reader 
recognises him, the author may simply be constructing a character from these fragments of 
identity, the use of actual identification papers underscoring the reflexivity of this 
approach. The author draws fragments of identity not just from his own life. Pearson 
reminds us that next the narrator: 
 
almost immediately signs himself into another hotel under the name of the long dead and 
somewhat dubious Austrian historian Jakob Phillip Fallmerayer [which] suggests we cannot 
make a straightforward identification of narrator and author.95  
 
That the narrator uses Fallmerayer’s name to check in to the hotel suggests that, just as the 
narrator could be Sebald, so could he be Fallmerayer. Identity is impossible to definitively 
locate. There is no rule that may debar Fallmerayer’s appearance in the novel, or even the 
idea that Fallmerayer himself, having time-travelled to late-twentieth century Milan, is the 
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narrator. It is certainly a far-fetched idea, unprecedented within the strictures the novel sets 
itself or tropes as evidenced in Sebald’s work as a whole, but given the text is ostensibly a 
work of fiction, it is not impossible. Indeed, the idea of Fallmerayer travelling around late-
twentieth century Europe, passing himself off as a man who may or may not be W. G. 
Sebald is rather appealing.  
 
The narrator and the narrated 
This discussion underscores a more salient fact – the two entities of narrator and narrative 
subject can never be one. The notion of the “Sebaldian narrator” or “Sebaldian subject” 
manifests again and again in discussion of Sebald’s particular narrative style – the 
investment and obfuscation of the author in the narrator, and the narrator’s relationship 
with his particular landscapes and micro-narratives.  
Richard Gray suggests that the saturnine narrator maintains a centrality to his 
narrative, and that:  
 
like the rings of Saturn, these narrative rings move in a coordinated orbit around a single 
regulative center. In the case of Sebald’s text, this center is the first-person narrator 
himself, who serves, like the planet Saturn, as the gravitational anchor that directs and 
choreographs the synchronized motion of the various narrative rings.96  
 
This image cements the notion of the author as a Prospero-like conjurer, utterly in control 
of the storm around him, whole and stable, and absolutely impervious to its destabilising 
effects. Conversely, Russell Kilbourn suggests that the narrator lacks such a singularity and 
is dependent upon the landscape for self-definition. He identifies the Sebaldian subject as: 
 
an extension of a post-Enlightenment and specifically modernist subjectivity, defined by its 
lack of self-presence, its non-coincidence with itself, and the consequent lack of coherent 
or authentic identity…  [and] an avatar of a post-modern(ist) subjectivity… a subject that 
seeks to represent itself (or be represented) via radically ‘unpeopled’ settings.97 
 
Of note here is the similarity between what Kilbourn identifies as the “unpeopled” 
landscapes through which the narrator wanders, and the notion of the dreamscape. Both 
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are constructed entirely by the subject, the former as a conscious act of representation on 
the part of the writer, and the latter in an act of unconscious representation. In both, the 
narrated subject is objectified and becomes a kind of dream-object, something recollected 
and perhaps fantastical, a notion reminiscent of Humbert Humbert’s exhortation to the 
reader, “Imagine me. I shall not exist if you do not imagine me.”98  
These texts are a very explicit illustration of Lacanian subjectivity99. In The Rings of 
Saturn and Vertigo no attempt is made to conceal the differentiation of the I that speaks 
from the I that is represented; the subject is forever divided by the space between the act of 
representation and the representation itself. A straightforward example of this is presented 
as the narrator of Vertigo first describes the novel’s titular sensation. Walking aimlessly in 
Vienna he believes he sees Dante, “banished from his home town on pain of being burned 
at the stake”: 
 
When I walked faster in order to catch him up he went down Henrichsgasse, but when I 
reached the corner he was nowhere to be seen. After one or two turns of this kind I began 
to sense in me a vague apprehension, which manifested itself as a sense of vertigo.100  
 
This sense of vertigo comes to characterise Sebald’s novel; here it is the manner in which 
the narrator first experiences the sensation that is of note. “I began to sense in me,” 
presents a division of subjectivity, a distinction between the represented “I” and the 
represented “me” which is subject to “vague apprehension”.  
 This is exemplified in Vertigo with the narrator’s account of Beyle’s diagram of a 
battle scene101, in which Beyle identifies himself with the marker, “H”. In constructing the 
diagram, Beyle fabricates an objective point of view. The narrator remarks: 
 
of course, when Beyle was in actual fact standing at that spot he will not have been viewing 
the scene in this precise way, for in reality, as we know, everything is always quite 
different.102 
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This phrase, “everything is always quite different,” especially when prefaced so dryly with, 
“as we know,” serves to include the reader in the joke that, throughout Vertigo and indeed 
most of Sebald’s prose work, the diegesis is radically dislocated from the reality it 
represents – the joke being that “true” or “accurate” representation is impossible. Just as 
Beyle’s representation of himself within the diagram is impossible because he could not 
hold a point of view which includes himself, the narrator’s representation of himself within 
the text is a dislocation of “reality”; his narrative cannot replicate the “real” world so why 
should it even attempt to? Coming as it does in the first few pages of his first novel, 
“everything is always quite different,” reads – in retrospect – as a kind of mission statement 
for the hybrid literary genre Sebald goes on to forge.  
Kilbourn observes that The Rings of Saturn, “typifies Sebald’s peculiar conflation of 
narrated and narrating object,”103 and it is this particular configuration that discussion of 
Sebald’s work returns to. In describing the Sebaldian subject as, “an avatar of a post-
modern(ist) subjectivity,”104 he hits upon the fact that this embodiment of the narrator has 
particular boundaries. The represented narrator might indeed be viewed as a vessel into 
which the narrator attempts to invest himself from the present, an embodiment (from the 
immobility of his hospital room, as noted below) of his active mind. The expediency of the 
notion of the avatar is also apropos in that both the walking tour of Suffolk and the book 
itself are not of indefinite length. Each is within fixed bounds and the avatar of the 
narrated subject need not exceed these bounds.   
Kilbourn notes that these temporal bounds are made explicit in the novel’s opening 
chapter: 
 
a year to the day after I began my tour, I was taken into hospital in Norwich in a state of 
almost total immobility. It was then that I began in my thoughts to write these pages… 
Now that I begin to assemble my notes, more than a year after my discharge from 
hospital…”105 
 
Kilbourn comments that, “the narrator-writer self-consciously recollects,” his 
hospitalisation106, drawing attention to the fact that the written word on the page is 
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assembled from notes drawn from the narrator’s thoughts of a year earlier, which in turn 
were of events a year before that. Gray comments that:  
 
Autobiography by its very nature is structured around a dual temporality, the presence of 
the narrating self and the past of its narrated persona and experiences. Especially in its early 
chapters, The Rings of Saturn highlights this temporal dichotomy by stressing the disparity 
between the situation of the narrating I—confined to his bed in a hospital room in part as 
a physical and emotional consequence of his recounted journey—and the retelling of his 
experiences, encounters, and thoughts during the pilgrimage along the Suffolk coast . . . 
This temporal discrepancy is further accentuated by the narrator’s proclivity to call 
attention to the acts of memory through which he accesses these former experiences, 
marked by his employment of self-reflexive phrases such as “I can remember precisely,”. . . 
“I still recall.” . . . or “I remember.”107 
 
This recollection specifies the division of narrator and narrated; the narrator narrates from 
a point in the future, and the narrative is rendered in the past tense, thus the figure of the 
narrator always exists concurrently at two points in time, at the moment of the events 
recalled and at the moment of writing, a dichotomy which creates a further – and 
irreconcilable – difference between narrating subject and narrated object.  
 Bianca Theisen also reminds us that the process of recollection necessitates a 
degree of fictionalisation in that it relies on a “spurious memory,” and requires 
reconstruction into a “coherent narrative”108. She argues that this process attempts to 
“dissimulate the doubling of past and present, the narrated and narrating persona, the 
factual and the fictional.”109 In this sense, the necessity of a degree of fictionalisation in 
memoir works as obfuscation for a potentially much greater degree of fictionalisation; 
Sebald exploits the already self-evident space between facticity and fictionality, opening the 
chasm further in the knowledge that all that occurs within this space is obfuscated. We 
accept that a fraction of the narrative is fictional, but we can never know the quantity of 
that fraction. 
 McCulloh uses the example of light to illustrate (or illuminate), comparing this 
particular quality of Sebald’s narratives with that which is, “not… either a particle or a wave 
but… having the properties of both,”110 suggesting that the concepts of both subject and 
object are destabilised; the narrator himself may be rendered an object, and the objects with 
which he negotiates may assume a subjectivity. Such a conflation is deconstructive; it 
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dissolves the hierarchy that regulates subject and object. In The Rings of Saturn, as 
throughout Sebald’s work, these categories cannot be placed in order or competition, but 
merely coexist, intersecting and metamorphosing, always becoming-other.  
 
Polyphony 
Our pilgrim lets others do the talking, often. 
John Domini111 
 
The presence of voices in the text other to that of the narrator has already been noted. 
These “voices” include intertextual citations and the voices of the people the narrator 
encounters. It is these latter voices that unsettle the subjectivity of the text most stealthily. 
John Domini suggests that Sebald: 
 
repeatedly [abandons] personal detail for appropriated passages from older texts, as well as 
fragments from the correspondence and biographies of those that wrote them (a 
heteroglossia, that is, of multiple voices and effects).112  
 
In such passages, the narrative voice remains constant; there are no quotation marks, 
paragraph breaks, or typographical shifts to assist in identifying particular voices. The 
surface of the text remains level, even when we suspect the narrating I is not the narrator 
we think we know.  
In Vertigo the narrating voice briefly becomes that of the narrator’s friend Salvatore 
Altamura113, and at other points the text is infused with unreferenced citations from the 
writings of the narrator’s subjects (Stendhal, Herbeck, Casanova). This device is developed 
and deployed more extensively in The Rings of Saturn, where myriad voices are invited into 
the text to address the reader directly. Here the narrative I becomes the voice of the writers 
Michael Hamburger, Joseph Conrad, and François-René de Chateaubriand, the narrator’s 
late friend Frederick Farrar, his hosts Mrs Ashbury and Thomas Abrams, and William 
Hazel, a gardener the narrator encounters at Somerleyton Hall. Each voice enters the text 
and supersedes the narrator to address the reader in the first person. 
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Furthermore, “the appropriated passages from older texts,” are not always readily 
apparent. The narrator quotes directly and at length from Conrad114, though does not cite a 
specific source and the reader is left unclear where exactly this quotation begins or ends, or 
indeed if there are multiple quotations. In other instances the narrative I becomes 
subsumed in an even subtler fashion, in moments when the narrator appropriates exterior 
texts as befits his present environment or preoccupation. Lost on Dunwich Heath115, he 
appropriates and reconfigures Edgar’s speech from Act Four, Scene Six of King Lear116:  
 
EDGAR: Come on, sir, here’s the place. Stand still: how fearful  
And dizzy ‘tis to cast one’s eyes so low.  
The crows and choughs that wing the midway air  
Show scarce so gross as beetles. Half-way down  
Hangs one that gathers sapphire, dreadful trade;  
Methinks he seems no bigger than his head.  
The fishermen that walk upon the beach 
Appear like mice, and yon tall anchoring barque  
Diminished to her cock, her cock a buoy 
Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge  
That on th’ numbered idle pebbles chafes,  
Cannot be heard so high. 117  
 
Although in my dream I was sitting transfixed with amazement in the Chinese pavilion, I 
was at the same time out in the open, within a foot of the very edge, and knew how fearful 
it is to cast one’s eye so low. The crows and choughs that winged the midway air were 
scarce the size of beetles; the fishermen that walked upon the beach appeared like mice; 
and the murmuring surge that chafed the countless pebbles could not be heard so high. 
Immediately below the cliff, on a black heap of earth, were the shattered ruins of a 
house.118  
 
This intertextuality, again without citation, is doubly playful, as the Lear speech is delivered 
by Edgar while he is disguised as Poor Tom. The approximation of a speech from a 
(famously) undecidable and multifarious subjectivity layers further pluralities onto the 
novel’s narrative subjectivity.  
This also disrupts the stability of the text in other senses; it unsettles Sebald’s status 
as “author”, and it unsettles the reader’s position to the text, depending on whether he or 
she acknowledges the game Sebald is playing. Pearson asks: 
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if the line between intertextuality and plagiarism does not become dangerously blurred, 
since without the reader’s nod of recognition the borrowed words pass as the author’s 
own.119  
 
I might assume that for many readers, myself included, Sebald’s intertextuality is never fully 
grasped, and even that it may very well be impossible to give a full account of the 
intertextuality at play in The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo; without knowing the full breadth of 
Sebald’s reading, it is impossible to know just to what degree intertextuality operates in 
these novels. This rather satisfyingly fulfils the criteria of the lacuna outlined in the 
introduction – the cannot-be-known, the anti-definitive – while also underscoring the 
notion of a limitless, unaccountable intersubjectivity.  
These devices – other voices assuming the first person, the direct citation of other 
texts, and the unreferenced use of Shakespeare – recall the “plurality of consciousnesses” 
that exists in Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel120. Here, these consciousnesses are greatly varied 
and come in many forms; each constitutes a micro-narrative which supplements and 
complements the voice of the narrator, and together they form a substantial portion of the 
text overall. However, these consciousnesses do not so much offer contrasting viewpoints 
as offshoots from the narrator’s own thoughts; he engages with the otherness of these 
voices with great sensitivity, yet employs each predominantly to support his storytelling 
agenda (there is a sense of a narrator determined to be persuasive, hiding beneath a veneer 
of passivity).  
With this in mind, I might dispute that The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo are truly 
polyphonic texts. James Zappen, in his summary of Bakhtin’s position, argues that, “The 
author of the polyphonic novel, the characters, and the reader participate as equals in the 
creation of this truth.”121 Zappen continues: 
 
The characters participate in this ongoing dialogue not as objects of the author’s 
consciousness but as "free people, capable of standing alongside," agreeing or disagreeing 
with, even rebelling against, their creator.122  
 
The Sebaldian narrator might be considered the inverse of this. Whereas Bakhtin sees in 
Dostoevsky a polyphony of viewpoints manifest in multiple distinct and conflicting 
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voices123, Sebald’s narrating I presents multiple indistinct voices, coalesced toward a 
singular viewpoint.  
In The Rings of Saturn (and Vertigo, to a lesser degree), there is not so much an open 
dialogue between voices as there is an afferent force drawing these voices toward that of 
the narrator, or rather, in line with that of the narrator. This would position Sebald closer 
to what Zappen identifies as, “traditional disciplines . . . [which] emphasize the centripetal 
forces that centralize and unify a language,” in contrast to Bakhtin’s assertion that 
polyphony is structured upon, “the centrifugal forces that decentralize and disunify.”124 
This poses a question of whether the author engages with and creates a dialogue with these 
other voices, or merely draws upon them, as in citation. Do these voices contain dissent to 
any degree, or are they passive, and submissive to the author’s or narrator’s intent? Does 
the narrator seek to assemble a discursive collage of voices from which a collective truth 
may emerge, or does he manipulate these other voices to strengthen his own singular 
argument?  
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival is also useful in considering how these voices operate. 
These voices, of differing orders and registers, are brought together in the space of the text. 
In joining the collectivity of the text, each voice abandons its singularity and becomes part 
of a greater whole125. This ramifies with McCulloh’s assertion that, “Sebald is interested in 
whether identity is somehow fluid, something that can be shared.”126 For instance, the 
voices which enter the text of The Rings of Saturn are fittingly from different orders, social 
classes, discourses, even eras. An equality is imposed; as stated, there are no quotation 
marks or paragraph breaks to assist in identifying the voice, a lack of formal differentiation 
of voices which resonates strongly with the carnivalesque. Furthermore, there are no 
notable shifts in register, diction or tone; each voice is rendered analogous with that of the 
narrator, presenting  a semblance which is unexpected given the diverse background of the 
sources. One would not expect William Hazel to speak in the same register as 
Chateaubriand, just as one would not expect Michael Hamburger to speak as Conrad. 
Many voices are allowed to speak yet ultimately they all sound alike.  
This leads to a question of whether a carnivalesque economy allows voices to 
remain distinct, equal but different, or whether it dissolves all difference absolutely. The 
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homogenising effect of the narrative voice is certainly an equaliser, yet the homogeneity to 
which these voices are reduced becomes embodied in a subjectivity which is at all times in 
the possession of the narrator. “Our pilgrim lets others do the talking, often,” writes 
Domini127, yet it is always the pilgrim who is talking.  
 
Intersubjectivity 
Of the many voices the narrator encounters, the one which allows him to ponder questions 
of singularity and otherness most directly is that of his friend Michael Hamburger. The 
narrator pays a visit to Hamburger and his wife at their home in the village of Middleton. 
Prior to his arrival, the narrator describes Hamburger’s move from Berlin to England at the 
age of nine. Initially he keeps Hamburger’s voice at a distance, drawing on the text of his 
memoirs128, which initially he cites only briefly, recounting a passage about the confiscation 
at customs of his grandfather’s budgerigars: 
 
It was the loss of the two pet birds, Michael writes, and having to stand by powerless and 
see them vanish forever behind some sort of screen, that brought us up against the whole 
monstrosity of changing countries under such inauspicious circumstances.129 
 
The narrative then retreats from Hamburger’s voice, referring to him as “he”, as the 
descriptive passage continues for about two hundred words, before Hamburger’s voice 
again returns to the narrative: 
 
If I look back to Berlin, writes Michael, all I see is a darkened background with a grey 
smudge on it, a slate pencil drawing, some unclear numbers in a gothic script, blurred and 
half wiped away with a damp rag.130 
 
Hamburger’s recollections continue for several hundred words, until the narrator chooses 
to draw Hamburger’s words from another source:  
 
My hallucinations and dreams, Michael writes elsewhere, often take place in a setting partly 
of the metropolis of Berlin and partly of rural Suffolk.131  
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Hambuger’s voice then continues, unhindered, for several hundred words more, until the 
narrator interrupts to announce his arrival at Hamburger’s house132. Hamburger has not yet 
entered the text in person, as it were, yet his voice has dominated the narrative for the 
previous five pages. The narrator’s sparse interjections (“Michael writes,” “writes Michael,” 
“Michael writes elsewhere,”) initially identify “Michael” as an object other to the narrator, 
but this distinction collapses when Hamburger is cited at length, his voice allowed 
command over the narrative. 
 The narrator points out that Hamburger and himself have much in common. They 
are both émigré German writers living in the same region of the United Kingdom and they 
share, utterly coincidentally, the same acquaintance in Manchester, Stanley Terry, who each 
met at the age of twenty-two, twenty-two years apart in 1944 and 1966133. As the narrator 
spends more time with Hamburger he senses a strange kinship, so much so that his 
subjectivity begins to lose its exclusivity. The narrator recalls his first visit to Hamburger’s 
house. Of being shown around, he writes: 
 
a strange feeling came upon me, as if it were not he who had abandoned that place of 
work, but I, as if the spectacles cases, letters and writing materials that had evidently lain 
untouched for months in the soft north light had once been my spectacles cases, my letters 
and my writing materials. In the porch that led to the garden, I felt again as if I or someone 
akin to me had long gone about his business there… [T]he quite outlandish thought 
crossed my mind… that Michael was taking me round a house in which I myself had lived 
a long time ago.134  
 
This follows the passage in which Hamburger’s voice assumes control of the narrative, the 
textual occupation affected by Hamburger’s voice succeeded by the narrator’s assertion 
that Hamburger’s personal belongings, and even his home, are or were once his own – a 
much more far-reaching occupation of otherness. McCulloh comments, “Can it be that he 
in fact is Michael or was once Michael?”135 Upon having these thoughts the narrator dispels 
them and, “did not pursue them in the years that have passed since then, perhaps because 
it is not possible to pursue them without losing one’s sanity.”136 The narrator, while 
bringing other voices into the group subjectivity of the text, acknowledges the danger of 
rescinding control of that subjectivity. McCulloh asserts the importance of resisting this: 
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By merging with the Other, consciousness would enter a realm that otherwise recedes from 
us – the realm of final certainty. Such certainty would be complete and irresistible, 
however, and would surely mean a descent into madness, as the narrator acknowledges.137 
 
Such absolute rescinding of autonomy would render subjectivity unintelligible but, as 
noted, the narrative voice flirts with this notion throughout Sebald’s work. This rescinding 
need not have solely negative connotations; it ramifies with the notion of the carnival, of a 
collective autonomy, a dissolution of boundaries and a fluid space.  Though of course, as 
carnival-time has its own defined boundaries, this can only ever be temporary.  
 
Liminal motifs 
This section moves away from the textual surface to consider particular motifs of liminality 
within the narratives of the texts. Here, the term motifs is employed to denote privileged 
instances, or intensities, of liminality; it comes to stand for images, themes, aggregations, 
and embodiments in which the liminal is accentuated.  In discussion of The Rings of Saturn 
and Vertigo, this section is divided into two main categories. The first focuses on the 
hypnagogic and the vertiginous; there is a continuity from the preceding section in that the 
focus remains on the subject, though whereas that section discusses the textual 
embodiment of subjectivity, this section bypasses the textual surface to consider the 
narrators’ evocations of liminal consciousnesses as manifest in (and at the intersection of) 
hypnagogia and the vertigo. The second part of this section focuses on Deleuzoguattarian 
models of the liminal as represented in descriptions of space and the image of the nomad. I 
will first however lay the ground for this discussion by considering a small selection of 
instances of liminality which are noteworthy but not necessarily analogous to these two 
models.  
The opening chapter of The Rings of Saturn evokes the image of Gregor Samsa138, as 
the narrator finds himself confined to a hospital room in a state of immobility, 
transformed, as Gregor is, into a state of incapacitation. He gazes out of the window and at 
a familiar city and finds it “an utterly alien place.”139 He compares himself to Samsa,  
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I could not help thinking of the scene in which poor Gregor Samsa, his little legs 
trembling, climbs the armchair and looks out of his room, no longer remembering (so 
Kafka’s narrative goes) the sense of liberation that gazing out of the window had formerly 
given him.140  
 
Metamorphosis, as represented by Samsa, is transparently analogous to the process of 
becoming-other and to the liminal phase in general; as stated, it provides Deleuze and 
Guattari with the central image of their theory of becoming 141. The image is revisited in the 
closing chapter of The Rings of Saturn as the narrator considers the cultivation of the 
silkworm moth: 
 
During their short lives, which last only six or seven weeks, they are overcome by sleep on 
four occasions and, after shedding their old skin, emerge from each one re-made, always 
whiter, smoother and larger, becoming more beautiful, and finally almost completely 
transparent.142  
 
The shedding of a skin is interesting here, as is the notion of being “re-made”. Here the 
skin takes on a semblance of territory; it is a two-dimensional plane which provides the 
surface area of the territory of the body, and as it is shed, a deterritorialisation occurs. To 
be “re-made” suggests a reterritorialisation, or in this instance a series of reterritorialisations 
which constitute a gradual progression towards otherness. It is also of note that this 
process occurs when the silkworm is “overcome by sleep,” which suggests that sleep itself 
may be viewed as kind of chrysalis, as a site which engenders change.  
 The metamorphosis model has applications beyond subjectivity. The narrator 
recounts the history of Somerleyton Hall, the first stop on his journey. He describes its 
glory days in the mid-nineteenth century when its owner Samuel Morton Peto lavished 
every expense upon it, extensively rebuilding the house and redesigning the gardens and 
grounds. The narrator describes the house and grounds at night: 
 
The most wonderful sight of all, according to one contemporary description, was 
Somerleyton of a summer’s night, when the incomparable glasshouses, borne on cast iron 
pillars and braces and seemingly weightless in their filigree grace, shed their gleaming 
radiance on the dark.143  
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This recalls the notion of the vespertine, of a coming-alive or an increase of activity as 
night falls. Darkness becomes light as the space of the night is corrupted by artificial 
illumination, a deterritorialisation which also deconstructs the binary of nature and 
civilisation. The image of radiance encroaching upon darkness has clear connotations of 
the Enlightenment, which in turn suggests the quest to establish an authoritative ethics and 
knowledge, to systemise and territorialise, and to dispense with the unfathomable and 
unaccountable144. As the Enlightenment sought to de- and re- territorialise ethics and 
knowledge, Morton Peto’s nineteenth century endeavour seeks to reterritorialise the space 
of actual darkness – the night, a space reserved for sleep – and claim it as territory for the 
wakeful.  
 To step outside of the narratives for a moment, it is also worth commenting upon 
the structure of Sebald’s texts, especially The Rings of Saturn. Each presents a series of 
becomings, from subject to subject, location to location, apparently seamlessly. Gray 
comments on The Rings of Saturn: 
 
More than a mere compiler, however, this narrative consciousness is characterized above 
all by its capacity to choreograph subtle transitions and cross-references among disparate 
elements. The essence of Sebald’s artistry in The Rings of Saturn is an art of inventive 
transitioning.145  
  
This is best exemplified across the novel’s Table of Contents pages, which read as 
succession of locations, names, and anecdotes, separated by dashes – described by 
Christopher Gregory-Guider as “hyphenated topoi”146. To illustrate:  
 
In hospital – Obituary – Odyssey of Thomas Browne’s skull – Anatomy lecture – 
Levitation – Quincunx – Fabled creatures – Urn burial147 
 
This is more than a list; the dashes suggest a journey, a linear series of transitions. Here the 
dash comes to represent liminal space itself.  
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The hypnagogic and the vertiginous 
The narrators of both Vertigo and The Rings of Saturn again and again call attention to their 
states of mind and states of consciousness. The narrator of Vertigo describes vividly his 
hypnagogic hallucinations (“my consciousness began to dissolve at the edges”148; “I 
imagined I heard a horse’s hooves on the cobbled square and the sound of carriage wheels; 
but the carriage itself did not materialise,”149) and the agony of insomnia (“There could be 
no prospect of sleep,”150; “Hours went by, never-ending hours, but rest eluded me”151). He 
is also aware of – and able to articulate – the particular conditions of consciousness he 
passes through in wakefulness. Whereas wakefulness may elsewhere be viewed as an even 
and sheer plane, the Sebaldian narrator details glitches and intensities in consciousness, and 
appears to be at all times aware that his wakefulness is as precarious as the liminal space at 
its thresholds.  
 The Rings of Saturn contains particularly rich descriptions of hypnagogia which, apt 
to the tone of the narrative, are imbued with anxiety and melancholia. The narrator recalls a 
house in Ireland in which he once stayed, and describes his bed: 
 
Whenever I rested on that bed… my consciousness began to dissolve at the edges, so that 
at times I could hardly have said how I had got there or indeed where I was. 152 
 
This dissolving of consciousness is a vivid evocation of hypnagogia, recalling too the filmic 
trope of “the dissolve”, the gradual transition from one image to another. It suggests the 
notion of something solid becoming fluid, a transformation of matter dependent on 
specific conditions. Here the space of this bed is bestowed with almost magical properties 
in its singular ability to foster these specifics. It is the specificity of the site that has such an 
effect on the narrator, yet paradoxically once it has taken effect he is unable to say where 
he is. Indeed, he repeatedly has the sense that he is in a field hospital, “a battlefield 
somewhere in Lombardy over which the vultures circled, and, all around, a country laid 
waste by war.”153 The image is so disparate from the tranquillity of the rural Irish house and 
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of this magical bed which offers such sudden somnolence (though so in keeping with the 
tone of the narrative and the narrator’s preoccupation with death).  
The despair of this image is revisited in the narrator’s account of the Norwich silk 
weavers, whose complex yet repetitive work, he imagines, must haunt their sleep.  
 
It is difficult to imagine the depth of despair into which those can be driven who, even 
after the end of the working day, are engrossed in their intricate designs and who are 
pursued, into their dreams, by the feeling that they have got hold of the wrong thread.154 
 
The repetitive nature of the work ingrains the activity within the subject, the anxiety of 
which comes to characterise the hypnagogic state. The phrase “into their dreams”, bound 
by commas, adds weight to the spatiality of the metaphor, to the notion of a pursuit, of a 
despair given agency and making chase.  
A startling account of hypnagogic hallucination occurs in Vertigo, in the final pages 
of All’estero. Following dinner with his friend Salvatore Altamura, the narrator sits alone at 
dusk in the Piazza Bra in Verona. He describes hearing horses’ hooves, as alluded to above, 
and suddenly is overwhelmed by the recollection of an open-air performance of Aida he 
saw as a boy, and which he hasn’t thought of since. He pictures the event:  
 
The triumphal procession, consisting of a paltry contingent of horsemen and a few sorrow-
worn camels and elephants on loan from the Circus Krone, as I have recently discovered, 
passed before me several times, quite as if it had never been forgotten, and, much as it had 
then in my boyhood, lulled me into a deep sleep from which – though to this day I cannot 
really explain how – I did not awake till the morning after, in my room at the Golden 
Dove.155  
 
This presents an uncanny moment. The forgotten memory rises like a phantom; unrecalled 
since the event it refers to, it now asserts itself as being of the narrator. The narrator’s 
journey back to his hotel room is also presented as uncanny; it occurs under a cloak of 
sleep, a somnambulism which presents the body as active and capable despite the absence 
of its resident wakeful subjectivity. This has connotations of something both dead and 
alive, and recalls the image of the phantom. I will return to theories of subjectivity 
displaced by sleep in later chapters.  
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 The Rings of Saturn offers intriguing examples of how the subject perceives language 
at these liminal sites. In his room at Southwold the narrator falls asleep whilst watching a 
TV documentary about Roger Casement, the early twentieth century British Consul and 
Irish Nationalist: 
 
As my waking consciousness ebbed away, I could still hear every word of the narrator’s 
account of Casement with singular clarity but was unable to grasp their meaning.156 
 
The narrator is unable to grasp the meaning of words, spoken in English; the language of 
his adopted home has become at once foreign and familiar. These words remain 
perceptible to the narrator as audible speech, but are rendered devoid of meaning. This is 
contrasted with an occasion on which he falls asleep on the beach at Scheveningen: 
 
When at last I reached the beach I was so tired that I lay down and slept til the afternoon. I 
heard the surge of the sea, and, half-dreaming, understood every word of Dutch and for 
the first time in my life believed I had arrived, and was home.157 
 
Here, in contrast to the former disintegration of meaning, the narrator claims to 
understand every word. As before, the language with which he negotiates – Dutch – is 
foreign though has a closer relationship to his native tongue. He states that he believes he 
has for the first time found home, an identification with an other, to the degree that it 
obfuscates any prior sense of “home”. This effects a radical shift in subjectivity, a total 
displacement, a realignment of selfhood with what was other.  
The term “half-dreaming” is interesting in its suggestion of hypnagogia – a hybrid 
operating simultaneously, half-dreaming, half-wakeful. This liminal state of consciousness 
creates the illusion that it holds the key to an encrypted system of meaning – not merely 
the comprehension of a foreign language, but an absolute understanding of a foreign 
language to the point that it displaces the subject’s primary language. In Southwold, the loss 
of comprehension of a foreign (though very familiar) language effects a loss of subjectivity, 
a disorientation; the narrator is left without language altogether. In Scheveningen 
comprehension becomes inevitable and incomprehension impossible. The half-dreaming 
mind creates a supplementary system of meaning which overrides the primary system; an 
illusion of meaning is created which supersedes the intended “true” meaning of the Dutch 
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words and comes to stand for something intrinsic to the subject. In both instances 
meaning, or lack of, is entirely within the subject – in Southwold an absence, in 
Scheveningen a presence.  
The implicit anxiety of the description of the silk weavers and the Lombardy 
battlefield with this state resonates with a sensation the narrator of Vertigo describes 
repeatedly – vertigo itself. McCulloh notes that the original German title of Schwindel. 
Gefühle158 is,  
 
a play on words – a kind of punctuated pun… Schwindel. Gefühle  is a recombination of the 
compound word Schwindelgefühle (“feelings of dizziness”) using a period to divide the word 
into its component parts, whereby Sebald exposes an ambiguity in the German language 
(Schwindel can mean “dizziness” as well as “swindle” or “deception”). Even as he 
destabilizes the meaning of the title, Sebald maintains the association with the compound 
Schwindelgefühle, suggesting vertigo. Thus the title works on three levels at once, creating a 
promise of irony, ambiguity, and authorial “sleight of hand”.159  
 
The implied “swindle” here, McCulloh suggests, refers to an authorial sleight-of-hand, but 
it can also refer to the narrator’s self-swindling – his compulsion to propel himself into 
situations of vertigo. Zilcosky suggests the narrator is “trying to get lost,” that he is, 
“seeking out that proximity to madness that ancient travellers feared.”160 Similarly, Massimo 
Leone suggests that in Sebald, “vertigo is not only passively endured but also actively 
sought.”161  
This sensation of vertigo finds a direct correlation in hypnagogia. In hypnagogia a 
threshold is approached and crossed. As this occurs the subject experiences physical 
sensations. Often these sensations are akin to vertigo; Andreas Mavromatis reports that 
the sensation of suddenly falling is common to hypnagogia: 
 
Quite often the fall forms part of a hypnagogic ‘dream’ in which the subject, for instance, 
finds himself falling off a cliff to escape a ferocious beast, or off a toppling ladder, missing 
a foothold while climbing steps or tumbling down the stairs at his home.162 
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Mavromatis cites Peter McKellar’s assertion that this phenomenon is possibly universal163, 
and similarly Ian Oswald suggests this sensation is highly common: 
 
The fall may seem to end with a sudden impact, or as a violent clutching for support, as if 
to arrest the fall.164  
 
This sense of losing and then attempting to re-establish one’s balance resonates strongly 
with the sensation of vertigo. Similarly, the apprehension Sebald’s narrator feels as he gives 
chase to Dante manifests in the hallucinatory physical sensation of vertigo165. In these 
instances the narrator has a sudden lack of surety of himself in a given environment – not 
merely a lack of confidence, but what appears to be a sudden dissolution of the boundaries 
of the self, of what constitutes the self as discrete – separate from and other to all 
phenomena in proximity. In a sense, the ego fails temporarily; the subject is unable to 
differentiate between self and other, which in the case of the narrator of Vertigo results in 
absolute disorientation.  
Here vertigo manifests as an apprehension at crossing a threshold – physical or 
otherwise. This threshold might have unappealing consequences, such as harm to the self, 
in falling for example, or it might put the integrity of the subject at threat, as in the case of 
crossing from one state of consciousness to another. Such a transit requires the loosening 
of ego boundaries166; as these boundaries are loosened the subject becomes more able to 
engage with otherness, and when further loosened the subject is able to become-other and 
transit from one state of consciousness to another. This liminal space represents a nodal 
point at the intersection of systems of meaning, from which the subject has access to both 
sleep and wakefulness, to the sensation of both balance and of falling. 
Alongside literal instances of vertigo, the novel transposes the concept on to 
notions of the destabilised subject, which serves to evoke the risk of toppling from a stable 
sense of self into an unknown otherness. The most prominent instance of this occurs as 
the narrator visits Milan Cathedral: 
 
Inside the cathedral I sat down for a while, untied my shoelaces, and, as I still remember 
with undiminished clarity, all of a sudden no longer had any knowledge of where I was. 
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Despite a great effort to account for the last few days and how I had come to be in this 
place, I was unable even to determine whether I was in the land of the living or already in 
another place.167  
 
This last line is one of the most memorable phrases – and ideas – within the novel. The 
narrator has found himself in a space of undecidability – the space of life or of death – and 
now a vertiginous tension holds him in place between these two theoretical positions. How 
has he reached this place? He has arrived in Milan having lost his passport and identity 
papers (upon recounting the story of how these came to be missing as he tries to take a 
room at a hotel, he remarks, “When I told my story all over again, it no longer sounded 
plausible, even to me,”168 suggesting that even he has lost faith in his mislaid identity). In 
the cathedral he unties his shoelaces, admittedly already uncertain whose shoes he is 
walking in, and in doing so metaphorically steps out of the last vestiges of what is holding 
his subjectivity in place. He is now aware of no boundary between himself and the ultimate 
otherness of death.  
 This episode has a counterpart, albeit not so dramatic, in The Rings of Saturn, as its 
narrator recounts his viewing of Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp169 in 
The Hague. Both instances are preceded by a night of insomnia; in Milan the narrator lies 
awake, waiting “for dawn to touch the tips of the aerials,”170 while in The Hague, insomnia 
is the straightforward effect of external stimuli – noise penetrating the thin windows of his 
hotel room – again, urban civilisation projecting into the space of the night. He finds 
himself in a liminal not-asleep-yet-not-fully-awake state: “I was quite unable to harness my 
thoughts.” He continues, “Indeed, without knowing why, I was so affected by the painting 
that it later took me a full hour to recover, in front of Jacob van Ruisdael’s View of Haarlem 
with Bleaching Fields.”171  
What criteria, aside from the narrator’s particular state of consciousness, might 
precipitate such a reaction, this inability to harness one’s thoughts? The subject of 
Rembrandt’s painting perhaps – a seventeenth century autopsy, gruesomely rendered. The 
experience of standing before the painting effects a kind of obfuscation, a detachment of 
the narrator from his thoughts; the inferred reading is that the intellectual response is 
overridden by an other response – emotional perhaps, or aesthetic, or even spiritual. The 
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particular flavour of the response is not specified, we are merely told that it is not of 
“thoughts”. The state that the narrator inhabits at that moment precludes such a response, 
and he remains in a state of sleep-becoming-awake, which in turn precludes the rigour of a 
wakeful subjectivity from which to summon such a response to the painting.  
The narrator is later able to access something of this wakeful subjectivity in front of 
van Ruisdael’s landscape. This hour sees a shift in subjectivity across a continuum of states 
of consciousness, towards a rigorous, thoughtful wakefulness. Indeed, there is a resonance 
of this process in the title of the painting and the activity it depicts. The bleaching of 
fabrics, though designed by man, is an organic process – the only agents employed are 
water and sunlight. Again, the sun figures into this equation of wakefulness, signifying a 
pole of consciousness – an absolute wakefulness. The nature of this shift suggests that 
subjectivity is not inherently wakeful, and that the narrator’s subjectivity does not revert to 
a pure subjectivity of its own accord. It suggests that to achieve such wakefulness requires a 
kind of bleaching, and that subject positions in the continuum of consciousness are entirely 
constituted by external forces. Just as it is external stimuli that keeps the narrator awake the 
night before, it is van Ruisdael’s painting which affects a wakefulness here. Whereas the 
narrator of Vertigo experiences a dissolution of subjectivity in Milan Cathedral, seemingly 
pulled apart by centrifugal forces, here the narrator finds his subjectivity reaggregating, as if 
at the behest of centripetal forces, brought about by his focus upon this painting.  
This resonates with a description in Vertigo, appropriated from Casanova’s 
memoirs, of how the mind shifts through degrees of lucidity: 
 
[During his incarceration] Casanova considered the limits of human reason. He established, 
while it might be rare for a man to be driven insane, little was required to tip the balance. 
All that was needed was a slight shift, and nothing would be as it formerly was. In these 
deliberations, Casanova likened a lucid mind to a glass, which does not break of its own 
accord. Yet how easily it is shattered.172 
 
Here, lucidity is akin to the “bleached” wakefulness the narrator of The Rings of Saturn 
experiences as he views van Ruisdael’s painting – a pole of consciousness that is at once 
clear and pure, and brittle and precarious. Just as the far pole of consciousness is in close 
proximity to death (as evidenced in the narrator’s melancholy – see below), this extreme of 
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wakefulness, the narrator suggests, might be in close proximity to madness – a position 
which, again, suggests vertigo.  
 Like Casanova, the narrator of Vertigo becomes imprisoned in Venice, though of 
his own introverted melancholy rather in persecution for extroverted blasphemies: 
 
On that first day of November in 1980, preoccupied as I was with my notes and the ever 
widening and contracting circles of my thoughts, I became enveloped by a sense of utter 
emptiness and never once left my room. It seemed to me then that one could well end 
one’s life simply through thinking and retreating into one’s mind, for, although I had 
closed the windows and the room was warm, my limbs were growing progressively colder 
and stiffer with my lack of movement, so that when at length the waiter arrived with the 
red wine and sandwiches I had ordered, I felt as if I had already been interred or laid out 
for burial, silently grateful for the proffered libation, but no longer capable of consuming it. 
173    
 
This sensation, so different from that which accompanies the narrator’s viewing of van 
Ruisdael in The Rings of Saturn, follows an instance of waking in Venice, markedly different 
from the description of attempting to sleep in The Hague, which is troubled by “the din of 
traffic from the crossroads and every few minutes the dreadful squeal of the tram as it 
ground round the terminus track-loop.”174 
 
 
Waking up in Venice is unlike waking up in any other place. The day begins quietly. Only a 
stray shout here and there may break the calm, or the sound of a shutter being raised, or 
the wing-beat of the pigeons. How often, I thought to myself, had I lain thus in a hotel 
room, in Vienna or Frankfurt or Brussels, with my hands clasped under my head, listening 
not to the stillness, as in Venice, but to the roar of traffic, with a mounting sense of 
panic.175 
 
While the narrator seems to savour this peace, it appears that the insomnia and panic 
experienced upon waking up in other cities affects a defence against melancholy. In Venice, 
the stillness and lack of external stimuli allows the narrator to become overwhelmed by 
internal stimuli; he sleeps soundly, but in wakefulness experiences sensations akin to death. 
 These instances (in particular the engagement with van Ruisdael’s painting and the 
statement from Vertigo, “It seemed to me then that one could well end one’s life simply 
                                                 
173 V: 65. 
174 TROS: 82. 
175 V: 63.   
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through thinking and retreating into one’s mind,”176) resonate strongly with Stendhal 
syndrome, the condition described by the narrator of Vertigo in his discussion of Beyle 
(though just as he never refers to Beyle as Stendhal, he never names the condition he 
describes). The symptoms of the syndrome – rapid heartbeat, dizziness, confusion, 
hallucinations – are analogous to vertigo, though brought on by the very specific 
circumstances of exposure to art or extreme natural beauty. The narrators of Vertigo and 
The Rings of Saturn appear to suffer similar symptoms on several occasions; again and again, 
there is a sense of the narrative subject being overwhelmed by an otherness (though often 
of horror as well as beauty).  
In these instances the imaginary, as manifest in the relationship between the 
narrator and a particular object, temporarily obliterates the real, or at the very least achieves 
an effect which exceeds its apparent bounds, as in the case of View of Haarlem with Bleaching 
Fields when the narrator senses a shift in the quality of his consciousness as he views the 
painting. This is reflected in other occasions on which the narrator of Vertigo allows the 
imaginary to overwhelm him, such as the aforementioned sighting of Dante in Vienna, his 
hallucination of the performance of Aida, and at Heidelberg, as he recounts passengers on 
the train: 
 
The last to come into my compartment of those passengers who had just boarded was a 
young woman wearing a beret of brown velvet whom I instantly recognised, without a 
shadow of a doubt, as Elizabeth, daughter of James I.177  
 
This recalls the notion of a time-travelling Fallmerayer, but moreover it hints at the power 
of the imaginary, and the risk (or potential) of the vertiginous mind to incorporate it and 
allow it to supplant the real.  
The Rings of Saturn offers two similar examples; the narrator gives an account of 
Thomas Browne’s Musaeum Clausum178, a catalogue of both real and imaginary things with 
no distinction between each, and a lengthier discussion of Borges’ short story Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius179, which centres on a conspiracy of intellectuals who aim to imagine and 
thereby create an entire world which ultimately comes to eclipse the primary world. These 
                                                 
176 V: 65. 
177 V: 254. 
178 TROS: 271; Browne 1683; the Browne text is available at 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/misctracts/museum.html>. Accessed 16 August 2010.  
179 TROS: 67-71; Borges 1981 [1940]: 111-22, trans. Alastair Reid. 
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citations balance a tension between wonder at the power of the imagination and fear of the 
threatened chaos if the order of reality, of what is known to be real, is rescinded.  
 
The nomad and the extraterritorial  
The concepts of the nomad and the extraterritorial are drawn from a Deleuzoguattarian 
model of liminality, that is, the process of becoming-other and deterritorialisation. In this 
model, the extraterritorial is constituted by that which lies beyond territorialisation, that 
which is not reterritorialised, that which cannot be claimed. This corresponds to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s nomadic subject, a subjectivity which is perpetually transient, which makes 
no claim upon territory and upon which territory makes no claims. The nomad is perpetual 
movement, perpetual becoming.  
 Sebald flirts with this notion of the nomad in both The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo. 
There is a tension of home and nomadism in his travelling narrators, particularly in the 
narrator of Vertigo, who we understand lives in England but does not refer to his home 
there, and visits his hometown in Germany yet feels little sense of home there either, 
despite the wealth of memories his stay brings to mind. He also embodies the nomadic in 
those he encounters on his journeys. In Vertigo he recounts arriving by train in Venice at 
night: 
 
I slowly walked down the platform to the station hall, where a veritable army of 
backpackers were lying on the stone floor in sleeping bags on straw mats, close to each 
other like an alien people resting on their way through the desert. Out in the station 
forecourt, too, countless young men and women lay in groups or couples or singly, on the 
steps and all around.180 
 
This description forms a playful reversal of the nomad and nomadic space. The space of 
the station hall and forecourt is, in essence, a straightforward example of Marc Augé’s 
concept of the non-place181. It is a place which is passed through (on foot) by passengers 
embarking and disembarking the train – a nodal point of two modes, or velocities, of the 
non-place182. Yet the travellers who now occupy the space (denoted as travellers by their 
                                                 
180 V: 82.  
181 Augé 1995. 
182 Anne Fuchs also discusses Sebald’s travelling narrator in relation to the non-place; see Fuchs 2007: 136. 
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backpacks) are in repose; night-time has enacted an inversion and the space of movement 
has become an uncanny space of slumber and stillness183.   
 The narrator describes these nomads as he passes amongst them, presenting an 
unacknowledged irony in his motion juxtaposed with their motionlessness. As he passes 
through however, the bodies begin to stir:  
 
several began moving among their brothers and sisters still lying on the ground, as if they 
were preparing for the next stage of an arduous and never-ending journey.184  
 
This passage reinforces the nomadic image in several ways. The implied fraternity of the 
travellers bonds them in solidarity; these are not individuals but a consolidated nomadic 
tribe (recalling also the notion of group subjectivity). Furthermore, the “never-ending 
journey” explicitly evokes the nomadic in denying the future possibility of any permanent 
station.  
 The Rings of Saturn features a similar instance, as the narrator comes across 
fishermen on the beach south of Lowestoft – a sight apparently familiar to him: 
 
 
I have often found all manner of tent-like shelters made of poles and cordage, sailcloth and 
oilskin, along the pebble beach. They are strung out in a long line on the margin of the sea, 
at regular intervals. It is as if the last stragglers of some nomadic people had settled there.185 
 
Again, the narrator invokes the image of the nomad but does not acknowledge the irony 
that these people are stationary and it is he who is in motion. Here, the notion of settling 
“on the margin of the sea,” is further problematic, in that it draws together the concepts of 
the nomad and of “settling”, and also the impossibility of settling “on the margin,” in a 
space which is fluid and ever-changing. The narrator analyses these settlers: 
 
They just want to be in a place where they have the world behind them, and before them 
nothing but emptiness.186 
 
                                                 
183 The sleeping body may itself be considered a “non-place” in that sleep displaces wakeful subjectivity from 
the body’s performance of the self and renders it an object, though the above account of the sleepwalking 
narrator complicates and problematises this theory.  
184 V: 83.  
185 TROS: 51. 
186 TROS: 52.  
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This suggests a vertiginous subjectivity which actively seeks an engagement with otherness, 
much like Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic subject – to be as close to this otherness as 
possible without becoming engulfed. This is a perilous position, which because of the 
permanently shifting shoreline, can only ever be temporary. 
The image of the shoreline dominates The Rings of Saturn. It is the ultimate 
extraterritorial space, shifting as the tide moves in and out, and with the break of each 
single wave. Writing on The Rings of Saturn, John Beck cites mathematician Benoit 
Mandelbrot’s paper, How Long Is The Coast Of Britain?187, which uses fractals to calculate 
coastline lengths. Mandelbrot states that not only does the length vary because of the 
movement of the sea, but the length varies depending on the scale of measurement – the 
smaller the unit of measurement, the longer the measured length. To follow this line of 
enquiry to its logical conclusion it might be said that alongside shifts made by the coastline 
over longer periods of time, tides and individual waves may be considered a form of micro-
liminality. 
 The territory of the sea becomes subject to dispute, despite or perhaps because of 
this fluidity; while English readers will be more familiar with the North Sea, the narrator 
refers to the sea alongside which he walks as the German Ocean188. It is a sea consisting 
predominantly of international waters (though its bordering nations each make a claim on 
sections of the seabed for the purpose of drilling oil). It is known by other names too – 
variants of the German Ocean (the German Sea, or the Germanic Sea) as well as the 
Frisian Sea, referring to the coast of the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. These 
attempts to definitively name the space of the sea fight against an essentially extraterritorial 
quality which refutes the definitive. Not only is it international, in name and spatially, but in 
its fluidity it is beyond territorialisation; it is the liminal space between nation states. 
Perhaps the most notable example of the extraterritorial in The Rings of Saturn is 
Orfordness, a cuspate spit upon which until 1983 lay a Ministry of Defence site. Now 
decommissioned, its purpose remains shrouded in secrecy; it is accessible to the public, but 
only by ferry from Orford, or a walk of several miles along the narrow spit from Aldeburgh 
in the north. The narrator notes its strange geography on his map189 and is intrigued. He 
notes how, “over a period of millennia”190, the shingle spit formed, stretching further and 
                                                 
187 Mandelbrot 1967: 449; cited in Beck 2004: 85-6. 
188 TROS: 78. 
189 TROS: 233. 
190 TROS: 233. 
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further south alongside the existing coast, creating a kind of anti-hinterland, a space lying 
just beyond the coast rather than behind it. This supplementary land supersedes the 
original coastline, its outer shore coming to be the coastline itself, as if the land mass has 
grown an extra skin.  
Along this stretch of coast in particular, the space of the shoreline cannot be 
territorialised because it is always shifting. Over centuries villages and towns along the 
Suffolk coast have been claimed by the sea. The narrator recounts the story of Dunwich, 
“one of the most important ports in Europe in the Middle Ages.”191  
 
On New Year’s Eve 1285 a storm tide devastated the lower town and the portside so 
terrible that for months afterwards no one could tell where the land ended and the sea 
began. 192 
 
In this image the boundary of land and sea becomes indistinct; the sea stretches into what 
was the town, lying over streets and buildings (“more than fifty churches, monasteries and 
convents… hospitals… dozens of windmills,”193). For a time the remains of these buildings 
projected above the surface of the water; though abandoned, they remained markers of 
civilisation. In this state, the shoreline no longer exists as a distinct line. It is fragmented, 
the continuity of the sea disrupted by the projecting buildings, the continuity of the land 
disrupted by the unbound sea. Alternatively it could be said that the shoreline continues to 
exist but in a radically different state, unrecognisable as a distinct line, its liminality 
distended to a wide margin that continues to demarcate one from the other but is vague, 
and includes aspects of each that it attempts to delineate. This excessive liminality 
diminishes over time – buildings standing in the sea erode and collapse, and gradually a 
more distinct shoreline re-emerges194.   
In Vertigo the counterpart to Dunwich is Venice. Like Somerleyton’s luminescence 
projecting into darkness, the promontory mass of its islands projecting into the Adriatic 
represents civilisation encroaching upon nature. It is however at threat from nature – from 
                                                 
191 TROS: 155. 
192 TROS: 157.  
193 TROS: 155. 
194 It is worth noting that the image of the tidal surge may be seen as analogous to sleep. Here the force of the 
sea is given form in a surge of water, which can be directly transposed onto an image of oncoming sleep – a 
force objectified, approaching and taking possession. The notion of force is key here too – it is something 
inescapable which, transposed onto sleep, suggests anaesthesia, or narcolepsy (the way in which the water of 
the storm surge remains, besieging the town, is also suggestive of narcolepsy).  
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the Acqua Alta tides, and, in the longer term, climate change195. It is geographically 
inhospitable to civilisation, and the intruding sea lends it the air of the dreamscape. In the 
narrator’s first account of the city the sea and canals appear to exceed their bounds, the 
waters reaching up into the air: 
 
The dampness of the autumn morning still hung thick among the houses and over the 
Grand Canal. Heavily laden, the boats went by, sitting low in the water. With a surging rush 
they came out of the mist, pushing ahead of them the aspic-green waves, and disappearing 
gain into the white swathes of the air.196  
 
This description paints Venice as part-concealed, of both this world and another. It is of 
the land, of civilisation, but also very much of the sea – the presiding element of the 
imagery is the water, which cloaks, hangs, obscures, haunts, and ultimately renders the city 
beyond definitive territory.  
 
Summary 
The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo explore notions of textual subjectivities through the liminal 
spaces that emerge between the original text and English translation, between the author 
and the narrator, the narrator and the narrated, between the many voices which constitute 
the narrative, and in the particular economy of these voices – how a haeccetic primary 
voice absorbs and marshals, but also in how that voice may be drawn towards and merge 
with an otherness, such as that represented by Michael Hamburger in The Rings of Saturn. 
The polyphonies of these texts are deftly managed; both texts display a mastery of voice in 
terms of the negotiation of haecceity and otherness. The reader never doubts the narrator 
in the way that he self-consciously doubts himself; the narrator does our doubting for us, 
and thus attains an authority which encompasses and encloses the discussion. In 
subsequent chapters I will discuss other manners in which polyphonies are instituted and 
managed, and whether these come to serve the narrative and maintain a sense of balance 
against forces which destabilise, or whether these seek to be a force of destabilisation in 
themselves.  
                                                 
195 See Fletcher and Spencer 2005. 
196 V: 52. 
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The liminal motifs presented in The Rings of Saturn and Vertigo reflect and refract the 
textual processes described above, through a transposition on to physical processes, 
processes of consciousness, and conceptions of space and motion. With discussion of 
Sebald’s travelling narrator, I introduce the concept of the nomad to the thesis; here a 
literal nomad in that the narrator is always in motion, but also a nomad of consciousness 
and subjectivity. In this sense the texts are travelogues of subjectivity – the narrator 
documents his journeys through consciousness, noting as much detail, flavour and 
idiosyncrasy as in his account of the physical landscape. In subsequent chapters I will apply 
this idea in ways which branch out from its conception, for instance in Murakami, in which 
the nomad is not a traveller of a physical landscape, but a traveller through a series of 
becomings, in a manner more analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s application of the term. 
In Van Sant the nomad becomes nomadic in every sense, in terms of physicality, 
consciousness, and subjectivity, resisting – deliberately, unwittingly, or reluctantly, all forms 
of stasis or reterritorialisation.  
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Two 
 
Haruki Murakami 
Sputnik Sweetheart, Kafka on the Shore, and After Dark 
 
This chapter focuses on what are currently Murakami’s three most recent novels in English 
translation, Sputnik Sweetheart, Kafka on the Shore, and After Dark. These novels are radically 
different to the work of Sebald in terms of genre, subject matter and in styles of narrative 
voice. In contrast to the literary and historical preoccupations of the Sebaldian narrator, 
Murakami takes as his subject matter the lives of contemporary Japanese characters. In the 
three novels discussed here these are mostly young characters, still within or recently 
passed through adolescence; their preoccupations (navigating first love, sexual desire) are 
offset by mystical quests and interventions from an obscure “other world” which reflect 
Murakami’s overarching preoccupation of locating truth and meaning within the self. It is 
this other world, often referred to in the novels as the “other side”, which draws the thesis 
toward these texts. In itself, the other side is an attractive concept for my research question 
– it is an enigma which is never unravelled, an unanswerable question, an indefinable 
quantity. Moreover, Murakami’s schema of characters negotiating the space of this side and 
the other has direct ramifications for the project of liminal subjectivities. 
Like Sebald, Murakami is principally concerned with issues of identity, transition 
and liminality, though he approaches these from fundamentally different angles, and with a 
radically different tone. Whereas Sebald takes an astringent, historical, scholarly tone, 
Murakami’s novels feature a postmodern and carnivalesque breadth of influences (or 
indeed, a mutual deterritorialisation of radically other influences – most notably in Kafka on 
the Shore in the clash of Japanese folklore and Western iconography). The tone of the 
Sebaldian narrator is also characterised by its insularity; it engages with other voices but, as 
discussed, this occurs under certain conditions. This tone is also predominantly 
introspective; the majority of the narrator’s communication is intrapsychic or directed 
towards his imagined reader. In contrast, Murakami institutes a dialogism between 
characters; much of these texts comprise of long sequences of dialogue in which the 
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characters’ viewpoints contrast and collide. In every case, the narrative subjectivity is 
outward looking, which engenders a greater potential for a truer polyphony. This is also 
apparent in the wide array of narrative modes Murakami employs – first person, third 
person, epistolary, and in After Dark an innovative first person plural narrator. 
 
The texts 
Sputnik Sweetheart follows a twentysomething narrator, K., who is in love with Sumire, who 
in turn is in love with Miu. Miu rejects Sumire’s advances with an explanation of how, years 
previously, her self was divided in a traumatic incident which left her without the capacity 
for sexuality of any kind; she perceives that the absent half of her self is beyond reach, lost 
on the “other side”. Following the rejection, Sumire vanishes, ostensibly to the other side, 
and the narrator attempts to find her. As he begins to understand her fate, he resists 
entering the other side, and accepts that he cannot follow her. 
Kafka on the Shore features two parallel narratives. The first follows fifteen-year-old 
Kafka Tamura as he runs away from his Tokyo home to the island of Shikoku. Shortly 
after his departure his father is violently murdered; simultaneously Kafka awakes in the 
grounds of a Shinto shrine covered in blood but apparently unwounded. The second 
narrative concerns Nakata, a man in his sixties who as a child fell into a coma and woke 
having lost the ability to read and write. In place of his previous academic prowess, he is 
able to converse with cats, and supplements his income tracing lost cats in his Tokyo 
neighbourhood197. One such assignment leads him the home of a man who claims to be 
making a flute from the souls of cats, and who inveigles Nakata to kill him. Nakata is then 
compelled to travel to Shikoku, to open and then close a mysterious portal, which 
corresponds to Kafka’s attempt to travel into the other side to escape his worldly fate.  
The narrative of After Dark takes place over a few hours in Tokyo. College student 
Mari stays out all night, reading in coffee houses to escape her problematic home life. Her 
sister Eri has been asleep for three months; on the night in question she is mysteriously 
transported to a room inside her television (analogous to the other side) where she is 
observed by a faceless man. Mari strikes up a new friendship with student and jazz 
trombonist Takahashi, and her translation skills are called upon to aid a young Chinese 
                                                 
197 This is a direct reference to the lost cat, and instigating incident, of Murakami’s most famous novel The 
Wind-Up Bird Chronicle (Murakami 1998b). 
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prostitute who has been assaulted by a man named Shirakawa, whom, it is implied, is the 
same man observing Eri on the other side.  
 
Murakami and Sebald 
In comparing Murakami and Sebald, my first objective is to explore the different modalities 
of subjectivity in each set of texts, the ways in which subjectivity is destabilised, and the 
liminal processes which affect the destabilisation. In Sebald the destabilisation occurs by 
means of the narrating I and the other voices it negotiates and assimilates, the deployment 
of a reality effect, and the hybridity of genre; of fiction, memoir, travelogue and historical 
essay – devices which resonate with the use of liminal images such as the shoreline, the 
nomad, and the theme of vertigo. The most prominent difference in Murakami’s novels is 
the explicit fictionality; the author makes no claim that his characters and narratives occupy 
any universe other the singular fictional universe of each diegesis. However, just as a space 
of liminality exists between Sebald’s fictionality and facticity, Murakami’s deployment of 
tropes of magic realism opens up a liminal space between a reality and an unreality – a 
naturalistically rendered representation of contemporary Japan, and an otherness 
constituted by the other side, as well as devices from Japanese folklore, such as spirit 
projection198. It follows that whereas much of the discussion of the previous chapter 
focuses on the narrator and the construction of a narrative subjectivity, the focus here is 
more upon how subjectivity manifests in the construction of Murakami’s characters. The 
discussion of subjectivity is primarily informed by Murakami’s recurrent device of positing 
an apparent “core” of subjectivity within his characters. This is seemingly at odds with 
poststructuralist notions of the subject, yet Murakami repeatedly skews the apparent 
stability of the “core” through exterior interventions of division and displacement and 
ultimately creates a tension between the reassertion of this core and a continued dissolution 
or destabilisation199.  
                                                 
198 This is a feature of Kafka on the Shore, drawn from The Tale of Genji, an eleventh century text attributed to 
Murasaki Shikibu (English translation: Muraksaki 1974 [1900]).  
199 To consider this facet of these texts within the context of Japanese literature from a Western perspective 
raises other issues of subjectivity. Kaoru Koizumi points out that the Japanese concept of subjectivity is 
already other to that of contemporary Western subjectivity, so that the reassertion of a core, rather than being 
a conservative insistence upon stability, may in fact be a destabilisation of conservative notions of subjectivity 
which – in opposition to Western notions – displace the source of meaning away from the subject, the 
individual subject always being secondary to the group subject of society. In this sense, Murakami’s assertion 
of a core becomes in fact a revolutionary reaggregation of subjectivity (Koizumi 2003: 319-320). 
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All three novels feature prominent liminal motifs; there are evocative descriptions 
of hypnagogia throughout, and all three texts explore the space of the night and its liminal 
threat and potentiality. The theme of nomadism is revisited, though in a different context 
to the Sebaldian nomad; while travel is a key theme of Sputnik Sweetheart and Kafka on the 
Shore, this is always in relation to a fixed home, which is almost always returned to. The 
only exception is in the character of Sumire, who embodies nomadism in much more than 
her physical travel (from Japan to England to Greece), through her transitions of 
subjectivity prior to this, and in her ultimate transit from Greece to an altogether “other” 
place.  
 Sumire’s transitions of subjectivity also reverberate with Victor Turner’s theory of 
rites of passage, as she passes through liminal positions in the quest to forge an identity. 
This is a common theme of these texts; the characters are often young; Sumire and the 
narrator of Sputnik Sweetheart are in their twenties; Kafka is fifteen; Mari, Eri and Takahashi 
are in late adolescence. As I will discuss, these novels mark the onset of what Murakami 
himself refers to as a “responsibility” in his writing200, and there is a sense that the author is 
guiding his characters through the liminal toward a stable subjectivity, a marked shift from 
earlier novels in which an adult male protagonist moves away from a stable position to 
explore and/or become consumed by the liminal and unknown201. As I will discuss, there is 
debate over whether this creates a more conservative tone to his narratives or whether this 
new direction broadens and elucidates the negotiation with otherness.  
It should also be noted that these texts are translations from the Japanese, and that 
the commentary applied to Hulse’s translation of Sebald also applies here, albeit with 
particular strictures202. These translations are by Philip Gabriel (Sputnik Sweetheart and Kafka 
on the Shore) and Jay Rubin (After Dark), and whereas Sebald closely supervised the 
translation of his work, greater liberties are taken with Murakami, suggesting a much wider 
lacuna between original and translated texts. Rebecca Suter notes that Murakami’s English 
language translators “tend to ‘domesticate’ foreign elements in Murakami’s fiction: 
culturally specific elements are often substituted with either generic or American 
                                                 
200 Rubin 2003: 274. 
201 see A Wild Sheep Chase (1989), Dance Dance Dance (1994), The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle (1998b) and South of the 
Border, West of the Sun (2000) 
202 Whereas Sebald is translated by the English poet Michael Hulse (and Anthea Bell in the case of Austerlitz), 
Murakami is translated by Americans Alfred J. Birnbaum, Jay Rubin, and Philip Gabriel. This is not to suggest 
that Murakami necessarily has a greater readership than Sebald in the US, or that Sebald has a stronger 
readership in the UK. The work of both authors is widely translated, though Murakami came to an English 
readership via the US, and Sebald via the UK. In the UK both authors share the same publisher in The 
Harvill Press (since 2002 the paperback editions of each are published in the Vintage imprint). 
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equivalents, so that he does not sound ‘too Japanese’ in translation.”203 Rubin offers an 
account of translating Murakami in which he cites the myriad issues with his translation of 
The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle and its publication in Western markets204. The three volumes of 
the Japanese original are condensed into one, and chapters are re-sequenced and in some 
cases omitted altogether. Rubin states that although Murakami approved the translation, he 
was, “uneasy that so much had been eliminated.”205 This suggests a much greater distance 
between the original and translated texts than is the case with Sebald, and as such a much 
greater and more complex liminal space.  
 
Critical work on Murakami  
Murakami’s work draws as much critical interest as that of Sebald, though given 
Murakami’s more extensive body of work, this criticism is more diverse in terms of both 
the texts covered and methodological approach. Particular attention is paid to the early 
“Trilogy of the Rat”, which in part owes its allure to the fact that, of the trilogy, only the 
final text A Wild Sheep Chase206 is available in English translation outside of Japan. Two 
subsequent novels Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World207and The Wind-Up Bird 
Chronicle208 have drawn greater critical interest, especially in English language criticism. 
Much less attention has been paid to the three novels discussed here (although a body of 
criticism on Kafka on the Shore is growing slowly). These novels might be described by critics 
as lesser or minor Murakami; indeed, criticism of Sputnik Sweetheart for instance is rarely 
favourable209.  
                                                 
203 Suter 2008: 36. 
204 Rubin 2003: 304-320. 
205 Rubin 2003: 306. Rubin also supplies an anecdotal account of the 2000 German publication of South of the 
Border, West of the Sun, which is of note in that it was translated from Gabriel’s English text (1999) rather than 
Murakami’s Japanese (Rubin 2003: 305), a two-fold alienation from the original Japanese, suggesting a further 
dissolution of the “original” meaning. This is of note in that it suggests an altogether “new” text – a far point 
on a continuum of decoding and recoding in which the English language is rendered a liminal point. Given 
Suter’s account of the English language translations of Murakami, this has far-reaching ramifications for the 
authorship – and the “original” message – of the three English language texts discussed here; meaning has 
not only been displaced from the original texts across the threshold of language, but also deterritorialised by 
the intervention of Rubin, Gabriel, and their editors.  
206 Murakami 1989 [1982].  
207 Murakami 1991 [1985]. 
208 Murakami 1997 [1995]. 
209 See Rubin 2003: 250-255.  
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The first two English language monographs of Murakami are Matthew Strecher’s 
Dances with Sheep: The Quest for Identity in the Fiction of Murakami Haruki210, and Jay Rubin’s 
more populist introduction to the author’s work, Haruki Murakami and the Music of Words211. 
Subsequently Michael Seats has published Murakami Haruki: the Simulacrum in Contemporary 
Japanese Culture212, and Rebecca Suter has published The Japanization of Modernity: Murakami 
Haruki Between Japan and the United States213. In addition to these I draw on critical work by 
Philip Gabriel (also one of Murakami’s translators), Steven Kellman, Amy Ty Lai, and 
Yoshiko Yokochi Samuel. I also cite Yukawa Yutaka and Koyama Tetsuro’s interview with 
the author (translated by Rubin)214, and draw greatly on Kaoru Koizumi’s wonderfully 
incisive thesis, The Unknown Core of Existence: Representation of the Self in the Novels of Haruki 
Murakami215.  
 
The other side 
In the world of Sebald, the ultimate otherness is represented by the encroaching threat of 
death, madness, decay, or evil. The border between haecceity and otherness is not well 
defined; the narrative voice exists on the same continuum as these concepts, in the same 
extended liminal space, and strives to maintain a distance, to stave off a corruption of or by 
otherness and to maintain a discreteness and opposition. In Murakami, the border is very 
clearly defined. The notion of ultimate otherness is embodied in the “other side” and 
although the boundaries here may shift and be subject to degrees of fluidity, these 
boundaries very definitely exist. In Murakami, there is this side and the other.  
This duality of haeccity and otherness frequently intersects with themes of 
consciousness – of the conscious mind and the otherness of the unconscious mind. 
However, this division is not always made along the latitude of consciousness; it may be 
related to other aspects of subjectivity, such as sexuality, as in the case of Miu in Sputnik 
Sweetheart, or the ability to perceive oneself, as in the case of Nakata in Kafka on the Shore. 
This otherness is almost invariably designated a spatial plane, which is commonly referred 
to, especially in Sputnik Sweetheart, as the “other side”. Kaoru Koizumi states that,  
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Murakami never specifically defines the nature of the other space. It can be a locus 
between life and death; a dream-like world; a psychical world; a world of blood and 
violence. In sum, the other world accommodates what is impossible in the ordinary world, 
or what is rejected in that formation.216  
 
The other side manifests in differing ways in the three novels discussed here. In 
Sputnik Sweetheart, the character of Miu has been divided in two, though only experiences 
the half of herself that exists on this side of the divide as her “self”. Sumire, the reader 
infers, makes a transit from this side to the other without sacrificing the unity of her 
“whole” self. The narrator attempts to trace her but as he approaches the threshold of the 
two worlds he begins to understand the nature of the other side and perceives a danger. He 
resists its draw and remains on this side.  
In Kafka on the Shore, the other side is less clearly differentiated from this side. This 
is especially so in Nakata’s narrative thread, in which he is able to converse with cats and 
encounters strange figures, such as the grotesque cat-killer Johnnie Walker. This is 
elucidated late in the narrative, when a cat announces to Nakata’s friend Hoshino, “We’re 
on the border of the world, speaking a common language,”217 which would seem to suggest 
that Nakata, who has possessed the ability to speak with cats since his childhood coma, has 
for a long time inhabited this threshold between this side and the other. Nakata’s quest to 
find the “entrance stone” also suggests a definitive crossing point between this side and the 
other, which intersects with the other narrative thread in which Kafka makes a clear transit 
to the other side as he becomes lost within a forest (representing a broad liminal space 
between this world and the other) and then through a clearing within the forest (a 
definitive portal between worlds)218. Kafka enters the other side as a means of escape from 
his problems on this side (he is a suspect in the murder of his father) but ultimately he 
returns to face up to his responsibilities and in doing so, assumes a stable adult subjectivity, 
the other side becoming, for him, a liminal space of rites of passage.  
In After Dark the other side is represented as a dank room visible from this side via 
the television screen in Eri’s bedroom. Eri becomes trapped in this room and watched over 
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by the malevolent gaze of a faceless man. She feels isolated and threatened in this space 
and strives to return to this side, though sees no means of achieving this. Ultimately this is 
achieved beyond the diegesis of the novel, as Eri appears back on this side with no 
suggestion of how she made such a return219.  
The characters’ relationship to this threshold of haeccity and otherness is a primary 
focus of this chapter. The discussion considers how characters negotiate otherness, and 
how the textual subjectivity conditions the characters’ position to this otherness. In each 
text a boundary exists between this side and the other. This is sometimes constituted by a 
broad liminal space, such as the forest in Kafka on the Shore, sometimes by an invisible, 
imperceptible line, as in Sputnik Sweetheart, and sometimes by a distinct line, represented by 
a tangible object in the primary world, such as the TV screen in After Dark. In some cases 
characters are divided between these sides; in other cases characters remain whole and 
move from one side to the other, and sometimes back again. In the case of Nakata, 
Murakami presents a character living perpetually on the border. The nature of this 
boundary – its permeability or impermeability, its perceptibility or imperceptibility – is as 
much of interest as the dichotomy of this side and the other.  
In early Murakami novels, the other side is explicitly related to the unconscious 
mind; it exists as the space of the core or “black box” of consciousness220. This allusion 
remains in his later novels, though it develops to include numerous other connotations; it 
may also be the space of sleep, of death, of loss, and, with direct reference to Freud, of 
mourning and melancholia. This multiplicity of meanings presents an apparent obscurity to 
the other side, which Koizumi attempts to delineate:  
 
However metaphysical and abstract Murakami’s inclination towards this so-called “other” 
world may be . . . the dichotomy of this and the other world reflects his endeavour to 
encapsulate the unknown, and often irrational forces inside the self, which could take on a 
status of psychical reality and exercise a dangerous power on the self.221  
 
The unknowability of this otherness has the effect of a vacuum, drawing in a broad 
configuration of possible meaning. The other side comes to offer a plane upon which 
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Murakami can persistently examine the unknown and experiment with these constellations 
of meaning. 
 The binary of this side and the other also presents a question of primacy. In Sputnik 
Sweetheart the other side remains out of sight at all times. The narrator never succumbs to 
its lure, and the narrative voice itself never leaves “this” side. The other side therefore 
suffers an obfuscation, which indirectly ascribes a primacy to the narrator’s position on this 
side, rendering the other side an invisible supplement. Sumire questions whether this side 
or the other is primary reality, and ponders the ramifications of it not being the one she 
currently inhabits: 
 
If this side, where Miu is, is not the real world – if this is actually the other side – what 
about me, the person who occupies the same temporal and spatial plane as her?222 
 
This poses another question: if the other side is ascribed a primacy, what are the 
ramifications for this side, the world in which the characters’ (and the reader’s) primary 
experience occurs?  
These three novels are of particular interest as they offer something of a sea-change 
in how Murakami presents this otherness. With Sputnik Sweetheart, the representation of the 
other side becomes broader and more multi-faceted, though there appears to be a conflict 
in readings of this new approach, between a reading of the insistence on refusing this 
otherness and maintaining a responsible engagement with this side, and a reading of an 
increased openness to this otherness. Sputnik Sweetheart is Murakami’s first novel following 
his experience documenting the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 
1995. Murakami published two books, Underground223 and The Place That Was Promised224, 
(collected in English translation as Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese 
Psyche225), the former a collection of interviews with survivors of the attacks, the latter 
interviews with members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The interviews in The Place That Was 
Promised226 build a picture of Aum members who either rejected the mainstream or felt that 
the mainstream had rejected them. In selecting an alternative lifestyle they unwittingly 
chose one which would culminate in terrorism, though each member interviewed by 
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Murakami claims to have known nothing of the attack until it had taken place. The motive 
for the attack itself remains obscure, presenting a void of unknowability which resonates 
strongly with the other side.  
Philip Gabriel and Yoshiko Yokochi Samuel both suggest that Murakami’s 
experience of interviewing members of Aum Shinrikyo led him to reconsider his concept 
of otherness227. Samuel makes the claim that: 
 
Murakami’s experience in collecting and publishing the personal testimonies of survivors 
and perpetrators of the 1995 gas attack on Tokyo subway – that is, of those who have 
returned to “this side” after an ordeal on “the other side” – has helped him turn his 
attention more to “this side.”228  
 
Gabriel is more direct in linking the experience of Underground with the writing of Sputnik 
Sweetheart, stating that, “Sputnik Sweetheart is Murakami’s first attempt at “shaping [the Aum 
experience] into a narrative form.”229 He suggests that Sputnik Sweetheart is in fact a direct 
descendent of Underground, noting that in the novel, “Murakami appropriates the kind of 
philosophically oriented, oral history-like confessional, especially of early childhood and 
youth, found in the interviews with Aum members,”230 and suggests that, “Murakami 
borrows details and motifs from the lives of Aum members for his fictional characters.”231 
He claims that Sumire is, “an amalgam of features of several of them, particularly 
Namimura Akio, Kanda Miyuki, and Inaba Mitsuharu,”232 and that Miu’s experience is, “an 
echo of the chilling experience of the Aum member Inaba, who described how his ascetic 
training made his ‘subconscious be[gin] to emerge and sense of reality gr[ow] faint’.”233  
It is impossible to not notice the similarity between Inaba’s experience in Aum as 
recounted to Murakami, and Miu’s experience in Sputnik Sweetheart; at one point Inaba 
states explicitly, “My consciousness had gone over to the other side and I couldn’t get it 
back.”234 Here the term “the other side” is used, as translated by Gabriel, serving as a direct 
precursor to the use of the term in Sputnik Sweetheart, the English translation of which is 
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also by Gabriel. Gabriel is explicit in citing this as a turning point in Murakami’s 
representation of the other side:  
 
In the pre-Aum fiction the “other world” is mostly menacing, with characters, as Rubin 
says, who are stymied in any search for spiritual meaning. But in his post-Aum novels – 
Sputnik Sweetheart and Kafka on the Shore – Murakami begins to reveal something different; 
an “other side” that is both accessible and from which one can return. Most importantly, 
this other side, while still frightening in some ways, is spiritually restorative. In his post-
Aum fiction, I argue, Murakami extends the this world/other world thematic of his earlier 
work in an attempt to find a different relationship between the two: not a yawning abyss of 
separation, but rather an overlap in which the two worlds can touch in ways that are not 
explosive and deadly, but productive. These new narratives, and the characters’ interaction 
with them, evince the other world as hopeful and even restorative to those who, in the 
final analysis, must live in the chaos that is reality.235  
 
Gabriel presupposes that Murakami reconfigures his other world as a matter of 
reconciliation, and that Sputnik Sweetheart offers an other side which is other yet also part of 
a greater whole. This would seem to dispute the fact of its otherness; it is as if Murakami 
attempts an assimilation of otherness to restrain it within sanctioned boundaries – an 
otherness which permits alternative lifestyles such as those of the Aum members in the 
hope that such inclusion within a group whole will preclude the violent otherness of 
terrorism. On the one hand, the other side remains precarious, invisible and inaccessible, 
on the other it is a sanctioned and necessary space. Gabriel suggests that Sputnik Sweetheart,  
 
attempts to create a newly imagined relationship between the two worlds. Instead of 
ending up a world of loss, the other side is now a world of reconciliation, restoration, and 
above all, hope.236  
 
That Sputnik Sweetheart represents a change Murakami’s treatment of the other side is 
undisputed. However, Koizumi and Samuel argue that rather than a more open 
engagement, Murakami chooses to relegate the other side to a definitively secondary 
position. As he sanctions the space of otherness, he simultaneously designates it an inferior 
status. Samuel notes that,  
 
unlike the previous works, [Sputnik Sweetheart] focuses more on reality on “this side” than 
fantasy on “the other side.” K, for example, refuses to be lured into “the other side” while 
on the island, [and] returns to Tokyo.237  
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Koizumi offers a contrast with the earlier novel Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End 
of the World, in which the protagonist is divided in alternate chapters between “Hard-Boiled 
Wonderland” which represents the space of his conscious mind, and “The End of the 
World,” which represents the space of his unconscious mind. Here the space of otherness 
is presented as, “a utopian construct . . . a peaceful, communal life.”238 Koizumi surmises 
that, “the End of the World appears to be a better alternative to [the] conscious world.”239   
 This would seem to stand in opposition to Gabriel’s assertion that Sputnik Sweetheart 
contains a more positive rendering of otherness. Compared to the utopia in Hard-Boiled 
Wonderland and the End of the World, the other side as represented in Murakami’s more recent 
fiction is a space which one must return from and which cannot sustain the self. As the 
narrator of Sputnik Sweetheart ultimately surmises, an open liaison with the other side is 
impossible: 
 
I dream. Sometimes I think that’s the only right thing to do. To dream, to live in the world 
of dreams – just as Sumire said. But it doesn’t last forever. Wakefulness always comes to 
take me back.240  
 
Whereas such an ongoing engagement with the other side was possible and even desirable 
in Murakami’s early work, it appears to have become stigmatised, a refuge from a primary 
reality which can only ever be temporary.   
This shift, and its consequences for Murakami’s representation of the other side, 
extends beyond Sputnik Sweetheart into Kafka on the Shore and After Dark. In Kafka on the 
Shore Kafka returns from the other side and assumes an adult responsibility. Rubin 
compares Kafka’s “clear-cut decision to abandon the attraction of lotus-land,” to Hard-
Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World241 in which the narrator, “decided to linger for ever 
in the forest while his shadow returned to the real world.”242 He cites a 2003 interview in 
which Murakami accounts for the emergence of this responsibility: 
 
Murakami: I have no regrets about [the conclusion of Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of 
the World] now. It was the most honest conclusion I could come up with at the time… If I 
were to write that story now, it would turn out differently… probably because my view of 
                                                 
238 Koizumi 2003: 171. 
239 Koizumi 2003: 171. 
240 SS: 226. 
241 Rubin describes Kafka on the Shore as a “quasi-sequel” to Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World 
(Rubin 2003: 270). 
242 Rubin 2003: 274. 
68 
 
the world and maybe of the function of the novel has changed. It’s a simple matter of a 
sense of responsibility.243 
 
Murakami’s new sense of responsibility posits a conservative tone in these texts, as the 
other side, previously imbued with a positive energy as a playful alternative to or refuge 
from the regimented order of this side, becomes associated with a darkness – a danger, a 
chaos, a fatalistic lure, and a dangerous lack of responsibility. 
 This is most notable in After Dark, in which Eri’s withdrawal from wakefulness 
leads to her becoming trapped in the other side and watched over by a malevolent gaze. 
Here the other side is not the “lotus-land,” Rubin refers to: 
 
It smells like a room that has not been cleaned for some time. The window is shut tight, 
and the air does not move. It’s chilly and smells faintly of mould. The silence is so deep it 
hurts our ears. No one is here, nor do we sense the presence of something lurking in here. 
If there was such a thing here before, it has long since departed.244  
 
Whereas Sumire’s journey to the other side is a necessity when her existence on this side 
becomes no longer tenable, Eri’s imprisonment on the other side seems to be a kind of 
punishment for refusing to engage with the world on this side – a warning that to rescind 
an engagement with conscious, wakeful reality, is to rescind all control of the self.  
 
Textual subjectivities  
Across Murakami’s fiction there occurs a negotiation with otherness which engenders a 
polyphony in the modes the author employs at the surface of the text and amongst the 
voices of characters. The former is evident in the graphological variations in Kafka on the 
Shore and to a lesser degree in Sputnik Sweetheart (the use of different typefaces and other 
textual effects), and in the first person plural narrator of After Dark, which approximates a 
cinematic gaze and affects an intimate and sometimes sinister complicity with the reader. 
The latter is evident – explicitly so – in extended passages of dialogue between characters 
which occur throughout all three novels.  
In addition to this, notions of “stable” and “unstable” subjectivity are 
deconstructed via the assertion that the characters hold a “core” of identity, an idea which 
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serves to effect an illusion of centred subjectivity (and which consequently lends the text 
itself the illusion of a stable centred subjectivity). This is destabilised as the characters 
suffer assaults upon this unity of self, being divided in two, as in the case of Miu in Sputnik 
Sweetheart, or displaced from the body, as with Eri in After Dark. The narrative itself 
becomes destabilised as no answers are offered to the fundamental questions posed at its 
supposed narrative core. For Miu, there is no reunification of self, and no answer to the 
enigma of the division. In After Dark there is no answer to Eri’s displacement, and in Kafka 
on the Shore, no answer to the question of who killed Kafka’s father. In refusing teleological 
closure, the text eludes stability just as stability eludes the characters. In each case, the 
construction of the narrative voice is fundamental to this treatment of textual subjectivity.  
 
The narrative subject  
The narrative voice of Sputnik Sweetheart achieves a centred subjectivity in its early chapters, 
in which the only voice is that of the narrator, K. The narrator however is not the primary 
character; the narrative takes as its focus the life of the object of the narrator’s unrequited 
love, Sumire. Rubin suggests that the narrator, “functions primarily as a window on 
Sumire,” and that his desire for and focus on Sumire conditions his own position in the 
narrative245. Later, as the narrator recounts the stories told to him by Sumire and Miu, the 
singularity of the narrative voice becomes other to a much greater degree, as it shifts from 
intimate and subjective first person to the illusion of an omniscient third person.  
The narrative voice becomes other absolutely with chapters eleven and twelve246, 
which are given over entirely to documents the narrator finds on floppy disks belonging to 
Sumire. Rubin draws attention to the otherness of the voice in these chapters: “Especially 
when her writing is quoted, the cuteness quotient can go off the charts.”247 It is, at least in 
Gabriel’s English translation, difficult to note a distinction between the “cuteness” of 
Sumire’s voice and that of the narrator, though the shift between voices is also denoted 
graphologically, by a change in typeface; Sumire’s voice is rendered sans serif, which lends 
it a less distinguished and more simplistic, perhaps childlike, perhaps unfussy, appearance.  
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These interventions appear to unsettle the centred subjectivity constructed in the 
early chapters, though the narrator retains control of the narrative as a whole; the stories 
told to the narrator by Miu and Sumire are at all times modulated through the narrator’s 
own voice. Chapters Eleven and Twelve are framed by the narrator as “found” documents; 
Chapter Ten closes with the narrator stating, “I set my pointer on Document 1 and double-
clicked the icon,”248 and Chapter Thirteen opens with, “I read each document twice.”249 
The narrator reminds the reader that we are privy to these documents only through his 
reading consciousness; Sumire’s narrative voice is mediated through a textual subjectivity 
over which he is master. This recalls the flirtation with polyphony present in Vertigo and 
The Rings of Saturn, which is willing to give voice to otherness yet retains ultimate control, 
and thus fails to achieve a genuine polyphony250. 
Kafka on the Shore is more convincing in its drawing of voices from multiple sources 
and discourses. The odd-numbered chapters follow the story of Kafka via a first person 
narration, and I will below offer a detailed analysis of how this narrative subjectivity 
operates with regard to the theme of sleep and wakefulness. The even-numbered chapters 
follow the story of Nakata, through a greater array of narrative devices; the early Nakata 
chapters consist of army intelligence reports of the “Yamanashi incident”, a strange event 
of mass hypnosis which prefigured Nakata’s childhood coma251 and a letter from Nakata’s 
teacher, written some years after the event252. While a third person narrative seems 
appropriate for a character who refers to himself only in the third person, Nakata is entirely 
absent from some later chapters, which focus on his travelling companion Hoshino253. 
These fluctuations resist the establishment of a stable narrative voice, and owing to short 
chapters of just a few thousand words, it is never long before a new voice takes command 
of the narrative. Hence one voice becomes another becomes another, instating in the text a 
polyphonic chain of becoming-other. 
The most consistent voice of the novel is that of Kafka, which is, initially at least, 
constructed as being entirely of wakefulness. Kafka’s first three chapters, which in terms of 
character exposition are fundamental, are framed by the narrator’s sleep: 
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Then I close the curtain and fall back to sleep. 
conclusion of Chapter 1.254 
 
It’s nearly dawn when I wake up. 
opening of Chapter 3.255 
 
I shut my book and look for a while at the passing scenery. But very soon, before I realise 
it, I fall asleep myself.  
conclusion of Chapter 3.256 
 
I’m asleep when our bus drives across the huge new bridge over the Inland Sea. I’d seen 
the bridge only on maps and had been looking forward to seeing it for real. Somebody taps 
me on the shoulder and I wake up. 
opening of Chapter 5.257 
 
I shove the phone into the pocket of my backpack, turn off the light and close my eyes. I 
don’t dream. Come to think of it, I haven’t had any dreams in a long time. 
conclusion of Chapter 5.258 
 
Kafka is constructed through his wakeful acts; all that is narrated falls within wakefulness, 
and everything beyond wakefulness escapes the narrating I. This posits narrative 
subjectivity definitively within wakefulness and ramifies with Koizumi’s assertion that, 
“Murakami sees consciousness as the site of the self.”259 To be unable to perceive oneself 
or others from within sleep makes apparent sense for a first-person narrator, yet in 
Murakami this is unusual; frequently across his fiction, characters narrate from within states 
other to wakeful consciousness (Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World and The 
Wind-Up Bird Chronicle being notable cases in point).  
Here this device posits Kafka as a character of the wakeful world, existing in a 
primary realm of reality. Later he will deviate from this schematic, and the final instance in 
these examples appears to suggest the possibility that an otherness which is not dream will 
come to fill the voids between his periods of wakefulness. He falls asleep but does not 
dream; indeed, he continues to narrate from this position; he is asleep yet aware that his 
sleep is absent of dream. This perhaps explains the narrative lacuna between states of 
wakefulness – if the narrator does not dream, then sleep is a void and therefore impossible 
to represent.  
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Like Kafka on the Shore, the chapters of After Dark alternate between stories 
concerning Mari (awake in the dead of night) and Eri (perpetually asleep), though whereas 
in the former novel the more stable textual subjectivity is achieved through the first person 
narration of Kafka, here the text achieves a greater stability via an exterior narrative voice. 
After Dark constructs a first person plural narrator, exterior to the central characters of 
Mari and Eri, which Suter suggests is “a parody of the extradiegetic narrator of the 
traditional realist novel, the purely external observer that does not get involved with the 
story.”260 This has the effect of rendering the reader complicit with its narrative gaze. Suter 
states:  
 
[T]he question of gaze is . . . clearly foregrounded and problematized . . . “we” slowly 
approach the characters in a cinematographic way… seeing the protagonists “as though we 
were a camera.”261  
 
As I will discuss, in Eri’s story this device achieves a sinister effect, with the narrative voice 
reflexively commenting upon its own gaze (and the manner in which this gaze “holds” 
Eri’s body). In Mari’s story the device soon becomes all but invisible; overwhelmed by 
action and dialogue, it assumes the effect of an omniscient third person narrator, more 
apparently exterior and therefore not so overtly intrusive. This action and dialogue renders 
the character of Mari more accessible, more individuated and whole, than that of her sister 
Eri, who remains asleep throughout her narrative and as such engages in only intrapersonal 
communication. Mari engages in conversations with several other characters – Takahashi, 
Kaoru, Komugi, Korogi, and Guo Dongli – and via these interactions the reader is given 
access to her thoughts. Like Kafka, her character is constructed upon this wakeful 
subjectivity.  
For Eri, this first person plural narrator is particularly problematic. It serves to 
construct a gaze within which is held the object of her sleeping body, which Michael Seats 
suggests constructs, “sometimes alarming viewing positions for the ‘reader’.”262 This is 
explicitly acknowledged in the reader’s first introduction to Eri: 
 
The room is dark, but our eyes gradually adjust to the darkness. A woman lies in bed, 
asleep. A young beautiful woman: Mari’s sister, Eri. Eri Asai . . . We allow ourselves to 
become a single point of view, and we observe her for a time. Perhaps it should be said 
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that we are peeping in on her . . . Her small, well-shaped lips are tightened into a straight 
line.263  
 
Here the narrative voice acknowledges that it is “peeping” and also sees fit to comment on 
Eri’s “well-shaped lips”; the passive sleeping object and active viewing subject are placed in 
sharp contrast. Suter argues that this device makes, “the narrator and the implied reader 
even closer,”264 yet when compared to the textual treatment of Mari – engaging in dialogue, 
sharing thoughts, participating in an objective, wakeful reality – Eri seems the more distant 
character. Whereas Mari’s subjectivity is represented as wakeful, active, and in the midst of 
dialogue, Eri is constructed through the representation of her sleeping body and its absence 
of her “self”; she is a sleeping body and nothing more – in Suter’s words, an “unaware and 
passive object.”265 A discrepancy forms in the reader’s distance from each, and the stability 
of the narrative as a whole is unsettled as the reader is repeatedly drawn close and then held 
back as the chapters alternate.  
 
The core self 
Whereas the Sebald texts announce an elusion of singularity whilst covertly achieving a 
monological effect of flatness, Murakami explicitly posits in his characters the notion of a 
“core self.” Writing on The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, Matthew Strecher identifies a room 
within the “maze-like hotel,” which represents the protagonist’s unconscious, as “the core, 
the centre of his whole being,”266 and similarly, the narrator of Dance Dance Dance, 
“discovers a musty, dust-filled room in a deep corner of his mind.”267 Strecher identifies 
Murakami’s first use of a “black box” metaphor for this core in Hard-Boiled Wonderland and 
the End of the World: 
 
when the protagonist is told by a scientist who has been tinkering with electrical circuits in 
his brain that the core consciousness is like the ‘black box’ used to record flight data on 
aircraft: it contains all the information necessary to form the individual identity, but it is 
impervious to attempts to open it and observe its contents. This is identity.268 
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A black box is something which is viewed in terms of its exterior, its interior beyond 
perception or knowledge269. It is a singular entity, undivided and impenetrable, and a 
container of objective truth.  
The idea of the self as a black box is problematic here; the subject, as I choose to 
understand it, has only an illusory core, and therefore the self has no core other than the 
brute physicality of the body, the fact of consciousness, and the separateness from others. 
The subject is an irrevocably divided construct; rather than emanating from an interior 
core, its source of meaning is displaced away from the individual. In apparent contrast to 
this, Murakami endows his characters with a particular essence – an identity which is 
unique and, in theory, indivisible. However, the notion of the core as a black box resonates 
with theories of the unconscious; the black box is a repository of information and meaning, 
possibly encrypted, lying beyond primary consciousness, not immediately accessible, if at 
all, but a record nonetheless. It is a site where meaning endures, beyond its displacement 
from consciousness. Koizumi makes this explicit in stating that the black box “is a 
metaphor for the unconscious, which Murakami also defines as the core of 
consciousness,”270 and suggests that it is “the self’s relation to its unknown core component 
which simultaneously anchors and destabilises itself.”271 It is unclear however if Murakami 
is positing this core as the origin of meaning, or the product of subjectivity; that is, if it is 
something inherent from which identity emanates, or if it is an arbitrary centre which 
accrues over time in a kind of sedimentation of meaning. This calls to mind the image of 
Orfordness in The Rings of Saturn, and of extraterritorial matter which is always shifting, 
never static, and forever resists stability.  
In After Dark, Mari and Takahashi concur that neither has been able to reach Eri, as 
if her core self is sequestered and always has been, even prior to her sleep272. It is suggested 
that her natural beauty, which led to her becoming a model, has affected a passivity in her 
and has rendered her a screen upon which others project their desires273. As such her 
identity is not disrupted by sleep, characterised as it is by her physical appearance and her 
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body; in sleep, she remains the socially constructed version of herself that others see. 
Clearly this concept is deeply problematic. An alternative reading presents itself in the idea 
that the alienated aspect of Eri’s self, the “active” aspect which has been displaced by this 
affected passivity, is the part of her which travels to the other side and which gains 
autonomy through the need to assert itself and escape from the other side’s prison-like 
bounds. The division of these aspects of Eri would seem to underscore a rhetoric which 
suggests that the individual is more than the fragmented subject and also that the notion of 
a core self is reductive.  
Mari’s core self is represented as radically different to that of Eri. While Eri is 
defined by her physical appearance and others’ perceptions of her, Mari is defined by her 
mind rather than her physical appearance274. Takahashi questions how two sisters born to 
the same parents and raised in the same environment could be so different, asking, “At 
what point do you go your separate ways?”275 This question implies a genetic essentialism 
and has connotations of a gendered sameness, and of these characters having to actively 
mark out difference rather than individuality being inherent.  
The concept of sameness is revisited at the novel’s close. Mari lies alongside her 
sleeping sister in bed. She listens for “reverberations” of Eri’s consciousness: 
 
The place where they originate is not far from here. And Eri’s flow is almost certainly 
blending with my own, Mari feels. We are sisters, after all.276 
 
This appears to undermine the notion of a singular individuated core, suggesting instead 
that there may be a coincidence of identity, a moment of intersubjectivity. It is of note that 
this moment is not only as the sisters are in physical proximity, but also as each is entering 
the liminal state of hypnagogia, Mari from wakefulness, Eri from sleep.  
 The notion of a unified core self is reflected and countered in the condition of the 
text itself. With regard to the “open question” or “lacuna”, Murakami seems determined to 
invest his narratives with enigma. He refuses definitive answers to the questions posed, and 
rarely offers complete resolutions to the teleologies he constructs. Within the texts 
discussed here there are many questions never resolved, for example, where does Sumire 
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disappear to? What really happened to Miu when her self was divided? What is the nature 
of the mysterious room that Eri travels to? What is her connection to Shirakawa? What 
happened to Nakata within his childhood coma to alter his subjectivity in such a way? Who 
killed Kafka’s father? Each novel constructs these questions with clarity and places each 
prominently within the narrative, yet no answers are ever divulged. This leaves the narrative 
open to accusations of opacity, while simultaneously enticing a readership which anticipates 
definitive answers yet derives pleasure from speculation and from having such answers 
withheld.  
In analysis of Kafka on the Shore, Seats questions the meaning of the “entrance 
stone” or iriguchi, the enigmatic something which Nakata is charged with searching for. He 
suggests that the undecidability of the iriguchi:  
 
invokes the simultaneous enticement and threat of the liminal . . . the possibility of both 
redemption and oblivion. Certainly, apart from its function as a key signifier of the liminal 
and the threshold of abjection, the ‘meaning’ of the iriguchi remains obscure to the very end 
of the narrative.277 
 
This undecidability is enticing, yet it places the stability of meaning in threat. Rubin 
suggests that the author himself refuses to place any specific meaning on his narratives or 
the images each deploys: “Murakami stubbornly asserts that the images in his work are not 
symbols and that he himself does not understand their ‘meanings’”278. This suggests that 
the unconscious of the author extends to the unconscious of the text, with no intervention 
or attempt to decode the images that manifest in the text. As with the decentred subject, 
meaning is displaced away from the body of the text. These questions and riddles function 
in the text much in the same way that questions of identity function in the characters – the 
possibility of a core truth is tantalisingly offered, then withheld. The repetition of this 
device over the body of Murakami’s work builds into a rhetorical position: beneath the 
teleological mysteries and questions of identity, there is no core of meaning. Just as the 
subject is constructed by exterior forces, the space beyond the surface is blank and 
mutable, its meaning constructed by the reader.  
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Division, displacement 
The concept of the core, with its insistence upon wholeness, also includes within it the 
possibility of division. The narrator of Sputnik Sweetheart states an awareness of his own 
wholeness: 
 
How well do we really know ourselves? When I was young I began to draw an invisible 
boundary between myself and other people. 
 SS: 60. 
 
This has clear parallels with theories of the self and subjectivity; it recalls the process 
through which the infant learns to differentiate itself from exterior objects, drawing 
boundaries to achieve individuation. The use of “began” however suggests the need to 
continue to draw these boundaries, that failure to do so will risk losing haecceity and 
wholeness. The process and maintenance of drawing boundaries and placing divisions 
between the self and other also suggests a question of boundaries drawn within the self. 
Psychoanalysis deploys the term “splitting of the ego” in several contexts, sometimes 
paradoxically. It can refer to a defence mechanism employed in fetishism to protect the 
ego, a process of identification and transference experienced in clinical practice, and, most 
straightforwardly, the splitting of the personality into two or more parts279. After splitting, 
only one of the part-egos is experienced by the subject as a “self”; the other remains but is 
driven into the unconscious.  
Strecher notes that many characters in Murakami are, “suddenly disconnected from 
some crucial part of themselves, forced to lead their lives as half-individuals.”280 The most 
notable cases of the divided self are the narrator of Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the 
World, and Miu, the object of Sumire’s desire in Sputnik Sweetheart. Miu tells Sumire, “The 
person here now isn’t the real me . . . I wish I could have met you when I was whole.”281 
She later recounts to Sumire the incident in which her self was divided282. As a student she 
visits an amusement park which she could see from her apartment; she brings binoculars 
and plans to ride the Ferris Wheel in the hope of seeing her apartment. However, the park 
closes with Miu trapped in a gondola on the wheel. She falls asleep, and upon waking looks 
through the binoculars to her apartment and sees herself, an other self, making love to a 
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man, Ferdinando, whose advances she has previously rejected. At this point her memory of 
the event comes to an end. Following this, she perceives in herself a split, as if she has been 
cut in two. Her hair turns white, and the half of her that remained in conscious reality (the 
half that she continues to perceive as her self and with whose voice she speaks) is left 
without the capacity for sexuality of any kind. She questions, “Which me, on which side of 
the mirror is the real me?”283 The use of the word mirror is of note, evoking the mirror 
stage in Lacan’s developmental model284. However, whereas the Lacanian subject is able to 
differentiate between itself and the other as a result of the mirror stage, Miu cannot. She 
perceives one half of her divided self as the seat of subjectivity yet she does not trust that it 
is her true self, “the real me.”  
The subjectivity of the divided character is represented from the opposite 
perspective in Kafka on the Shore, in which the character of Nakata – whose division is, 
again, the result of a mysterious “otherworldly” experience – does not perceive himself as 
“the real me,” but is altogether alienated from the concept of selfhood. The division of 
Nakata occurs in childhood, following a coma. According to his teacher he had been a very 
bright, if resigned, boy285; when he wakes from the coma he has no capacity for learning, 
can no longer read or write, and most notably, no longer refers to himself in the first 
person. He uses “I” as a speaking subject, and “Nakata,” when referring to himself, as in 
this dialogue with the cat Otsuka: 
 
“I know. It’s easy to forget things you don’t need any more. Nakata’s exactly the same 
way,” the man said, scratching his head.286 
 
This reference to himself in the third person suggests that he views himself as an object, an 
entity other to the I that speaks. His speaking self has become fractured from his physical 
self, which appears to carry a trace of this separation within itself, commented upon as 
Otsuka notices that Nakata has a very faint shadow: 
 
“Your problem is that your shadow is a bit – how should I put it? – faint. I thought this the 
first time I laid eyes on you, that the shadow you cast on the ground is only half as dark as 
that of ordinary people.”287 
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The faintness of his shadow implies that he is in some way opaque – light passes through 
his body, he is somehow inherently ethereal, or more simply, his shadow, the mark he casts 
on the world, is faint because it is the shadow of only half of him. Read in conjunction with 
his alienated sense of self (his inability to refer to himself as “I”), this half-shadow suggests 
that Nakata is divided not only between his speaking and physical selves, but from his 
“core” self, which lies somewhere exterior to both his voice and his body.  
This recalls the case of Miu, and Strecher’s description of characters, “disconnected 
from some crucial part of themselves.”288 However, whereas Miu comes to accept the 
division in her self, Nakata moves toward attaining a wholeness. As his quest nears its 
conclusion, a subjectivity emerges. “It’s not just that I’m dumb,” he says, towards the end 
of his narrative,289 using “I” in reference to himself for the first time. Here he also displays 
a sense of reflexivity as he analyses his particular state of being, concluding that he is 
“empty inside”290. He continues to refer to himself as Nakata, but from this point refers to 
himself intermittently as “I” and also takes an active interest in reuniting the disparate parts 
of himself: “I have to get the other half of my shadow back,” he says291.  
Like Nakata, Kafka’s subjectivity is literally fractured. “Kafka” is itself a false name, 
assumed to conceal the narrator’s identity upon running away from home. Seats comments 
that, “[a]s a signifier, the proper name ‘Kafka’ brings into play a huge range of connotative 
possibilities as to how the narrative and characters are to be ‘interpreted’.”292 Kafka has 
chosen the name for the Czech meaning of “crow” rather than as homage to Franz Kafka, 
though that connotation remains in play. Speaking to Miss Saeki, an older woman on 
whom he develops an Oedipal fixation, he says, “I have to get stronger – like a stray crow. 
That’s what Kafka means in Czech, you know – crow.”293  
This statement problematises the reader’s understanding of Kafka. Up to this point 
Kafka has referred to another character as “Crow” – the mysterious “boy named Crow”. 
This Crow is a kind of hallucination, an imaginary friend – a manifestation of an aspect of 
Kafka which he objectifies and projects outside himself. Gabriel argues that Crow is 
Kafka’s ikiryo, meaning “spirit of the living,” that is, the ghost of one still alive294. Crow 
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appears to possess much greater strength than Kafka, and is able to supersede Kafka’s 
voice to give firm instructions. On his first appearance he initiates a game, ordering Kafka 
to imagine a sandstorm: “I do as he says, get everything else out of my head. I am a total 
blank.”295  
Kafka is a “total blank,” yet the “I” remains, highlighting another division of 
subjectivity, independent of Crow; Kafka is blank, absent, yet his narrating voice remains 
present, maintaining the agency to refer to the other’s blankness. At a further exterior 
position, Crow’s voice enters the text, rendered in bold typeface. This affects a clear 
distinction between voices, instituting an opposition of the standard typeface of Kafka’s 
first person narrative, and an other, stronger, more emphatic mode of address. Crow’s text 
asserts a greater authority than Kafka’s, which resounds with the notion of the super-ego296, 
a role which Crow certainly fulfils in Kafka; despite being merely an aspect of his host, he 
appears to be wiser and more articulate, functioning at different times as a guide, a calming 
influence, and a conscience. He maintains a steady, unflustered tone; when Kafka is under 
pressure he turns to Crow for help, and when Crow is unavailable, he flounders:  
 
I search for the right words. First of all I look for the boy named Crow, but he’s nowhere 
to be found. I’m left to choose them on my own, and that takes time.297  
 
That Crow is always outside of and separate to Kafka makes Kafka’s statement to Miss 
Saeki all the more surprising; it subverts the description of Crow as exterior in his direct 
first person to narration to the reader. The reader is already aware that Crow is an aspect of 
Kafka, but here he becomes explicitly aligned with Kafka – Kafka and Crow become one, 
become whole. This marks an important development in Kafka’s journey through the 
liminal. He takes on the powerful mantle of Crow and attains a new strength in uniting 
these disparate aspects of himself. 
These notions of division are made even more explicit in Murakami’s short story 
Sleep298, in which the unnamed female narrator discovers she is able to survive without 
sleep. She finds she enjoys her sleepless life as she is able to fulfil her social duties as a wife 
and mother, and have time to herself, which she spends reading novels. She achieves this 
perpetual wakefulness through separating mind and body: 
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It was easy once I got the hang of it. All I had to do was break the connection between my 
mind and my body. While my body went about its business, my mind floated in its own 
inner space.299  
 
She recalls a time in college when she first experienced insomnia (or “something like it”300) 
which leaves her feeling tired in the daylight hours, never fully awake nor asleep. Her 
second experience of sleeplessness is “nothing like that insomnia, nothing at all. I just can’t 
sleep. Not for one second.”301  
 
Aside from that simple fact, I’m perfectly normal. I don’t feel sleepy, and my mind is as 
clear as ever. Clearer, if anything. . . In terms of everyday reality, there’s nothing wrong 
with me. I just can’t sleep.302 
 
Suter comments that the narrator’s “‘new self’ is amazed at how easy it is to separate mind 
and body and make them work independently.”303 She continues: 
 
If during her first insomnia the narrator lived the separation between mind and body 
passively, as a disconcerting state in the face of which she was powerless, now she actively 
appropriates it, cultivating it as a resource that allows her to be herself while simultaneously 
continuing to play her part. To overcome the sense of alienation from her role as wife and 
mother, the narrator decides to distance the reality that has been imposed on her and to 
live in two different worlds at the same time.304   
 
This resonates with the displacement of subjectivity which occurs with Eri, as the camera-
like narrator objectifies her sleeping body, and her subjectivity is displaced, manifesting in a 
mysterious room on her TV screen. It also ramifies with an event in Kafka on the Shore, in 
which Kafka is passed out in the grounds of a Shinto shrine in Shikoku as his father is 
murdered hundreds of miles away in Tokyo. It is postulated within the novel that this is an 
instance of sprit projection, an event which sees the subject displaced from the body and 
able to travel away from the body across space or time. This concept is first mentioned in 
reference to Nakata; the doctor treating Nakata during his childhood coma suggests that 
Nakata is experiencing such an occurrence:  
                                                 
299 Murakami 1993: 96.  
300 Murakami 1993: 74. 
301 Murakami 1993: 76. 
302 Murakami 1993: 76. 
303 Suter 2008: 160. 
304 Suter 2008: 161. 
82 
 
 
It might sound strange to put it this way, but it seemed like the real Nakata had gone off 
somewhere, leaving behind for a time the physical container, which in his absence kept all 
his bodily functions going at the minimum level needed to preserve itself. The term “spirit 
projection” sprang to mind . . . the soul temporarily leaves the body, goes off a great 
distance to take care of some vital task and then returns to reunite with the body.305  
 
In each case, subjectivity is displaced from within the bounds of the body during sleep. The 
sleeping body becomes a site which is not inscribed by subjectivity, or by the wakeful 
“performance” of the self, which in turn suggests a question of how identity is performed 
during sleep.  
In summary, the core of the self comes to reverberate with the space of the other 
side. It is whole and undivided; it is the unconscious – an otherness interior to the 
characters, separate from physicality and the conscious mind yet inextricably linked to the 
exterior otherness, what might be understood as a space of the collective unconscious, as 
embodied in the notion of the other side. These exterior and interior forms of otherness 
appear to interact and effect ruptures within the characters – a division in Miu, a 
displacement in Eri, a permanent liminal hypnagogia in Nakata.  
 
Liminal motifs 
As with Sebald, the Murakami texts present a wide array of liminal motifs; the hypnagogic 
and the nomadic are present, though approached from new angles. Here we see the 
hypnagogic evoked with greater focus on physicality and the body, and while less attention 
is paid to the potentially obfuscated liminal site, as evoked in the Sebaldian narrator’s 
moments of existential disorientation, Murakami professes a site of elucidation, a peak 
rather than a trough, a liminal site which is inclusive rather than exclusive of the states it 
bridges.  
 In addition to these discussions, the Murakami texts offer the opportunity to 
discuss two further tropes of the liminal – the night, a space which can be theorised via 
notions of the vespertine, the non-place, and the carnivalesque – and the rites of passage, 
as embodied in the space of adolescence. The narrative of After Dark is bound within the 
temporal confines of a single night; in Sputnik Sweetheart, Sumire makes her transition to the 
other side at night, and similarly the narrator attempts to trace her across that boundary in 
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darkness. In these instances, night appears to attain a kind of agency and effects a 
carnivalesque liminality which engenders such transitions.  The adolescent characters of 
Kafka and Mari are shown to move through liminal rites of passage, toward a stable adult 
identity; in contrast, Sumire, already beyond adolescence, refuses a stable identity and 
negotiates a nomadic identity as she opts for new becoming after new becoming.   
 
Hypnagogia  
Hypnagogia is a very prominent model of liminality in these texts. In Sputnik Sweetheart, all 
three of the main characters encounter the other side while in the proximity of sleep. Miu 
loses part of herself while in a hypnagogic state, Sumire makes her transit to the other side, 
and the narrator resists its pull, both from the space of hypnagogia. Kafka on the Shore 
features two central occurrences of sleep. One concerns an incident of spirit projection – 
Kafka’s murder of his father – and the other occurs when the young Nakata and his 
classmates fall asleep while on an excursion with their young teacher, Setsuko; his 
classmates wake, but Nakata remains in his coma for weeks and emerges with a radically 
altered subjectivity. In After Dark, Eri sleeps while Mari is awake; Mari engages with 
otherness, while Eri’s self-imposed solitude renders her a singular object for the narrator’s 
gaze and the sexually threatening gaze of Shirikawa.  
The dichotomy of a primary wakefulness and a supplemental sleep is apparent in 
Sputnik Sweetheart, in which the space of wakefulness is privileged as a site in which one may 
be alert to engage with life and open to otherness. The privileging of wakefulness is present 
in advice given to the narrator which he passes on to Sumire: 
 
“What’s important is being attentive. Staying calm, being alert to things around you… The 
part about being alert… not prejudging things, listening to what’s going on, keeping your 
ears, heart, and mind open.”306 
 
The narrator implies that wakefulness is a necessity for engagement with other things; he 
even suggests thinking about “a cucumber in a fridge on a summer afternoon”307 to 
enhance this alertness, which ramifies with the idea of a continuum, as discussed in The 
Rings of Saturn in relation to the “bleaching” of consciousness. The idea of “keeping your 
ears, heart, and mind open,” suggests a receptiveness to and an engagement with that 
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which lies beyond the self, such as sensory experiences or interpersonal encounters. This 
viewpoint re-asserts a primacy of wakeful alertness and contrasts with the depiction of Eri 
in After Dark, adrift and isolated in the oblivion of sleep. Murakami uses the metonymy of 
heart and mind, referring to Eri’s “heart and mind at the bottom of the sea,”308 which 
would seem to suggest that sleep effects an absence of the self from the surface of the 
body at the very least, and perhaps a total displacement from the body. 
With this prioritisation of wakefulness already instated, Murakami pays particular 
attention to sites of hypnagogia, constructing his characters in this state on frequent 
occasion, and never neglecting to evoke how proximity to sleep affects these characters’ 
subjectivity. In an airport departure lounge, the narrator of Sputnik Sweetheart states that he 
is “in the midst of [an] illogical dream – or uncertain wakefulness.”309 Shortly afterwards he 
“wakes”310; a border of consciousness is crossed, though it is unclear what state of 
consciousness has he entered if he was already within wakefulness. The continuity of 
consciousness is disrupted, recalling the sensation of “waking” from a dream, only to 
discover one is still within the dream. 
 The physical effects of hypnagogia are evoked in a description of Sumire from 
Miu’s perspective. Miu wakes in the night and finds Sumire in her room, “crouched like an 
insect between the door and the wardrobe.”311 Sumire is in a trance; she does not respond 
to Miu’s voice, though, “[h]er eyes were open, but unseeing,”312 presenting a paradox – the 
ghost of wakefulness manifest in sleep, or vice versa. Miu helps Sumire into her bed, and 
watches as she closes her eyes and appears to fall into a more definite sleep313. Later, she 
finds Sumire has woken and is relatively lucid, though she remains within the hypnagogic 
and is unable to coordinate her fingers to button her pyjamas314. This hypnagogic episode 
immediately precedes Sumire’s disappearance and transit to the other side, and appears to 
prefigure the transit, as if her paradoxical state of consciousness were a pre-condition. This 
might appear to confound the narrator’s earlier assertion that an alert wakefulness is 
necessary to engage with otherness.  
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The manner in which sleep and wakefulness act upon each other as disruptive 
agents is illustrated in another instance in which the two states take on a weight as each 
struggles for dominance. Sumire telephones the narrator at night and he struggles to wake 
himself; he says, “Just holding this phone I feel like I’m holding up a crumbling stone 
wall.”315 Here the weight of sleep is embodied in the image of the stone wall; if he lets the 
wall fall, he will fall back into sleep. Similarly, Sumire remains in a semiconscious state as 
she tries to put on pyjamas following a deep trance: “It took some time to get all the 
buttons fastened. Her fingers wouldn’t work right.”316 Here Sumire, still partially within 
sleep, lacks conscious control of her body, which itself becomes the site of a struggle 
between the two states, between the conscious desire for activity and control, and the pull 
towards inactivity and the oblivion it represents.  
Murakami repeats the event of being roused from sleep by a telephone call in After 
Dark, as Mari is woken by Takahashi: 
 
“Practice over?” she asks, but she hardly recognises her own voice. I am me and not me.317  
 
In her hypnopompic state, Mari is both her sleeping self and wakeful self, yet fully neither. 
Her confusion and failure to recognise herself upon waking suggests an apparent rupture 
between these selves. She has remembered that Takahashi has been attending band 
practice, but she “hardly recognises her voice,” suggesting a partial, fragmented and 
arbitrary continuity from a previous period of wakefulness; she is able to recall an event 
which is definitively exterior to her, yet her voice, a core aspect of her wakeful self, 
becomes something other to her, an object outside of her self. The act of waking 
necessitates that Mari’s sleeping subjectivity incorporates the otherness of her wakeful 
subjectivity, for example, that she recognises her voice as her own, and allows her wakeful 
subjectivity to re-establish itself. This process is repeated upon each instance of waking, 
and it follows that there would be an equivalent upon falling asleep; we might therefore 
conceive of a continuity to one’s sleeping self which must re-establish and reassert itself 
upon each instance of falling asleep. 
Murakami offers an alternative model in Mari’s next encounter with hypnagogia. As 
she falls asleep, “a thick cloak . . . envelops her.”318 This image of hypnagogia carries 
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connotations of concealment, Mari’s wakeful self becoming obscured by a “thick cloak”; it 
bestows upon sleep an agency to conceal the subject’s wakeful self from external 
perception, beyond the surface of the body. Mari is rendered as Eri – an object. The 
narrative does not follow Mari into sleep – that is, the Mari who is enveloped by sleep – 
but remains at a distance, observing her sleeping body. It acknowledges that this body is 
not Mari and that she is out of sight, but it is reticent to follow.  
Murakami offers his fullest, most lingering evocation of hypnagogia in his 
description of Nakata in Kafka on the Shore:  
 
Nakata let his body relax, switched off his mind, letting things flow through him. This was 
natural for him, something he’d done ever since he was a child, without a second thought. 
Before long the borders of his consciousness fluttered around, just like the butterflies. 
Beyond these borders lay a dark abyss. Occasionally his consciousness would fly over the 
border and hover over that dizzying, black crevasse. But Nakata wasn’t afraid of the 
darkness or how deep it was. And why should he be? That bottomless world of darkness, 
that weighty silence and chaos, was an old friend, a part of him already. Nakata understood 
this well. In that world there was no writing, no days of the week, no scary Governor, no 
opera, no BMWs. No scissors, no tall hats. On the other hand, neither were there delicious 
eel, no tasty bean-jam buns. Everything is there, but there are no parts. Since there are no 
parts, there’s no need to replace one thing with another. No need to remove anything, or 
add anything. You don’t have to think about difficult things, just let yourself soak it all in. 
For Nakata, nothing could be better.319  
 
That Nakata “switched off his mind, letting things flow through him,” suggests he actively 
embraces this otherness, and that it is accessible not through the “alertness” stipulated in 
Sputnik Sweetheart but through the decision to forsake an alert consciousness. The sentence, 
“Occasionally his consciousness would fly over the border and hover over that dizzying, 
black crevasse,” suggests a vertigo of consciousness akin to that described by Sebald, and 
the physical sensation of falling described by Mavromatis and Oswald in their respective 
accounts of hypnagogia320. However, to Nakata this is a far from unpleasant sensation; he is 
not afraid of this darkness, it is “a part of him already.” He finds the darkness comforting 
(“nothing could be better”) as it represents a wholeness that he is unable to attain in 
wakefulness. Yet it is also a kind of oblivion; nothing is differentiated, all is one.  
That this is a comforting experience for Nakata places him in opposition to almost 
every other character across all three texts, for whom wakeful engagement is paramount 
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and oblivion is dangerous. Even Sumire, who makes an apparently successful transition to 
the other side, does not share Nakata’s ease and acceptance of oblivion. It would appear 
that, despite the apparent privileging of wakefulness, of this side over the other, that an 
engagement with the other via hypnagogia (even a total engagement as in the case of 
Nakata) need not engender a precarious subject position. It may even be desirable.  
 
The night  
In The Rings of Saturn, the narrator’s account of Somerleyton at night hints at the vespertine, 
a coming alive as night falls, and an inversion of day and night which privileges the night as 
a space of activity. Each of the Murakami texts engages with the space of night extensively 
and offers a range of models for considering its liminality. Night is, in turn, ascribed a 
primacy over day, is located as a non-place, and as a carnivalesque space.  
 Sputnik Sweetheart considers Sumire’s lifestyle as non-circadian; she is neither strictly 
diurnal nor nocturnal but lives across the day and the night, sleeping when she wants, being 
awake when she wants, and using neither sleep nor wakefulness to demarcate day and 
night.  This coincides with the narrator’s description of her as a “wild, cool, dissolute,” 
bohemian321, and aligns her with a carnivalesque disregard for such lifestyle boundaries. 
The space of the night becomes prominent later in the narrative as the site of the 
narrator’s encounter with the other side. This particular night occurs on an unnamed Greek 
island as the narrator attempts to find the missing Sumire. It is described not as a passive 
darkness or merely an absence of day, but as a space of great activity, as exemplified in the 
narrator’s account of dusk falling:  
 
Moment by moment the blue of the sky turned deeper, a large circular moon rising from 
the sea, a handful of stars piercing holes in the sky. A breeze blew up the slopes, rustling 
the hibiscus.322  
 
This recalls the concept of the vespertine in Sebald, in particular the evening activity 
signified by the “gleaming radiance” of illuminated glasshouses323. Here, it presents a 
reversal of the anticipated lessening of activity; the transitional space of dusk sees not a 
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withdrawal of the day’s activities but an announcement of the oncoming night – stars 
pierce holes in the sky; a breeze arrives to disturb the peace. Here, nightfall is an agent of 
instigation, and later acquires an even greater agency, as the narrator is awoken by a strange 
music, “far-off,” and “barely audible,”324 yet intrusive enough to wake him. He identifies it 
as having, “the uneven, sharp sound of live music,” which gives it an immediacy and 
presence, and places it in opposition to something, “played through speakers.”325 He 
considers that Sumire might be “listening to the same music,”326 and is drawn towards the 
sound. He walks toward the summit of a hill from where he perceives the music originates 
and as he approaches the source he perceives a change in himself: 
 
I looked up at the sky then, under the moonlight, and glanced at my palm. With a rush of 
understanding I knew this wasn’t my hand anymore. I can’t explain it. But at a glance I 
knew. My hand was no longer my hand, my legs no longer my legs.327  
 
The narrator’s sense of self is destabilised. His body is present yet he no longer perceives it 
to be his own. His subjectivity is displaced yet remains, exterior to his physical body, which 
he is able to observe as if it is other to his consciousness, which continues to narrate in the 
first person. The music, the mysterious source of which he never reaches, wakes him from 
sleep, and lures him into this particular state of consciousness adjacent to the other side.  
This state of consciousness instigates a disorientation akin to the hypnagogic, and in this 
proximity to otherness the stability of subjectivity begins to erode:  
 
Bathed in the pallid moonlight, my body, like some plaster puppet, had lost all living 
warmth. As if a voodoo magician had put a spell on me, blowing my transient life into this 
lump of clay. The spark of life had vanished… Someone had rearranged my cells, untied 
the threads that held my mind together.328  
 
The narrator resists the draw of the other side and the nature of this boundary remains 
uncertain329. However, his experience at this threshold hints at Sumire’s fate. Her 
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disappearance is described as “like smoke”330, which presents a very canny visual image of 
becoming-other – of something perpetually in motion from its point of origin which is 
initially visible but disperses to become invisible. It also carries connotations of transience 
and concealment – it can be opaque, a smokescreen, or smoke in the wind. It can also be 
sulphuric, as if emerging from the underworld, which in conjunction with the Greek 
location suggests an allusion to Orpheus. 
  An alternative perspective on the space of the night is offered in After Dark, the 
title of which explicitly locates the content of the narrative within this darkness. Each 
chapter begins with the image of a clock face, announcing to the reader precisely what time 
of night it is; the novel opens at five to midnight, and closes a few hours later at ten to 
seven in the morning, as the, “new sun pours new light on the city streets.”331 One 
narrative strand concerns Mari, who remains in downtown Tokyo having missed the last 
train home to her middle class suburb, possibly deliberately332. The narrative follows her 
through a succession of spaces, and documents her interaction with a succession of people.  
For Mari, the night city is a liminal space. She is a young woman away from home, 
and this particular night comes to be a rite of passage for her. Her experience of the night-
time space of the city recalls The Catcher in the Rye333 as she passes through coffee shops and 
a hotel, and comes into contact with people from radically different social orders; it seems 
no coincidence that After Dark was written shortly after Murakami completed his 
translation of Salinger334. Mari is however much more self-contained than Holden 
Caulfield; she never commands the narrative and is always represented via the third person. 
Even at this remove, she is taciturn and reticent to impart anything about herself, despite 
Takahashi’s best attempts to solicit such information.  
She passes through coffee houses, a deserted park, and a love hotel – a short-stay 
hotel for the purpose of sex, here named “Alphaville” after Godard’s 1965 film, which also 
features a succession of night-time spaces335. These spaces could all be considered as within 
the category of the non-place, in that they fulfil Augé’s definition of space which resists 
anthropological categorisation336. This is not to say a space devoid of people, but a space 
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through which people pass rather than inhabit. The non-place is an unstable and liminal 
space, as opposed to the stable space as defined by the fixture of inhabitants. Some of the 
spaces in After Dark, such as the love hotel and Takahashi’s rehearsal space, might also be 
considered vespertine, seeing an increase in activity as night falls. Others – the coffee 
shops, the park, the space of the city as a whole – see a decrease in activity as night falls, 
and might represent the non-place more acutely than in daylight hours. At night, the space 
of the city becomes depopulated; as the narrative opens at midnight, the coffee house is 
busy: 
 
Many different kinds of people are taking meals and drinking coffee . . . the street is bright 
enough and filled with people coming and going – people with places to go and people 
with no place to go.337  
 
Half an hour later, “The number of customers has decreased markedly . . . the atmosphere 
suggests a deeper stage of night.”338 Here the “deeper stage” refers to a lessening of activity, 
yet the narrative shortly takes an about turn to introduce a marked increase in activity.  
For Mari, the night becomes a space which engenders a series of particular 
interactions. She meets and converses with Takahashi, the love hotel manger Kaoru and 
her employees Korogi and Komugi, and Guo Dongli, a Chinese prostitute. These are 
people from radically different social orders, though almost all of them are of a lower social 
class than middle-class Mari. They are of this space whereas Mari is apparently not; Kaoru 
says to her, “[T]his is not the kind of neighbourhood where respectable girls ought to be 
spending the night.”339 Yet Mari, far from home, is very much at home in this space; the 
narrative avoids any threatening overtones which might locate Mari as a vulnerable young 
woman in the city at night, and presents her as not othering herself from her surroundings 
but embracing them. Mari and Kaoru treat each other as equals, extending respect and 
hospitality to each other. 
For Victor Turner, one of the most prominent facets of liminality is the “blend” of 
“lowliness and sacredness, of homogeneity and comradeship.”340 Turner argues that within 
the liminal phase there exists a state of communitas, an unstructured community in which 
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all are equal341. This resonates with the space of the carnival, which is a temporal though 
not strictly liminal space, as no progression is made through it; when the carnival ceases, 
the post-carnival state is as the pre-carnival. However, there are instances of liminality 
within the carnival, as participants move from fixed positions in the social hierarchy to an 
equality beyond, or an inversion of, the hierarchy – the beggar becomes the king and vice 
versa342. Here, the term communitas is particularly appropriate; everyone is a participant, 
both a spectator and a performer, and all are rendered equal.  
The love hotel itself may be considered a space of carnival in that it is a sanctioned 
space in which people may engage in sexual activity. Mari concludes her night in the city 
returning to the love hotel to take up Kaoru’s offer of using one of the vacant rooms to 
sleep343. Mari differs from the love hotel’s usual clientele – visitors who hire rooms for sex 
rather than sleep – and her act of sleeping deterritorialises and re-carnivalises its space.  
With the act of sleeping, the love hotel becomes a “sleep hotel”; it is now characterised not 
merely by acts of lovemaking but also by an act of sleeping. This further destabilises its 
classification as a non-place; somebody is sleeping there, and sleep, in this instance, 
connotes a homeliness: “Alone in this offbeat room, [Mari] feels, if anything, protected.”344  
In summary, Sputnik Sweetheart presents night as irrevocably other, a space which 
one might be wary of, and in which one must keep one’s guard against disruptive forces of 
otherness. After Dark presents a contrast in that it invites the reader into this otherness, and 
renders it a space of engagement, of carnival, and of interactions which may not occur 
outside of this space. Here, the night is a liminal space which engenders new alliances, and 
new becomings. It is a treasured and vital space. 
 
Rites of passage 
The proliferation of young characters in Murakami’s recent fiction, in conjunction with the 
author’s predilection for sending his characters on various kinds of quests (out of their 
realm of comfort and into an otherness, as it were) presents a clear example of Turner’s 
theory of rites of passage. To reiterate, Turner’s theory offers a means of theorising the 
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liminal space between childhood and adulthood; it comprises the individual leaving the 
“fixed point” of childhood identity and entering into a liminal period of adolescence, 
during which, “the characteristics of the ritual subject (the “passenger”) are ambiguous; he 
passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming 
state.”345 This is followed by a third phase in which the passage is completed:  
 
The ritual subject, individual or corporate, is in a relatively stable state once more and, by 
virtue of this, has rights and obligations vis-à-vis others of a clearly defined and 
“structured” type; he is expected to behave in accordance with certain customary norms 
and ethical standards binding incumbents of social position in a system of such 
positions.346 
 
Like models of translation, Turner’s model is notable in that its definition relies as much 
upon the exit as it does upon the entrance of the phase. For Turner there is no way of 
theorising or acknowledging that which enters the liminal phase but which does not 
successfully complete the transition; in this model the phase is always exited, and the 
subject is always reterritorialised.  
Turner’s account of the liminal phase is particularly applicable to Kafka’s journey, 
especially in the conclusion, in which Kafka emerges bearing an adult responsibility. 
Kafka’s rites of passage appears to have two arcs. First, there is a large arc that corresponds 
to the entirety of his narrative thread – he runs away to Shikoku, leaving behind the “earlier 
fixed point,” of the family home, and returns at the close of the narrative and assumes a 
responsible adult subjectivity. Second, there is the briefer but equally significant arc in 
which he leaves behind the safe “fixed point” of his friend Oshima’s log cabin to enter the 
dangerous space of the forest and cross to the other side. Again, he returns having 
progressed to a more mature subjectivity. As he progresses through these liminal arcs he 
assumes an ambiguity by, respectively, taking on a name which is not his own – Kafka – 
and by eluding, evading, or exceeding his wakeful self as he crosses to the other side. Upon 
his return, his “reaggregation or reincorporation,” Kafka must do the “right thing,”347 and 
return first to this side, and then to Tokyo to hand himself into the police. In doing so, he 
makes himself subject to the, “ethical standards binding incumbents of social position in a 
system of such positions.” 
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Kafka on the Shore was written as Murakami worked on his aforementioned 
translation of The Catcher in the Rye348 and the introduction of younger protagonists to 
Murakami’s fiction, to which the author positions himself as paternalistic guide (re: his 
assertion of “responsibility”349) appears to be no coincidence. Kafka on the Shore takes a 
similar bildungsroman form to The Catcher in the Rye; Kafka and Holden Caulfield are both 
teenagers on the run, both heavily burdened with a sense of guilt and responsibility. 
Whereas Holden’s leads to a breakdown350, Kafka’s leads to an absolute – if temporary – 
negation of his existence, as he crosses to the other side. He heads into the apparently 
boundless forest that surrounds Oshima’s log cabin, within which lies the entrance to the 
other side. Oshima has warned him, “once you get lost in these woods, believe me, you 
stay lost,”351 but as he moves forward into the forest he remarks, “No need to mark any 
more trees, no need to remember the path back.”352 By crossing to the other side, from 
which he initially has no intention of returning, he forsakes his wakeful life altogether. 
However, in Murakami’s topography of the other side as it manifests in Kafka on the 
Shore, Kafka’s attempt to escape his responsibilities is futile. It is already stipulated that – 
for Kafka – responsibility extends beyond wakefulness into the otherness of his dream life 
and imagination. As he begins a sexual encounter with a young woman, Sakura, he asks her 
permission to imagine her naked353. She is surprised at the request; he responds, “Imagining 
something’s very important, so I thought I’d better tell you.”354 Later he reads notes 
Oshima has been taking in his research on Adolf Eichmann. Oshima cites the epigraph of 
Yeats’ Responsibilities, “In dreams begins responsibility,”355 which strikes a chord with Kafka 
– in his guilt over his father’s death, and in his encounter with Sakura.  
 
She’d said, I don’t get it. You didn’t have to tell me that! Why don’t you just go ahead and 
imagine what you want? You don’t need my permission. How can I know what’s in your 
head? But she got it wrong. What I imagine is perhaps very important. For the entire 
world.356 
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Murakami bestows Kafka with a conscience from which he cannot escape, no matter what 
state of consciousness he inhabits. This changes only once Kafka has returned from the 
other side and assumed a responsible, adult subjectivity. He tells Sakura he had a dream 
about her. “A pretty raunchy one, I bet?” she says. He replies: “Could be… But it was just 
a dream.”357 His post-liminal, more stable position appears to allow a delineation of the 
content of dream and wakeful reality. His dream is now just that – his own subjective 
fantasy, exempt from responsibility and with no danger of its content bleeding into a 
shared reality.  
 Ultimately it would seem that Kafka’s completion of the liminal phase is smooth 
and absolute. Amy Ty Lai suggests that, “Kafka’s maturation depends on his decision not 
to remain in… ‘the other world’s suspended state,’ but to go back to Tokyo and take his 
place as a responsible member of society.”358 As such, Turner’s description of the liminal 
phase accurately reflects Kafka’s liminal subjectivity; Kafka’s decision to return home and 
face up to his responsibilities demonstrates very clearly the successful resolution of a 
liminal passage.   
Sputnik Sweetheart and After Dark feature comparative instances of the liminal phase. 
In After Dark, Takahashi gives up on dreams of playing trombone in a jazz band to train as 
a lawyer, completing the phase and assuming an adult subjectivity. Mari seeks a becoming-
other through stepping away from her family and immersing herself in a foreign language 
and culture – as the narrative nears its close she announces to Takahashi her imminent 
departure to China359. In Sputnik Sweetheart, Sumire has already left behind adolescence yet 
remains in a liminal phase. She appears to have completed the phase when she abandons 
her bohemian lifestyle to take gainful employment, but it becomes clear that this is simply 
another step in an ongoing liminal chain. As I will come to discuss, she does not assume a 
stable adult subjectivity; rather her nomadic subjectivity perpetuates, and becomes further 
destabilised until its absolute dissolution in her transit to the other side.  
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The nomad  
Given that Turner’s model of liminality allows only for the successful completion of the 
liminal phase, it is necessary to look elsewhere for a model with which to discuss Sumire’s 
negotiation of the liminal. One apparent model is that of the nomad.  
In discussion of Sebald, the nomadic is confined an almost literal nomadism – a 
physical transience. In Sputnik Sweetheart, Sumire becomes similarly nomadic in that she 
travels from from Japan to England to Greece (and then on to another plane of existence 
entirely), but moreover her subjectivity may be described as nomadic in that she moves 
from one position to another, in a perpetual movement of becoming. First, she transforms 
from bohemian to salarywoman. She takes a job as Miu’s assistant and Miu acquires new 
clothes for her, and changes her hairstyle to something she (Miu) considers to be smarter. 
The narrator barely recognises her360 and Sumire herself considers it a kind of defection 
from her previous lifestyle361. In her desire for Miu, she also “becomes” a lesbian, though 
there is no suggestion that she was heterosexual before this becoming, merely that through 
her desire for a woman she becomes classified as lesbian. Soon she loses all sense of her 
original self; she, “finds herself transformed (willingly, but unnervingly) into someone she 
no longer recognizes.”362 
 
 
“I have this strange feeling that I’m not myself anymore… it’s as if I was fast asleep and 
someone came, disassembled me, and hurriedly put me back together again.”363 
 
She perceives these changes as having originated externally – that she has no conscious 
control over them. The idea that the change happened in sleep suggests a site of 
vulnerability, of reduced defences that allows an exterior force to intervene and alter 
identity. Sumire’s speech also suggests sleep as a metaphor for obfuscation: “it’s as if I was 
fast asleep,” suggests the change began to happen without her noticing. The term “fast 
asleep” is also notable in that it presciently describes how Sumire becomes locked in sleep 
when she crosses to the other side. The OED defines the adjective fast as: 
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1 a. Firmly fixed in its place; not easily moved or shaken; settled, stable. 
1 f. Of a colour: That will not quickly fade or wash out; permanent. 
2 c. Frozen.364 
 
This contrasts with the fluidity of becoming-other, and again suggests states of 
consciousness as corresponding to conditions of light, of night and day, or an absolute 
darkness of unconsciousness and a “bleaching” of consciousness, as described in 
discussion of The Rings of Saturn. The notion of a rigid position impervious to light, resistant 
absolutely, suggests a stasis of consciousness beyond the subject’s agency, a position as 
precarious and potentially dangerous as the fluidity of becoming other.  
The act of writing serves to place Sumire within another continuum of becoming.  
Sumire is “struggling to become a writer”365. She already writes, and the reader is made 
aware that she has actually written several long, rambling novels366. Her success has been 
limited; she hasn’t published her work though neither has she shown any desire to. She 
remains in the process of becoming-writer; while the act of writing may suggest an 
alienation from primary wakefulness, Sumire writes but does not become consumed by the 
act of writing – she remains very much engaged in her wakeful activities. Where she may 
fail in creating written fictional narratives367 she succeeds in creating her own authorial 
narrative, assuming the role of author so as to author her own life. She drops out of college 
when it fails to meet her needs368, she challenges the narrator on his reading habits (“Why 
Nizan, of all people? She sounded like she was trying to pick a fight.”369) and even when 
she walks around the park it is with the, “enthusiasm of a pilgrim making her way through 
sacred hills.”370 However, she could also, “get so engrossed in her thoughts at times she’d 
forget to eat.”371  
The events and activities the narrator describes suggest that Sumire is attempting to 
create a self-image from outside herself, to engage with aspects other to herself in the hope 
of achieving a fully realised self. It might be said that this approach is somewhat adolescent 
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in that she remains at the liminal stage of attempting to forge an identity. This process is 
evident in her attempts to self-mythologise; for example: 
 
Sumire wanted to be like a character in a Kerouac novel – wild, cool, dissolute. She’d stand 
around, hands shoved deep in her coat pockets, her hair an uncombed mess, staring 
vacantly at the sky through her plastic framed Dizzy Gillespie glasses, which she wore 
despite her 20/20 vision. She was invariably decked out in an oversized herringbone coat 
from a second-hand shop and a pair of rough work boots. If she’d been able to grow a 
beard, I’m sure she would have.372  
 
The narrator asserts that, however arbitrary or fanciful these becomings may appear, 
Sumire’s desire to become other is genuine. It is not important whether or not this 
represents a lack of security in her pre-ordained or expected identities for someone of her 
age, gender, and nationality; the desire unsettles notions of identities as pre-ordained, static, 
and impermeable. In Sumire’s nomadic subjectivity it is perfectly possible for her to grow a 
beard.  
Following her transformation from bohemian to salarywoman, this fluidity 
becomes a stasis, and she finds herself unable to write: 
 
“It’s not that I want to give up writing,” Sumire said. She thought for a moment. “It’s just 
that when I try to write, I can’t. I sit down at my desk and nothing comes – no ideas, no 
words, no scenes. Zero. Not too long ago I had a million things to write about. What in the 
world’s happening to me?”373 
 
Strecher sees this as a very significant becoming-other: 
 
Having given up her passion for writing… she is no longer the same Sumire; she has 
already begun her journey to the “other” world she predicted earlier, from which she will 
never return as herself.374 
 
This suggests that there is no return for Sumire, and presupposes another kind of 
becoming; to stop writing is not necessarily to be drawn backwards into a previous identity, 
but rather is a becoming within a new temporal context which engenders further 
movement in the nomadic process of subjectivity.  
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In turn, this suggests the idea of the subject as its own author. The narrator 
compares life to fiction, recalling notions of authoring the self. He likens particular 
Sumire’s old and new lives to two kinds of fiction, or two different stories.  
 
“You don’t know the plot; the style’s still not set. The only thing you do know is the main 
character’s name. Nevertheless, this new fiction is reinventing who you are. Give it time, 
it’ll take you under its wing, and you may very well catch a glimpse of a new world. But 
you’re not there yet, which leaves you in a precarious position.”375 
 
The narrator’s explanatory speech posits this transition as “precarious,” suggesting a danger 
to such shifts in identity. However, Murakami’s characters repeatedly demonstrate that 
stasis is impossible and such shifts are inevitable. In the case of Sumire, nomadism appears 
to be nothing less than necessity in the project of the self.   
 
Summary  
These three novels present an economy of wholes, fragments, and displacement. The 
construct of the “other side” is fundamental in Murakami’s diegetic universe, and his 
aggressive insistence upon this otherness and its potentiality – both positive and negative – 
make these texts vital to my research question. The liminal motifs which reflect and refract 
issues of subjectivity serve to elucidate and crystallise, to transpose from textual to tangible, 
across a broad range of points – the hypnagogic, the night, rites of passage, and the 
nomadic – which in turn serve to open up the discussion for subsequent chapters. Of 
particular interest, and carried forward to Van Sant, is the conception of the night as not 
merely a liminal site between molar entities of daytime, but as an agency which imposes a 
liminality upon space – place becomes non-place, a governed space becomes carnivalesque, 
and, in Sputnik Sweetheart, engenders a gateway to an absolute otherness.  
My discussion of Turner’s rites of passage also carries forward to Gondry and Van 
Sant; its application here seeks to privilege adolescent liminality as a key mode of 
becoming. In Murakami, as if guided by the author’s benevolence, such becomings are 
successful transits from one stable position to another. The case of Sumire stands out as 
problematic, and yet her nomadism encompasses this – it is presented as a positive force, a 
necessity in her being, the need to remain in motion and to exceed boundaries. As with 
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Sebald’s mastery of textual subjectivities, Sumire’s nomadism presents a mastery of 
subjectivity in that she is always able to keep moving, to keep becoming, even when, as in 
her transit to the other side, no means of moving or becoming appear to be available. Her 
final return to “this side” represents an absolute fluidity. She emphasises to the narrator 
that the transition has not been smooth (“It wasn’t easy. But somehow I managed it,”376) 
yet she achieves a truly nomadic subjectivity, travelling to an absolute otherness, a site of 
absolute deterritorialisation, and then returning, reaggregating, with a distinct and 
recognisable subjectivity apparently intact.   
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Three 
 
Michel Gondry 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind  
and The Science of Sleep 
 
With this chapter and the following chapter on Van Sant, I seek to broaden the discussion 
of liminal subjectivities through a consideration of filmic texts. While Gondry’s and Van 
Sant’s films are very clearly of a different form to the texts discussed in previous chapters, 
there are notable connections with Sebald and Murakami, these films address issues of 
subjectivity, identity, memory, and loss, and feature motifs of hypnagogia, nomads, 
adolescent liminality, and the extraterritorial.  
Where the texts differ is in the modalities of subjectivity presented, and the means 
by which these are constructed. Like the Sebald and Murakami texts, these films construct 
a textual subjectivity through a play of particular modes; in the novels these modes are 
voices and narrative styles, while here these modes are definitively filmic. Moreover, 
whereas the novels allow a more open analysis of these modes, here modes are deployed 
with a very particular precision, toward the construction of each film’s protagonist. The 
novels have the benefit of a narrator, whether first or third person, a voice which whether 
stable or unstable remains a constant presence in the interface between reader and text. 
Here that interface is the screen itself, and the equivalent to the narrative voice may be seen 
as the invisible director’s deployment of modes to construct in his protagonist a haecceity, 
so that this protagonist may function as at the very least a primary character, and at most a 
proxy narrator.  
I will discuss in detail how Gondry and Van Sant construct their protagonists as 
haecceitic, as of the text, through a drawing together of the subjectivities of protagonist and 
text. In each instance, this is primarily through the depiction of each protagonist’s interior 
world, sometimes through devices such as point-of-view shots and voiceover, but 
especially through the evocation of subjective dream-space. This lays the ground for 
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discussion of how this haecceity, like that of the literary narrators, comes to engage with 
otherness through polyphonies and intersubjectivities.  
 
The texts 
Directed by Gondry from a screenplay by Charlie Kaufman377, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind features a protagonist, Joel Barish, who discovers his ex-girlfriend Clementine has had 
her memories of him surgically removed, and in retaliation decides to do likewise. The 
space of his dream becomes the space of his experience of the relationship, as he is guided 
from one memory of Clem to another, from the most recent to the very first. Almost 
immediately, his sleeping self acquires a reflexivity – he is aware that the procedure is taking 
place. He re-experiences each memory as it is erased, and decides from within his sleep 
state that he does not want to erase his memory of Clem. Unable to wake himself from the 
procedure, he instead tries to hide her amidst unrelated memories, especially those of his 
childhood. This tactic ultimately fails, but as his final (that is, his very first) memory of 
Clem is deleted, she whispers to him, “Meet me in Montauk,” Montauk being the site of 
their first meeting. The narrative is bookended by the after effects of the procedure. In a 
lengthy pre-title sequence, Joel travels to Montauk, obeying the instruction of his dream-
Clem. There he re-meets Clem and the two, encountering each other as strangers, begin a 
relationship anew. The close of the film follows the pair as they discover each has 
undergone the procedure, and that they previously shared a romantic relationship. They 
decide to try again despite the acknowledgement that the relationship will likely fail a 
second time.  
The Science of Sleep, from Gondry’s own screenplay, follows protagonist Stéphane as 
he becomes romantically interested in his neighbour Stéphanie. He discovers she shares his 
creative spirit and together they plan to make a short animated film featuring Stéphanie’s 
model horse. Stéphanie believes Stéphane’s friendship is purely platonic (partly through the 
misapprehension that Stéphane is interested in her friend Zoe), and Stéphane’s attempts to 
become closer to Stéphanie are problematised by his childlike disregard of social norms 
and a pathological insecurity regarding her interest in him. The reappearance of Stéphane’s 
mother Christine, and the advice of a misogynist colleague, Guy, also intrude upon 
Stéphane’s desire. Moreover, his propensity to confuse sleep and wakefulness has an ever-
                                                 
377 Kaufman 2004. 
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increasing effect upon his behaviour, which begins to trouble and ultimately alienate 
Stéphanie. The narrative concludes with an impasse, as Stéphane and Stéphanie clearly have 
a great affection for each other, yet Stéphane cannot overcome his particular mental state, 
and can only ever be with Stéphanie within his dreams.  
The protagonists of both films spend much of each narrative within sleep. In 
Eternal Sunshine, the sedated Joel’s dream-space becomes a reconstruction of the 
relationship as he undergoes the pseudo-medical “Lacuna procedure”. For Joel, the sleep 
of the Lacuna procedure functions as the space of memory, represented naturalistically, 
albeit in reverse linearity, and reflexively experienced by the protagonist. This space distorts 
as, from within sleep, Joel attempts to thwart the Lacuna procedure, and reconfigure the 
structure of his memory to hide the object of his lost love. The romantic narrative of The 
Science of Sleep, in contrast to Eternal Sunshine’s theme of retaining a love object, takes the 
form of a more traditional pursuit of a love object. However, it confounds many aspects of 
the romantic narrative by refusing the protagonist Stéphane access to the object of his 
desire, and ultimately takes a very different approach to Eternal Sunshine with regard to 
notions of intersubjectivity and love. The representation of sleep also differs from that of 
Eternal Sunshine, resembling less a recalled reality and more a “free dream”. The mother of 
protagonist Stéphane remarks, “Since he was six he’s inverted dreams and reality,” and as 
the narrative progresses, so does Stéphane’s confusion and inability to delineate one state 
from the other. In contrast to the notion of inversion, the narrative as filtered through the 
subjectivity of Stéphane seems to suggest less rigid and more diffuse states of 
consciousness, imbued with elements of sleep and wakefulness.  
In both films, the protagonists’ consciousness is represented and delineated 
through the use of contrasting modes. This is achieved through the self-conscious 
signification of polarised, apparently discrete diegeses; each film consists of a “whole” 
diegesis (and what lies beyond it – voiceover dialogue, the score, other content at the 
textual surface) and two sub-diegeses, an exterior diegesis depicting the objective wakeful 
reality, and an interior diegesis, depicting the protagonist’s dream-space. The wakeful 
diegesis is represented through a naturalism which is contrasted with the fantastical 
elements of the dream-space. With Eternal Sunshine, the exterior diegesis takes a linear form, 
spanning the night in which Joel undergoes the Lacuna procedure, and the interior diegesis 
of Joel’s sleeping subjectivity takes a reverse linearity, and manifests as the scenes of his 
relationship with Clem, from the moment Joel falls into sedated sleep, to his first meeting 
103 
 
with Clem. The Science of Sleep employs a much looser narrative structure, instating a similar 
discrete economy of modes via delineating signifiers, and then ushering in discord through 
progressively deploying these signifiers interchangeably, to create a more diffuse 
hypnagogic reverie.  
In Eternal Sunshine, sleep assists in the act of reconstruction, whereas in The Science of 
Sleep, sleep is a deconstructive agent. This dynamic also applies to sleep’s influence on the 
central relationships of each film. In Eternal Sunshine, sleep creates a space in which Joel and 
Clem can communicate telepathically and plot their reunion. In The Science of Sleep, 
Stéphane’s progressively ambiguous hypnagogia and subsequent unusual behaviour serves 
to alienate him from others around him, most notably Stéphanie, who struggles to 
understand his peculiar relationship between dream and reality. Joel’s sleep is notable for an 
element of reflexivity; within the dream-space, he soon realises he is in fact asleep. In 
contrast Stéphane rarely seems to know when he is asleep, or indeed awake. In his dream-
space he shows no awareness that he is asleep, even though it is much more visually other 
to this wakeful space than that of Joel. At certain moments, such as upon waking and 
discovering traces of his somnambulist activity, he questions whether he is awake or asleep, 
but he never appears to definitively know.  
In The Science of Sleep there is a strong assertion of this unknowability; it appears to 
offer great potential for the imagination and creativity, yet it hinders successful living. 
Furthermore, this unknowability is applicable to Stéphane’s relationship with Stéphanie; 
just as he can never truly know his own state of consciousness, he can never truly know 
Stéphanie. Whereas the apparent telepathy of Eternal Sunshine puts forward a case for 
intersubjectivity, The Science of Sleep confounds it. This theme however, despite the key 
difference in approach, binds the two films together and underlines Gondry’s 
preoccupation with the potential for intersubjectivity. In both films the protagonist wishes 
to know, and then to assimilate his love object, and in each case that desire is 
problematised and/or thwarted. Ultimately the two films respond conversely to the 
romantic genre. Eternal Sunshine insists upon a utopian love which exceeds the boundaries 
of individuated subjectivity, and The Science of Sleep puts forward a treatment of love which 
asserts that, however strong love might be, it can never exceed such boundaries, and the 
subject remains a singular individual no matter how strong the desire to become one with 
the love object.  
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The discussion of motifs explores how Gondry finds visual means of representing 
the liminal, in particular his specific visual interpretation of hypnagogia in The Science of 
Sleep, and an amplification of Sebald’s preoccupation – the shoreline – in Eternal Sunshine.  
The construction of interior and exterior diegeses also facilitates discussion of how 
particular objects function across the threshold of dream and reality, how the transition 
from one space to the other affects a translation or distortion, and how these objects are 
further complicated by issues of intersubjectivity and territorialisation. The territorial is also 
central to notions of space in these films; in Eternal Sunshine, memory is represented via 
space – as memories bleed into each other, so do the locations of memory, an effect 
achieved through innovative editing and set design. Similarly, in The Science of Sleep, notions 
of territory come to impose upon and enclose the protagonist’s desire, setting boundaries 
which sometimes succeed and sometimes fail to constrain him, but which always serve to 
complicate and problematise.   
 
Critical work on Gondry 
Gondry’s films, the most recent of the texts discussed here, are slowly accruing a body of 
critical work. The Science of Sleep has, it seems, so far been neglected, though there is a 
growing body of work on Eternal Sunshine, which provides much material for critics 
discussing notions of memory, science, and ethics. It is discussed in great detail by José van 
Djick378, Christopher Grau379, Bert Cardullo380, and Verena-Susanna Nungesser381. José van 
Djick’s work is of particular interest; he writes of the science fiction element of Eternal 
Sunshine and notes how cultural theorists such as Walter Benjamin locate “the “matter” of 
memory . . . in the tangibility of mediated objects,”382 and discusses the ramifications of the 
objectification and digitalisation of memory.  
The film is more frequently alluded to in discussion of other texts, by critics such as 
Michele Pierson383, Joseph Jonghyun Jeon384, Neil Scheurich385, and Allan Cameron386. 
These allusions however often offer as much insight as in depth studies. Mentioning the 
                                                 
378 van Djick 2004. 
379 Grau 2006. 
380 Cardullo 2007. 
381 Nungesser 2009. 
382 Djick 2004: 358. 
383 Pierson 2006. 
384 Jeon 2009. 
385 Scheurich 2008. 
386 Cameron 2006. 
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film alongside Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner387, Neil Scheurich draws attention to the focus on 
subjectivity; the narrative of Scott’s film, from Philip K. Dick’s novel388, discusses the 
notion of authentic versus inauthentic subjectivity in the post-human construct of the 
android, which ramifies with notions of how memory constitutes such authenticities in 
Eternal Sunshine389.  
 
Textual subjectivities 
In both Eternal Sunshine and The Science of Sleep, the interior worlds of protagonists Joel and 
Stéphane function as a window on aspects of their subjectivity which remain hidden from 
other characters. Here I discuss the construction of these interior worlds, and how each 
achieves a haecceity, placing the protagonist close to the textual surface, as a kind of 
interface between viewer and text, so as to achieve an identification and an investment in 
the narrative. I discuss how these worlds come to intersect with the primary wakeful world 
of each film, and how a liminal space between the external and internal begins to effect a 
diffusion, a deconstruction, or deterritorialisation of interior and exterior. Beyond this, I 
discuss how the protagonists’ subjectivities come to engage with other subjectivities within 
the texts; both narratives are structured around romantic relationships and the positioning 
of each partner, of Clem, and of Stéphanie, within the protagonist’s gaze and in proximity 
to his subjectivity opens a discussion of intersubjectivities, the success or refusal of which 
comes to condition the narrative outcome.  
 
Filmic modes and diegeses 
Eternal Sunshine and The Science of Sleep construct their respective protagonists across both 
wakefulness and sleep, and in each case this is achieved via an economy of separate and 
distinctive diegeses. I use the term diegeses to refer to distinct paradigms of filmic modes 
which create a particular reality; within the “whole-diegesis” defined by boundaries and 
surface of the text itself are two sub-diegeses – two sets of modes which conflict and 
contrast, one representing the protagonist within wakefulness, the other within sleep.  
                                                 
387 Scott 1982. 
388 Dick 1968. 
389 Scheurich 2008: 9. 
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In both instances here, wakefulness is defined by a naturalism achieved via natural 
lighting, naturalistic performances from the actors, and often handheld camerawork. Again, 
in both instances, though to varying degrees, dream-states are defined by modes which 
conflict with this naturalism. In The Science of Sleep these modes are overt; Gondry 
constructs a distinctive universe of animation, music, bright and artificial lighting, and 
expressionistic performances. We see clouds floating indoors, we see a model horse 
apparently come to life, and we see the protagonist Stéphane depicted with preposterously 
large cartoon hands. In the dream-space Gael García Bernal performs Stéphane as 
articulate and effusive in contrast to the shy and hesitant counterpart of the wakeful 
diegesis; furthermore his interaction with other characters is modified – he appears to have 
sexual access to his co-worker Martine, and is able to battle and overrule his boss, 
Monsieur Pouchet. He is also able to “fly” (Gondry films his dream-city in a water tank, 
and Stéphane flies/swims over the city).  
The surface of Eternal Sunshine is never disrupted to the same degree as that of The 
Science of Sleep, though this of course corresponds to what the dream-space of each text is 
intended to represent – a fantastical wish-fulfilment in The Science of Sleep, and a space of 
memory in Eternal Sunshine. In Eternal Sunshine these modes are less distinct; the dream 
world much resembles the wakeful world but for specific distortions of space and time, and 
for particular glitches and deviations (the spines in a bookstore are turned in towards the 
shelf; the protagonist tries to get a look at his love rival – he spins him around but sees only 
the back of his head, as if this man has no face).  
Alongside the denotation of wakeful reality and dream, this economy of diegeses 
also serves to instate a particular character as the protagonist of each film, and to “embed” 
the subjectivity of that character within the text, to make that subjectivity haecceitic 
through a “drawing together” of the protagonist and textual surface. In each case we see 
the protagonist’s dream-space, a space internal to that character, and portions of the film 
are given over absolutely to the representation of this interior space. We do not see the 
dream-spaces of other characters, and no character other than the protagonist has access to 
the dream-space that we see. Thus the viewer is made complicit in his dreaming mind; we 
come to perceive that the narrative or textual subjectivity is akin to that of the protagonist 
– we see things from his point of view, both in his wakeful reality and dream-space. A 
distance remains between the subjectivity of protagonist and text; as in the discussion of 
Sebald’s narrating subjected and narrated object, the textual subjectivity coincides to a 
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degree with that of the protagonist, but as the protagonist remains an object within the text 
– as represented by an actor and a performance – the subjectivities of text and protagonist 
can never be entirely analogous390.  
The construction of the protagonist and the economy of diegeses are introduced 
early in each narrative, serving to orientate the viewer in regard to the specific paradigms of 
modes. Eternal Sunshine opens on Joel: a close-up on his face as he wakes in bed, lit by the 
morning sun. He turns his head towards the source of the light, and the film cuts to a shot 
from his perspective – an upwards shot out of the window, into the hazy morning sky. The 
viewer sees what Joel sees; the gaze of the viewer and the protagonist is aligned 
unequivocally, creating a rare but tactically positioned moment of coincidence of character 
subjectivity and textual subjectivity. The first dialogue is his internal monologue, heard as 
extradiegetic voiceover. This device is integral to the fabric of the text; that is, a component 
of form as well as of content. No other character is permitted this degree of subjectivity; 
the viewer hears no other character’s internal monologue and is permitted to no other 
character’s thoughts beyond what is uttered within the diegesis, thus this device introduces 
the viewer to Joel’s specific perspective and privileges that perspective. It is also of note 
that the voiceover coincides with shots of him reading from and writing in his journal.  
Journal writing is a record of intrapersonal communication391 and here Joel’s voiceover 
does not posit the viewer as its recipient; his speech is quiet and reflective, indicative of 
internal rather than external monologue. It does not institute the dichotomy of speaker and 
addressee, rather the viewer is privy to it, left with a sense of eavesdropping rather than of 
being addressed. Thus Joel’s voice does not become the singular “voice of text”, speaking 
to or at the viewer, but rather the foremost voice; other voices come into play and become 
of the text, but none achieves the primary status of Joel’s voice.  
The Science of Sleep opens within Stéphane’s dream-space, which likewise suggests 
that the viewer has been offered privileged access to the mind of this character beyond his 
existence in a wakeful, objective world, thus favouring his position amongst characters, and 
placing him between the viewer and all other characters. The narrative moves outward 
from this point, toward an external, wakeful diegesis, which foregrounds and prioritises the 
site of sleep. Stéphane’s confidence and happiness in the dream-space contrasted with his 
                                                 
390 This problematic is addressed in Gasper Noé’s Enter The Void (Noé 2009) which is shot from the 
protagonist’s point of view, filming from behind his head (thus retaining him as an object within the diegesis) 
until the character’s death, when the camera assumes his direct point-of-view as he negotiates a notional 
afterlife.   
391 See Jensen 1984: 237-247.  
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subsequent unease and trepidation in the wakeful world suggests this space is where he 
feels most at home. The space in which we first see Stéphane comes to be a key trope of 
his dream-space: “Stéphane-TV” – a mocked-up TV studio, constructed predominantly 
from cardboard but featuring also a drum-kit and a kitchen area from which Stéphane 
performs a kind of cookery TV show, communicating recipes for dreams to his imagined 
audience. The space also features two small windows concealed with roller blinds, which in 
a later scene he unfurls to correspond with the opening of his eyes in the external diegesis. 
These windows turn out to in fact be small screens upon which his wakeful gaze is 
projected, as if Stéphane’s dream-self is seeing what his wakeful self sees, but at a remove, 
through a lens of hypnagogia.  
As in Eternal Sunshine, the first dialogue is a monologue from the protagonist, 
though it is delivered within the diegesis, not as voiceover. In this scene Gondry reflexively 
plays with the construction of his protagonist; we see Stéphane speaking into a camera, one 
of the mocked-up cardboard cameras present in the studio, a dream facsimile of a camera. 
The viewer never views through that particular lens – Gondry’s camera always shoots from 
behind or from the side of the mocked-up camera, and Stéphane’s gaze never meets that of 
the viewer; as in Eternal Sunshine, there is no a dichotomy of speaker and addressee – this is 
an intrapersonal communication. Stéphane is asleep, or on the edge of sleep; his dialogue 
occurs within the space of his sleep (again, the viewer is positioned as eavesdropper) and 
does not exceed it.  
In contrast to the surety of the dream-space (Stéphane’s apparent confidence and 
vivacity; the fixed and steady camera-work; the controlled environment of the studio), the 
wakeful diegesis conveys a precariousness and disorientation. The very first shot of the 
wakeful diegesis occurs at the close of the opening credit sequence, and the first fraction of 
a second is obscured by a lens flare. We see Stéphane as he travels through the streets of 
Paris in the back of a taxi, scanning the buildings for his mother’s apartment (it becomes 
clear that he hasn’t been in the city for some time). The lens flare serves to temporarily 
exacerbate his disorientation. It is also indicative of the naturalism that characterises the 
wakeful diegesis. Gondry makes use of natural light and García Bernal’s performance of 
introversion to denote an objective reality which Stéphane exists within rather than 
presides over. This juxtaposition of modes continues as the film progresses, one 
representing a vivacious mastery, the other a nervous disorientation, until a diffusion begins 
to occur, and the diegeses begin to overlap.  
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This notion of an overlap is explored earlier in Eternal Sunshine, in the context of 
hypnagogia, with Gondry evoking Joel’s hypnagogic experience as he enters the Lacuna 
procedure. Here, modes of the dream-space are introduced progressively, alongside 
established modes of the wakeful diegesis. With an inciting action reminiscent of Alice in 
Wonderland, Joel takes a pill, a sedative we presume, prescribed by Mierzwiak, chief 
technician and inventor of the Lacuna procedure. Shortly afterwards we see him stumbling 
through his apartment, falling sideways into a shelving unit, and saying to himself, “Okay, 
okay...” as if in acknowledgement and acceptance of the fast effects of the drug. Joel next 
revisits his last interaction before reaching the threshold of sleep – a brief conversation 
with his neighbour, Frank. Gondry keeps Joel in close-up in the foreground, while Frank 
remains indistinct beyond, identifiable only by the colour of his clothes, a blur of red and 
blue. We see Joel’s face in close-up; he appears puzzled and we infer that he is aware that 
this is a repetition and is beginning to dispute its authenticity. He begins to realise that he 
has crossed or is at the threshold of consciousness. This experience reflects the particular 
circumstances of his hypnagogia – it is the effect of a sedative, and Joel, even upon his 
realisation, is unable to fight against it; this hypnagogia bypasses the vertiginous sensations 
described in discussion of Sebald. The “tipping point” does not exist for Joel; he is beyond 
that point as soon as he digests the sedative. 
As Joel moves further towards sleep, we see him represented in a space which we 
come to understand more clearly as being a dreamscape. Clem is present in his apartment; 
they eat a meal as if they are still a couple, and we infer that this is a memory interior to 
Joel. Yet even at this stage, he is seen to experience and respond to stimuli from the 
external diegesis. He becomes distracted by a disembodied voice – in the external diegesis 
Patrick (one of the Lacuna technicians and, unbeknownst to Joel, his love rival) tells co-
worker Stan that he stole Clem’s underwear. Joel responds to this information, telling 
Clem, “There’s someone here. He stole your underwear.” Gondry cuts back and forth 
between Joel in his dream-space and Patrick and Stan in the external diegesis; the viewer 
sees and hears Patrick speak in the external diegesis yet continues to hear his speech in the 
internal diegesis, his voice modulated and distorted, and its source invisible. This would 
suggest that, at this stage of Joel’s hypnagogia, these diegeses are not yet discrete, but 
porous or overlapping, the distortion a condition of the threshold. The differentiating 
signifier is Joel himself – as Gondry cuts quickly between the internal and the external we 
are aware of the doubling of his body, asleep and prostrate in the external, and active and 
disorientated in the internal.  
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Extended liminal moments 
These moments of liminality come to be fundamental in maintaining the economy of 
internal and external. In their evocation of threshold space, they serve to remind the viewer 
of both the space that holds these worlds apart and the protagonist that binds them 
together.  
Some minutes into the narrative of The Science of Sleep, the dream-space re-emerges, 
denoted by the modes described in the account of the opening sequence. Stéphane is 
settling into his life in Paris, and has begun a new job at a printing press. We enter the 
dream-space via the Stéphane-TV studio, a set the viewer recognises as representing an 
internal, dream aspect of the protagonist. Already disillusioned by his job, Stéphane places 
a photograph of his boss Monsieur Pouchet in a frying pan and begins to heat it (revisiting 
the notion of a “recipe” for dreams). Next we see Stéphane at the office, though his hands 
appear to be abnormally large and he is unable to carry out the delicate job of typesetting. 
The office also appears to be subject to an aggressive breeze, and his co-workers speak in a 
nonsensical language he is unable to understand (reflecting his difficulty as a Spanish 
speaker in understanding the French language; unlike Sebald’s narrator’s hypnagogic grasp 
of Dutch, for Stéphane sleep affects an obfuscation of foreign language). The scene 
progresses to broad slapstick as he battles his co-workers, and further modes of the dream-
space are introduced (Stéphane “flies” over the city; buildings are represented by two 
dimensional cut-out drawings), before a sudden return to the wakeful diegesis and the 
Stéphane-TV studio.  
Here the film presents its first extended liminal moment. We see Stéphane in his 
dream-space, troubled by the sound of a public address system. Gondry cuts sharply to the 
external diegesis and we see Stéphane asleep in his bed, the sound of his alarm clock 
corresponding to the PA system in his dream. Gondry cuts to the Stéphane-TV studio 
where Stéphane lifts the aforementioned roller blinds to reveal the two screens, upon 
which we see the image of his hand reaching out to turn off the alarm; we then cut to a 
shot of Stéphane in his bed, reaching out to the clock. This presents a doubling of dream-
Stéphane and physical-Stéphane, simultaneously coalesced and juxtaposed. As before, 
Gondry uses lighting and acting styles to differentiate between states. García Bernal plays 
dream-Stéphane as alert and animated, over-excited and short-tempered; physical-Stéphane 
is passive, sluggish, and struggles to keep his eyes open. The Stéphane-TV studio is 
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artificially lit, bright and hyper-real, whereas Stéphane’s bedroom is lit by natural light from 
the window, reflecting from a light-coloured building on the far side of the street.  
From this sequence we infer that the space of the Stéphane-TV studio is analogous 
to the conditions of hypnagogia. Gondry’s treatment of the space corresponds to some 
modes of the dream-space, yet does not contain any of the more expressionistic modes 
from the previous sequence which seem to represent a deeper level of dream. That deeper 
level has its own narrative logic, within which scenes from Stéphane’s waking life become 
distorted. Stéphane-TV is predominantly a space of Stéphane alone (on one occasion we 
see his mother in the studio, on another we see Stéphanie, though in neither instance is this 
in the context of a re-enactment or distortion of a scene from external diegesis). Stéphane-
TV is characterised by its adjacency to wakefulness, and to Stéphane’s wakeful subjectivity 
within his physical body, as suggested by the roller blinds’ correspondence to eyelids, which 
when lifted offer dream-Stéphane the gaze of his wakeful self. 
This liminality is teased out further as the scene progresses and the viewer is taken 
to a much more precarious balancing point between sleep and wakefulness. The telephone 
rings again, and Stéphane is disturbed a second time; Gondry then cuts back and forth 
between the external diegesis and Stéphane-TV as he negotiates a conversation from his 
hypnagogic state. Another doubling occurs; in the external diegesis Stéphane sits up in bed 
and picks up the telephone, apparently awake. We hear the voice of a woman – his mother 
– who asks how his first day at work went. The conversation occurs in two versions 
simultaneously – one wakeful, one within sleep; in the space of Stéphane-TV, Stéphane 
also speaks on the telephone to his mother, but whereas the apparently wakeful Stéphane 
soberly explains to his mother that his job is dull and not what he had anticipated, dream-
Stéphane is indignant. Angrily (and apropos to the dream logic of the Stéphane-TV studio) 
he asks, “Are you trying to mock me on the air? A creative job, is that what you call it?” 
His responses to his mother vary greatly between the two states; there is a continuity to the 
conversation across both (Stéphane is unhappy in his new job and blames his mother, who 
found the job for him), but Gondry’s fast edits between diegeses present a sharp contrast 
in García Bernal’s acting style392. The fast cutting between one diegesis and the other leaves 
the viewer to ponder the co-existence of both, and we see an extended liminal moment 
consisting of incompatible, contrasting and conflicting systems of meaning.  
                                                 
392 It is also of note is that the wakeful conversation is conducted in French, while Stéphane alternates 
between English and French within the dream. 
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The object of the telephone reoccurs later in the narrative in a similar scene of 
hypnagogia, this time manifesting more explicitly as a bridge between sleep and 
wakefulness393. As Stéphane and Stéphanie speak on the phone, Stéphane edges closer to 
sleep and makes a request of Stéphanie: 
  
STÉPHANE: Keep on talking to me for a little while, because I always thought it was 
possible to talk from my sleep. I feel that I’m falling down into a black hole.  
 
Stéphane begins to fall asleep. His speech becomes mumbled and nonsensical, prompting 
Stéphanie to ask, “Stéphane? Are you here?” Instantly his speech becomes loud and clear 
as he announces, “No, I’m there! I’m there!” We see him asleep in bed, his lips unmoving, 
and hear his voice as Stéphanie does, as non-diegetic dialogue, modulated through the 
telephone line. Stéphanie asks him to describe what he sees. We follow Stéphane through a 
rural setting in his dream-space as he narrates to Stéphanie through the telephone; we cut 
between his excited description of his surroundings and her delighted reception. Eventually 
we cut back to Stéphane, asleep in his bed, the telephone receiver still pressed to his ear. 
We hear Stéphanie’s voice through the telephone: “Stéphane, are you asleep?” and we infer 
that the preceding conversation has occurred only within Stéphane’s sleeping mind, that 
Stéphanie’s side of the conversation was a fabricated projection of Stéphane. Thus the 
textual subjectivity is again drawn towards that of Stéphane, and Stéphanie – the Stéphanie 
whose delighted reception we heard – becomes relegated to an object within Stéphane394. 
Similar liminal moments occur in Eternal Sunshine, the opening sequence of which 
offers a rich evocation of the hypnagogic, as Joel emerges from the “sleep” of the Lacuna 
procedure. As he wakes he appears disorientated and in mild pain; he sighs and grunts as 
he tries to sit up in bed; he glances down at his body as if he doesn’t recognise it – a simple 
yet clear evocation of hypnagogia. In this instance Joel’s disorientation is particularly 
appropriate as he is waking from a process in which a portion of himself has been 
removed, so he is in fact familiarising himself with an altered version of his subjectivity. 
Gondry creates a lens flare as Joel steps outside to his car, as in the establishing shot of the  
                                                 
393 This echoes the conclusion of Sputnik Sweetheart, which sees Sumire telephone the narrator, apparently 
from the “other side”, the telephone transmission becoming a link between otherwise discrete worlds.  
394 This is indicative of a problematic which I will expand upon in discussion of the contrasting approaches of 
The Science of Sleep and Eternal Sunshine to issues of intersubjectivity.  
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external diegesis in The Science of Sleep; here he shoots toward the sun but crops it 
from the frame so that light bleeds in from the edges, obscuring detail. This partial 
obfuscation, in conjunction with Joel’s adjacent sleep, suggests Joel is still not fully awake, 
as if the sun itself cannot yet be fully assimilated into his wakeful perspective – that which 
lights his world, also obscures it.  
 Latter engagements with the hypnagogic liminal occur in relation to the particular 
circumstances of the Lacuna procedure, the circumstances of Joel’s “sleep” and how it 
constructed by the diegeses. In the external diegesis, we see Joel asleep on his bed and 
attached to the Lacuna technicians’ memory-erasing equipment. Within his dream-space, 
we witness Joel develop both a growing awareness and reluctance of the procedure. The 
dream-Joel searches for ways to bring the procedure to a halt, discussing his quandary with 
Clem (within the dream), who implores him to attempt the obvious: “Wake yourself up.” 
Dream-Joel lifts his hands to his face and holds his eyes wide open; “This is working like 
gangbusters,” he declares sarcastically. However, a moment later in the external diegesis, 
Joel, lying prostrate on his bed, opens his eyes. The viewer takes Joel’s point-of-view 
directly; an indistinct image fills the screen and gradually comes into focus – the ceiling of 
his apartment. The success of this seems to surprise dream-Joel, and he rebounds to 
dream-space almost immediately, telling Clem, “It did work, for a second. But I couldn’t 
move.” Here, the differentiating signifier of Joel’s body ceases to differentiate; it 
corresponds to both his physical and dream selves – the double momentarily appears to 
become singular as dream-Joel coincides with physical-Joel, and a wholeness is achieved for 
a brief liminal moment.  
This device is revisited later in the narrative to construct a second liminal moment. 
In this latter instance dream-Joel has not attempted to wake himself, rather he appears to 
have woken as the result of a trauma within the dream: Clem is taken from him (as she is 
again and again, but this time from a point of apparent safety, Joel having “hidden” her in a 
memory of infancy). Joel’s eyes open and again the camera takes his point-of-view, 
focusing on the faces of Stan, Mary and Mierzwiak, peering over the bed, alarmed at his 
apparently wakeful state. This time he does not rebound to dream-space. He remains in his 
physical body for a longer period and his eyes fill with tears – we infer in response to the 
realisation that Clem will soon be gone from his memory entirely – and he returns to sleep 
only when Mierzwiak injects him with a sedative. Joel’s point-of-view shot of Stan, Mary 
and Mierzwiak slowly dissolves from focus and Gondry cuts back to Joel’s dream-space.  
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In these instances, the conscious but still prostrate body of Joel calls to mind the 
paralysed narrator of The Rings of Saturn. In both cases, a doubling occurs; Sebald’s narrator 
is present within his paralysed body and via memory within the active body of the walking 
tour a year before. Similarly Joel is present within his motionless body and within his active 
sleeping subjectivity. In both instances the doubling occurs as an active subjectivity, of 
dream or imagination, exceeds the body and manifests in a memory of a past self. Sebald 
stages this past presence by literary and photographic means, Gondry by cinematic means – 
a shot of Joel prostrate on his bed is juxtaposed with a shot of an active Joel in the dream 
space. Unlike Sebald, who presents a distinct temporal dichotomy between states (“a year 
to the day” TROS: 3), Gondry returns more than once to the site of the bed, of Joel’s 
body, and explores both states contemporaneously, as when Joel hears the voices of Patrick 
and Stan from within sleep, when Joel attempts to wake himself, and finally in a moment of 
trauma. 
 Beyond these extended interfaces of diegeses, The Science of Sleep offers another 
means of representing this liminality between sleep and wakefulness, via a particular visual 
trope. In the title sequence and a second time, late in the film, Gondry films the creation of 
“Spin Art” paintings, which he explicitly states is intended as a representation of 
hypnagogia395. A derivation from the Action Painting movement, Spin Art developed in the 
1960s with the work of Alfons Schilling and Annick Gendron; paint or ink is dropped onto 
a rotating canvas, and centrifugal forces draw the paint away from the centre of the canvas 
toward the edges, creating kaleidoscopic patterns. The emphasis is very much on the 
process of creation rather than the final image, and Gondry’s own addition to the form is 
in filming the image as it comes into being, placing his camera directly above the image and 
rotating it at the same speed as the spinning turntable so that the turntable does not appear 
to be moving396.   
This technique is embedded within the text; it fills the frame, becoming the viewer’s 
only focal point. In the opening title sequence, we see trails of ink drawn away from the 
centre of the screen; a sensation of gravity is created, a centrifugal force akin to the pull of 
sleep at the hypnagogic moment. The movement suggests a progression, a moving away 
from a central static point in all directions, and offers an alternative model to linear 
                                                 
395 Gondry 2006 [DVD commentary, 2007].  
396 An early experiment with the technique saw Gondry collaborate with the musician Björk to configure a 
piano into the apparatus so that as particular notes were played, corresponding coloured inks were released 
onto the canvas. This is documented in a short film entitled Spin Art (Gondry 2003 [1997]).  
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transition from one fixed state to another. It suggests instead, a dissolution of wakefulness 
into a dispersed sleep.  
Gondry deploys this device a second time later in the narrative, in the scene 
discussed above in which Stéphane and Stéphanie talk on the telephone as he falls asleep. 
This time there is a notable difference in the device: the film plays in reverse, so that the 
ink droplets move centripetally from the dispersed outer edges towards the central point, 
before vanishing. The corresponding visual image of the reversed Spin Art approximates 
the experience of falling asleep as described in Stéphane’s dialogue, as he says, “I feel that 
I’m falling down into a black hole.” It evokes the sensation of being drawn towards a 
point, until he vanishes, and passes from one dimension into another. This proves a 
versatile model of hypnagogia, functioning in both directions, and providing an 
interestingly paradoxical argument – that falling asleep (and waking) can be mapped on to 
processes of both divergence and convergence. 
Finally, this visual leads to a fortuitous image of the sleeping body. As Stéphane 
approaches the threshold hold of sleep, we hear Stéphanie’s voice:  
 
STÉPHANIE: You know you could never see someone fall in a black hole, because the 
image of the traveller who passes the horizon would slow down until it would remain stuck 
in the same position. The state he was when he crossed the line. 
 
The image of the traveller having reached this threshold resonates with the image of the 
body in repose, as it reaches sleep and the movements of bodily wakefulness cease. The 
body becomes static as subjectivity is displaced away from the surface.  
 
Diffusion and deconstruction 
In the scenes described above, Gondry evokes states of dream, wakeful reality, and 
hypnagogia via specific paradigms of modes, which remain discrete and only come together 
in moments which cut sharply between diegeses. The boundary between diegeses remains 
hermetic; modes from each diegesis never appear in the same frame. While this rule is 
applied to the entirety of the narrative of Eternal Sunshine, The Science of Sleep diverges, and as 
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the narrative proceeds, the boundary becomes progressively permeable, as Gondry 
introduces modes from his dream-space into the wakeful reality Stéphane shares with 
others.  
Stéphane’s mother remarks that since he was a child he has inverted dreams and 
reality, a notion which implies a binary, and while this applies to the clearly delineated states 
of sleep and wakefulness depicted early in the film, in later sequences Gondry depicts 
Stéphane in much more diffuse states, imbued with elements of both sleep and 
wakefulness. Often these scenes also feature the object of Stéphane’s affection, Stéphanie. 
In one such scene Stéphane proposes making an animated film of Stéphanie’s model boat. 
Stéphanie charges him with making the sea; he suggests strips of paper to be configured in 
a paralactic movement, but Stéphanie argues it should be more “special” than paper. She 
takes him to the kitchen sink and turns the tap; “water” pours from the tap, but rather than 
water, the viewer sees a stop-motion animation with cellophane representing water. 
“Cellophane!” they declare in unison. The viewer infers that Stéphane and Stéphanie see 
real water, but translate this – simultaneously – into a substance with which they can 
recreate water for their film. As they make this translation, Gondry makes a parallel 
translation, presenting what is interior to both of them as a visual mode in the exterior 
diegesis. These modes – stop-motion animation, and the practice of representing one 
object (water) with a metaphorical other (cellophane) – have until this point been seen only 
in Stéphane’s dream-space.  
What follows moves further into a coalescence of modes. Looking for material with 
which to create clouds, Stéphanie finds clusters of down feathers and throws them into the 
air. Naturally, they fall to the floor – until Stéphane contrives a device to keep them in the 
air. He plays chords at the piano as Stéphanie throws clusters of down into the air. When 
Stéphane happens upon the “correct” chord, he affects the suspension of these “clouds” 
mid-air. Stéphane explains: “Each structure has its own resonant frequency!” The 
explanation, within the diegesis, could be an extension of the previous rationale – Stéphane 
and Stéphanie are imagining this, and Gondry is translating it directly to the viewer. 
However, this instance is a step away from the cellophane water, in that it is the chords 
Stéphane plays which keep the clouds afloat – not simply their imaginations. Whereas 
water-as-cellophane is a simple translation, here the piano creates an interjection397.  
                                                 
397  This corresponds to the use of the piano in his collaboration with Björk; whereas certain notes released 
certain coloured inks into the Spin Art image, here certain chords keep clouds afloat.  
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These modes function in a similar manner to the voiceover in that they represent at 
the surface of the text something which is internal to the characters. While this is a given in 
the dream-space – indeed, fundamental to how the dream-space is constructed – the arrival 
of these modes in a wakeful space which Stéphane shares with Stéphanie is startling; a 
textual boundary is breached, and a liminal space opens up between the real and the 
imaginary, leading the viewer to question the nature of the state being depicted. That this 
occurs in a shared space also suggests a kind of telepathy, a binding together of these 
characters at a textual level – for a moment it seems that Stéphanie’s subjectivity becomes 
equal with that of Stéphane. However, as I will discuss with regard to notions of 
intersubjectivity, there are very few such instances in The Science of Sleep, and all are only 
momentary.  
The deployment of modes becomes progressively diffuse, though only, from this 
point onwards, in scenes depicting Stéphane alone. He is shown falling asleep in the bath, 
and familiar modes are deployed to represent his dream-space. As in the diegesis of wakeful 
reality, Stéphane is depicted in the bath, though here the bathwater is represented by strips 
of cellophane, the earlier scene with Stéphanie setting a precedent for this particular 
signification of water. In his dream, he writes a letter to Stéphanie. He attempts to write in 
French, a language he is not entirely proficient in, and dream appears to affect a further 
alienation of language and meaning. The resulting letter is almost nonsensical. He creeps 
naked across the hallway to Stéphanie’s apartment to deliver the letter, slipping it under her 
door. Here his skin is coated with strips of cellophane from the bath, presenting an 
interesting hybrid moment – he has entered a wakeful, physical space bearing remnants of 
the dream-space. The space of the hallway between apartments is real; it does not differ in 
representation between wakeful and sleep states. However, Stéphane’s body is represented 
as within sleep, as denoted by the strips of cellophane. When he wakes, back in the bath, 
his face registers his cognizance of the dream, but then he notices a notepad and pen 
alongside the bath, and wet footprints, which he follows from the bathroom to Stéphanie’s 
apartment door. He is left pondering whether dream was in fact reality, and it transpires 
that dream and reality have in fact coincided.  
Gondry deliberately confuses the viewer’s perception of the pre-established 
economy of modes so as to evoke Stéphane’s own confusion, a device further exploited in 
later scenes which are framed as dream sequences. One such sequence shows Stéphane 
pursued by police – the scene is filmed in an exterior location and makes use of natural 
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lighting, handheld camerawork, and existing architecture, as opposed to the water-tank 
cityscape of previous dreams. Given the previous designation of modes, this would be read 
as a space of wakefulness, yet both Stéphane’s getaway vehicle and the police car that 
pursues him are constructed from a material previously seen in the Stéphane-TV studio – 
cardboard (Stéphane’s car is a miniature which he barely fits inside; the police car a real car, 
coated with cardboard panels, the word “POLICE” crudely painted on). As the narrative 
nears its conclusion, the disorientation caused by Stéphane’s “inversion” of dream and 
reality is allowed greater and greater textual representation, so that the viewer comes to 
share in the protagonist’s confusion.  
 
Polyphony 
As the discussion has made clear, Eternal Sunshine and The Science of Sleep rely upon a 
multiplicity of filmic modes to construct their respective diegeses. Of course, even a 
straightforwardly naturalistic narrative film may rely on a wealth of modes, albeit modes 
which are co-dependent and coalesced in the aim of creating a stable diegesis which allows 
the suspension of disbelief. In Gondry’s films it is the clash rather than cohesion of modes 
that is distinctive. Such clashes of modes correspond to the contrasting voices at work in 
Sebald and Murakami, which function to subvert stable and whole subjectivities to varying 
degrees – the voices of characters and conflicting modes of word and image in Sebald, and 
the various narrative modes at play in Murakami. The filmic modes of Gondry’s films serve 
to both stabilise and destabilise textual subjectivity; modes work in tandem within each 
diegesis, and the modes of contrasting diegeses work in opposition, serving to construct 
and maintain the boundary between spaces of wakefulness and dream (this dynamic is of 
course subverted in the progressive deconstruction of diegeses in The Science of Sleep).  
As in the literary texts, polyphony may manifest as a clamour of disruptive, 
destabilising force, apparent in both content and form, or it may manifest as a 
“performance” of polyphony, a self-signifying flirtation with multiple voices which does 
not destabilise the text but rather reasserts a unified centre, assimilating that dissenting 
otherness into a singular, monological whole. Ultimately, Gondry’s films appear to fall into 
the latter category; despite the great array of conflicting and disruptive modes at play, these 
films appear to achieve a stability of textual surface – something close to an integrated 
wholeness, to the illusion of a centred textual subjectivity. Gondry’s deployment of modes 
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is far-reaching; there are radical departures from naturalistic representation, and from 
mainstream editing, lighting, and set design, and both films appear heterogeneous, in terms 
of filmic modes, narrative devices, and at the level of suspension of disbelief. Yet while the 
diegeses operate to their own specific, conflicting rules, there are no significantly upsetting 
interruptions to the surface of the text. The previously discussed liminal moments at the 
interface of diegeses serve to establish the terms and conditions of how these function in 
conjunction, as a whole-diegesis. Even when deconstructed in The Science of Sleep, the 
economy of diegeses is quite straightforward; the deployment of fantastical modes signifies 
dream, and as soon as that trope is established it can be taken for granted, much as the 
tropes of magic realism become commonplace in Murakami. Thus, when Gondry cuts back 
and forth between the internal and external at great frequency, the viewing experience 
remains “smooth” – there is no sense of “jarring” despite the vacillation between 
representations of radically different states of consciousness. In this sense, the illusion of 
unity Gondry creates is reminiscent of Vertigo and especially The Rings of Saturn, in which 
the surface of the text appears to be stable despite the polyphony of voices at play in the 
text.  
 
Intersubjectivities 
A separate economy of polyphony functions at the level of the characters, their voices and 
dialogue. In contrast to the polyphony of modes, this is radically at odds in the two films. 
In Eternal Sunshine, contrasting viewpoints manifest in the duologues of Joel and Clem 
which convincingly portray the dialogism of a fractious or fracturing relationship; however, 
the voices present in the love-triangle subplot of Mierzwiak, Stan and Mary offer no 
contrast to that of the primary narrative, instead presenting more an echo of Joel and 
Clem’s relationship than a discordant or alternative viewpoint. It is as if the subplot exists 
to reaffirm and bolster the thesis of the primary narrative, that is, the assertion of an 
essentialist romantic love.  
The Science of Sleep however presents a series of characters much more diverse in 
voice. Beyond Stéphane and Stéphanie, the screenplay gives voice to the exuberant 
misogyny of Guy, the romanticism of Christine, the cynicism of Zoe, and the pragmatism 
of Monsieur Pouchet. The designation of such broad attributes might appear mechanistic 
yet the interaction of these voices achieves more of a carnivalesque economy, and indeed 
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the designation does not remain static – Christine has her heart broken, Guy’s exuberance 
turns to dejection and alienation, and Monsieur Pouchet goes against his better judgement 
and publishes a highly uncommercial calendar which Stéphane has proposed.  
The contrast in voice is never more present than in the relationship of Stéphane 
and Stéphanie. Initially these two characters appear very alike; they are both shy, creative 
artists, and the echo of their names suggests an inherent oneness – a Platonic destiny. 
However, this emerges as a simple rhetorical device; Gondry thwarts the expectation that, 
however similar the voices of these two people may seem (so much more similar that those 
of outspoken Clem and introvert Joel), these are two individuals who will never speak as 
one. The moment in which Stéphane and Stéphanie see the same spectacular things, and 
which the viewer, included in their intersubjectivity, sees too (cellophane as water, clouds 
kept afloat indoors by the resonant frequency of piano chords) becomes a rhetoric with 
which Gondry subverts a key trope of the romantic-comedy genre: The Science of Sleep 
presents a moment of intersubjectivity and then refuses the promise of its potential. 
Stéphane’s romantic hopes are raised and subsequently dashed, leading the viewer to 
retrospectively ponder whether this startling scene was indeed of his own, and just his own, 
imagination.  
As the narrative progresses, the voices of Stéphane and Stéphanie are most often 
heard in conflict, as they argue more and more and their communication becomes less and 
less successful. In later scenes, Stéphane speaks from within his hypnagogic reverie which 
operates on an entirely different logic than the wakeful world Stéphanie speaks from. The 
dialogue of each appears out of context with the other. Stéphanie attempts to decipher 
what Stéphane says to her, or shouts at her, but can’t because it makes no sense; “You’re 
manipulating me,” she says, “I... I don’t understand!” He leaps from topic to topic with the 
logic of dream, proffering non-sequiturs and abstract thoughts, and interjecting obscene 
sexual comments. He is somehow unable to respond directly to what Stéphanie says to 
him, and she is unable to interpret his convoluted utterances. 
The way in which the viewer is positioned to see both Stéphanie and Clem is 
fundamental to issues of intersubjectivity. In both instances we see each primarily via the 
gaze of the protagonist, sometimes directly, when the gaze of the camera is aligned with the 
view of the protagonist, but moreover in the sense that the viewer’s understanding of 
everything within the text is mediated by the subjectivity of the protagonist. The 
protagonist is always positioned between the viewer and Clem or Stéphanie, which is 
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further problematised by the fact that both protagonists spend considerable amounts of 
time asleep or in states of consciousness beyond a (comparatively) objective wakefulness. 
In wakefulness each protagonist is permitted an apparently open and interactive 
subjectivity, and in sleep a closed and hermetic subjectivity, within which the love object 
becomes alienated from its real life counterpart and reconfigured via the subjectivity of that 
which desires it.  
Whereas ultimately Stéphanie emerges as a distinct subjectivity in her own right, the 
case of Clem remains problematic. Clem exists in the external diegesis of Eternal Sunshine; 
she is a fully-formed character who interacts with Joel and with Patrick. However, the 
viewer sees much more of Clem in the internal diegesis, that is, within Joel’s sleeping mind. 
This version of Clem (which I will refer to as object-Clem, as opposed to the subject-Clem of 
the external diegesis), is a construct of Joel’s mind. The veracity of the characters in the 
internal diegesis is clearly defined in an exchange between Joel and Mierzwiak, as Joel 
beseeches the doctor to help him escape the Lacuna procedure:  
 
JOEL: Mierzwiak! Wake me up! 
MIERZWIAK: Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Barish. I thought you understood what was going on 
here.  
JOEL: You're erasing her from me. You're erasing me from her. You've got this thing. I'm 
in my bed. I know it. I'm in my brain.  
MIERZWIAK: I'm part of your imagination too, Joel. How can I help you from there? I'm 
inside your head too. I'm you. 
 
It follows that object-Clem, like Mierzwiak, is a facet of Joel; she is Joel’s subjective 
conception of Clem. As such, she exists in stark contrast to subject-Clem; object-Clem is 
entirely defined by Joel’s gaze – the vested gaze of the man who loves/hates/desires her. 
Every action of the object-Clem is defined by Joel’s subjectivity. It is therefore surprising, 
and problematic, when object-Clem becomes an active presence in Joel’s memory; rather 
than the recollected love object, this Clem appears to develop a subjective agency, an 
awareness and apparent autonomy; she becomes cognizant of Joel’s undertaking of the 
Lacuna procedure and proactive in schemes to halt it. One reading of this apparent 
acquisition of subjectivity would be to suggest that she is invested with an awareness; she 
remains an object within Joel and therefore remains barred from subjectivity. The apparent 
autonomy of the character is projected; to suggest that an object within dream may assume 
a subjectivity would be to suggest dream is not exclusive to the subject.  
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There are several further possible readings to this illusion of an active subjectivity 
bestowed upon an object, though the most salient interpretation posits object-Clem’s 
reflexivity as misogynist. Object-Clem is present on screen much more often than subject-
Clem and as such, the viewer comes to know the character (whole-Clem?398) primarily 
through the version within Joel, the object within his sleeping mind. Therefore the Clem 
the viewer comes to know is constructed by Joel’s gaze – his visual desiring gaze, but 
moreover his psychic gaze. The viewer sees Clem as Joel sees her, with reference to 
Mierzwiak’s line cited above, as an aspect of himself. Hence, object-Clem’s agency in trying 
to halt the procedure may be read as nothing more than Joel’s projected wish. The events 
of the external diegesis would seem to contradict Clem’s helpfulness here – she has already 
undergone the procedure herself; we do not know whether she experienced similar pangs 
of regret during, but regardless, she has moved on and is beginning a new relationship with 
Patrick.  
This opens up a further line of enquiry in regard to the film’s narrative tension, 
which charges Joel with outrunning the Lacuna technicians and preserving Clem within his 
memory. Ultimately he fails in this but tragedy is averted when the couple meets again the 
following day in Montauk (how this contrivance is brought about is discussed below). But 
what if Clem is wiped from Joel’s mind and he never sees her again? This is presented as 
the potential tragedy of the narrative – if Clem no longer exists to Joel, then she no longer 
exists at all. Joel is the film’s protagonist and as such the viewer is positioned to invest in 
his needs and desires. The viewer prioritises Joel’s need to reunite with Clem above all else. 
If a reunion cannot be realised, Clem’s existence in the external diegesis becomes arbitrary. 
Object-Clem, not simply the Clem of Joel’s dream-space, but Clem as the object of Joel’s 
desire, again takes precedence over subject-Clem.  
There are however positive interpretations of object-Clem’s illusion of subjectivity. 
This apparent presence of subjectivity within an other subject might be considered a 
coalescence of subjectivities, a meeting of two separate entities in a shared unconscious 
space, or indeed, a reinforcement of a feminine subjectivity within a male subject. It might 
be considered that the subjectivity of Clem in the external diegesis is so forceful that it 
leaves a trace within Joel. This is substantiated by the tropes of the romantic genre, which 
                                                 
398 I use this term to suggest the “whole-Clem” of the character’s representation in the film, across both 
exterior and interior diegeses. This is indicative of Joel’s subjectivity dominating the textual subjectivity; if we 
consider Clem’s subjectivity beyond that of Joel, then whole-Clem becomes synonymous with subject-Clem, 
or the “real” Clem. Correspondingly, object-Clem is an aspect of “whole-Joel”.  
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suggest that two people are “made for each other”399. This resonates with the conclusion of 
Kaufman’s screenplay (an aspect which Gondry chose not to film), in which Joel and Clem 
are shown as an elderly couple going through the Lacuna process again, having erased and 
re-met each other many times400. Clem’s apparently active subjectivity suggests a dialogue 
between Joel and Clem, if only within Joel, that indicates Joel, at the very least seeks, or has 
sought, such an engagement with subject-Clem.  
Notions of intersubjectivity are further complicated by the denouement of the 
narrative, as Kaufman and Gondry contrive a reunion for Clem and Joel. Object-Clem, in 
her dying moment, whispers to Joel, “Meet me in Montauk,” and, in the external diegesis 
the following morning both Joel and Clem travel to Montauk and meet again, as if for the 
first time. This instruction, “Meet me in Montauk,” seemingly implants in Joel the 
unconscious need to travel to Montauk. But why does Clem travel to Montauk? The 
instruction, with its origins in Joel’s dream-space, is unavailable to subject-Clem; it does not 
intersect with her at any point. Yet she travels to Montauk to be re-met by Joel, and the 
potential tragedy of the narrative is averted. Is this the film relying upon its generic 
foundations? The romantic comedy-drama insists upon an either/or resolution; the 
protagonist and his or her love object must meet again to either be reconciled or separated 
for good. Such a reading offers weight to the argument that as a result of their mutual love, 
the thresholds of Clem and Joel’s subjectivities have become indistinct.  
The notion of intersubjectivity is reasserted by an apparent telepathy between Joel 
and Clem as Joel undergoes the procedure. His attempts to hold on to Clem have an 
apparent effect upon wakeful-Clem, who, exterior to the events in Joel’s mind, begins to 
experience an uncanny change in herself. “I feel like I’m disappearing,” she says. She 
expresses a sudden urge to visit the frozen Charles River as she had done with Joel, though 
now Joel is absent from this image. Instead she suggests taking the trip with Patrick, but is 
immediately overcome with unease about the idea, and changes her mind. This occurs just 
as object-Clem gains an agency and begins to assist Joel in preserving her in his memory. 
Here, romantic love is invested with a supernatural agency, and telepathy intervenes to 
fulfil the role of an apparently impossible necessity. This underscores the supposedly 
                                                 
399 For an overview of how mainstream filmic narratives construct romance, see Shumway 1995: 381-401. 
400 The modified shooting script of Eternal Sunshine is published by Nick Hern Books (Kaufman 2004). 
Kaufman’s original script is available to view at the Internet Movie Script Database, at 
http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Eternal-Sunshine-of-the-Spotless-Mind.html. Accessed 9 February 2010.   
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inherent need of love – of the subject to be with the love object, which, in the instance 
presented here, is apparently reciprocal.  
This notion of thresholds of subjectivities becoming indistinct serves to effect a 
deterritorialisation of subjectivity and might also be mapped on to the model of becoming-
other – for instance, in the idea of “Joel-becoming-Clem”. Through his interaction with 
Clem, Joel enters into a process of becoming-Clem, just as Clem enters into a becoming-
Joel. This process is merely initiated and at no point progresses beyond the most tentative 
stages. The notion of progress suggests a linearity which is not necessarily appropriate. It 
remains within process, and might be considered a move towards a becoming, or an 
unconscious identification. If Joel’s emotional engagement with Clem is such that the 
boundary between them is breached, Clem’s own subjectivity would be permitted some 
operation within, or in conjunction with, that of Joel. This is perhaps an overly functional 
reading, a means of explaining how Clem achieves an agency in Joel’s sleeping mind – an 
agency which is more than just the illusion of. This Clem is not merely object-Clem but 
bears a trace of Clem’s subjectivity, suggesting a telepathy with the “real” Clem, the 
independent subjectivity active within the external diegesis.  
Nicholas Royle writes of the telepathic dream in Wuthering Heights, in which 
Lockwood dreams of Catherine, pleading “Let me in – let me in!”. The telepathic nature of 
Lockwood’s dream is:  
 
confirmed a few minutes afterwards when Heathcliff, believing Lockwood is out of 
hearing, ‘wrenched open the lattice, bursting, as he pulled at it, into an uncontrollable 
passion of tears. “Come in! come in!” he sobbed.’401 
 
Here the recipient of the message is not the intended recipient; Lockwood stands in for 
Heathcliff, receiving the message on his behalf, as it were, and by the conduit of dream. 
This appears to be the inverse of Eternal Sunshine, in which, it seems, the wakeful Clem 
experiences a telepathic communication (though does not understand it as such) from 
within her ex-lover’s sleep. This suggests a perhaps more complex telepathy; at this point 
of the narrative Clem is unaware even of Joel’s existence, and yet it would seem that the 
reason she feels as if she is disappearing is that a part of her remains inside Joel. She 
becomes telepathically aware that this aspect of herself is being erased; her response 
indicates that her desire, supposedly already erased, is in fact inerasable. 
                                                 
401 Brontë 1972: 30; Royle 1990: 49-50. 
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Such notions of intersubjectivity continue to be steadfastly refused in The Science of 
Sleep as its narrative proceeds toward a denouement. The final scene revisits the 
intersubjectivity of the cellophane water and down feather clouds, as from Stéphanie’s 
apartment window, Stéphane and Stéphanie see a man in the street below who appears to 
be on fire, the “flames” appearing, as the cellophane water before, as a stop-motion 
animation. They rush to the kitchen and fill a pot with water (cellophane), return to the 
window and throw it to the street below. A man cries out as he is hit by water – real water; 
the man does not appear to be on fire, nor to have been at any point. This moment offers a 
brief revitalisation of Stéphane and Stéphanie’s friendship, and appears to be so placed, just 
prior to the narrative’s conclusion, so as to juxtapose the potentiality of what was, with 
what has become. Stéphane is leaving Paris, frustrated that his relationship with Stéphanie 
has been thwarted by her rejection of his desire, or rather (as he does not see) his attempt 
to possess her. This mirrors the way in which Joel possesses Clem in Eternal Sunshine, and 
how eventually the object of Clem in Joel’s dream-space comes to partially coincide with 
Clem’s subjectivity in the external diegesis.  
This final scene shows a moment of intersubjectivity, which engenders a 
subsequent moment of emotional intimacy. Stéphane and Stéphanie sit alongside each 
other and attempt to discuss the reasons why their potential relationship has failed. This 
intimacy is brought to an abrupt end as Stéphane becomes, in Stéphanie’s words, “a pig.” 
 
STÉPHANE: Will you fix your teeth one day? 
STÉPHANIE: You’re mean. 
STÉPHANE: No, I’m just saying because it’s going to be forty years till we’re married and 
I might as well take care of my goods now, you know? Or actually, you know, don’t do 
anything. Maybe no teeth is good for a blowjob.  
STÉPHANIE: Okay, I think you should leave now.  
 
Stéphanie is quick to deflect Stéphane’s sexually suggestive comments but he does not 
leave. He continues to make offensive comments, and then climbs into her bed, fully 
clothed, where he begins to cry, before falling into a sudden sleep. Gondry returns us to 
Stéphane’s dream-space, where he and Stéphanie ride on a horse (Stéphanie’s toy horse 
come to life) which jumps on to a boat (the toy boat that she has made) before the boat 
sails away on a sea of cellophane.  
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In contrast to Eternal Sunshine which concludes on a bittersweet note of Joel and 
Clem attempting to restart their relationship in the full knowledge that it will most likely 
fail, The Science of Sleep concludes with the acknowledgement that Stéphane and Stéphanie’s 
relationship will never even begin. The apparent telepathy experienced by Joel and Clem is 
denied to Stéphane; he is unable to understand that the object-Stéphanie of his dream-
space does not correspond to the subject-Stéphanie of the external diegesis.  
Stéphanie refuses the objectification of Stéphane’s gaze. Object-Stéphanie cannot 
exist beyond Stéphane’s mind, and is obliterated in the external diegesis by the presence of 
the distinct and forceful subjectivity of the real Stéphanie. Stéphane however remains 
oblivious to this. She steadfastly rejects him; as she says, “I think you should go now,” she 
breaks her gaze from his, and refuses any further participation in discourse, which would 
seem to indicate absolutely that there is no coincidence of the object in Stéphane’s mind 
and the subject who sits alongside him. Furthermore, it shows that she appreciates a 
painful irony which Stéphane does not: that it is not her that he desires at all, but an 
imaginary version of her, of his own construct. 
 
Liminal motifs 
In previous chapters discussion of liminal motifs has centred on hypnagogia, the night, the 
vertiginous, rites of passage, the nomad, and the extraterritorial. Several of these motifs 
correspond to the particular form of the text – for example, the travelogue or memoir of 
Sebald, or the bildungsroman aspects of Kafka on the Shore. Eternal Sunshine and The Science of 
Sleep follow a generic romantic comedy/drama narrative, and do not so readily reflect these 
motifs. However, the diegetic economies of these films suggest opportunities for 
discussion of the construction of objects and space – of objects which become liminal 
through an existence across and between diegeses, and of liminal space translated through 
the boundaries of diegeses, in the notion of sleeping subjectivity effecting a translation of 
real-life space into a distorted dream-space.  
Both films are extraordinarily rich with inventive imagery, and liminal 
consciousness is a key facet. Gondry explores a visual means of representing hypnagogic 
transitions; in The Science of Sleep this is specifically the hypnagogic; in Eternal Sunshine it is 
the transition of the Lacuna procedure, and implicitly of memory and consciousness. The 
aforementioned use of Spin Art in The Science of Sleep presents an imposing visual conceit. 
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The viewer is not privy to the construction of these sequences (as we see Stéphane 
concocting his recipes for dreams). Indeed, the composition remains a mystery until 
explained by Gondry in sources external to the text402. As such, rather than manifesting as 
an object in either diegesis, it is of neither – it is a separate device embedded in the text. 
The corresponding image of transition in Eternal Sunshine is of snow and ice, which 
manifests as a peripheral, apparently arbitrary detail in various forms throughout the film. 
The film is set in the north east of the United States in February and as such the cold 
weather conditions would seem to be a given, yet Gondry’s approach to the texture and 
potentiality of the locale’s meteorological substances, as well as the persistence of this 
imagery, ties it inextricably to the film’s themes of transition, of both the impermanence of 
the central relationship, and of the manner in which memory and consciousness operates, 
whether authentically, or through an artificial process such as the Lacuna procedure.  
Snow is first apparent in the pre-title sequence, notably at the site of Joel and 
Clem’s meeting and re-meeting – the beach at Montauk. The re-meeting, occurring on St. 
Valentine’s Day, sees the beach awash with snow. Joel and Clem’s first date after their 
serendipitous re-meeting is a night-time picnic on a frozen lake. Joel fears the ice will 
shatter beneath their weight, and there is in fact a large visible fracture in the ice beneath 
them as they lie back and gaze at the stars. This seems to suggest a perilous position in this 
particular romantic narrative; the ice will inevitably begin to melt, creating a progressively 
unstable surface. The title sequence itself invites the viewer to imagine melting ice; the 
credits appear in a sharp, white, sans-serif typeface, which melts away after a brief moment.  
The choice of this landscape as the backdrop to the story cannot be discounted. As 
the characters negotiate unavoidable transitions, the frame again and again makes a feature 
of these substances which similarly cannot avoid instability. This “phase transition” from 
one state of matter to another is a perfect becoming-other; a substance changes form 
according to the conditions of its environment. Another term for liquefaction might be 
appropriate here; “fusion,” with its double meaning of melting and fusing, suggests both 
the transition from one state to another, and a coming together. 
Moving beyond the visual, The Science of Sleep presents a specific mode of dialogue 
which falls into the category of the liminal. Stéphane’s native tongue is Spanish (his father 
of Mexican; he is of dual nationality) and Stéphanie’s is French. Neither speaks the other’s 
                                                 
402 Gondry 2003 [1997]. 
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language so when together they speak in English.403 Here, the English language is not 
merely a liminal space, but a system in itself. It engenders, to both characters, a somewhat 
magical space; it facilitates the beginnings of an intersubjectivity through which we see 
objects translated into fantastical substances. English becomes a mode like the animation, 
the shared imagination. However, the ultimate refusal of this intersubjectivity imposes 
boundaries on this space. We might say that it is a tentative intersubjective space, which 
does not fully absorb the subjectivity of either character. It allows their subjectivities to 
“touch” but not to converge. So while the shared use of this language engenders great 
imagination and creativity, it cannot bridge other, more vital spaces.  
This recalls negotiations with language in other texts – Mari’s engagement with the 
Chinese language in After Dark, which corresponds to her position in the liminal night, and 
a move towards an adult subjectivity (she assumes a role of responsibility in translating for 
Guo Dongli404). It also resonates with the narrator of The Rings of Saturn, on the beach at 
Scheveningen, listening to the Dutch language and mis-recognising it as his own405. In The 
Science of Sleep, the liminal space of the lingua franca engenders a fantastical space akin to 
hypnagogia, while in The Rings of Saturn, a liminal hypnagogia engenders an apparent unity 
of languages.  
 
Liminal objects  
Both films feature sets of objects which are specifically related to the characters, and which 
function in two main ways. First, these objects exist between diegeses, and this duality 
lends an instability to the object; for instance, in some cases the translation from one 
diegesis to the other effects a fantastical translation, as in Stéphane’s typewriter, which in 
his dream becomes a giant spider/typewriter hybrid, its eight legs frantically punching at its 
own keys. In other cases, the dream object remains indistinguishable from its wakeful 
counterpart, or translated in much subtler ways. One such example is Stéphane’s telephone, 
distinctive in its retro style, which remains identical in his dream-space, but for its 
                                                 
403 It is worth noting that beyond the heteroglossia, this device makes the film eminently more marketable to 
an English speaking audience. 
404 AD: 38.  
405 TROS: 84-85. 
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exceptionally long cord, which allows Stéphane to continue his phone conversation as he 
walks through a meadow, or into a forest406.  
As with the spider/typewriter, these translations often take the form of a hybridity. 
The first instance of this occurs when Stéphane is in an apparently wakeful state. He shaves 
with an electric razor; suddenly the razor cuts him; it cuts him a second time and, angered, 
he throws it to the floor. To his surprise, it sputters back to life, jerking on the bathroom 
floor. Later, he dreams of a razor-spider hybrid, which attacks the current object of his ire, 
Monsieur Pouchet. The razor exists in both reality and dream; in dream it is imbued with a 
violent agency, and furthermore it seems to retain an aspect of this agency in Stéphane’s 
wakeful experience – following his dream, the violent potentiality of the dream-razor leads 
Stéphane to regard its wakeful counterpart with wariness and suspicion.  
 A second way in which these objects function comes to have greater significance 
for the theme of intersubjectivity, and comes to condition and be conditioned by the ways 
in which the characters relate to each other. These objects are often extensions of the 
characters, for example, in preparation for the Lacuna procedure in Eternal Sunshine, Joel is 
asked to assemble objects which remind him of Clem; these include a mug, letters, 
photographs, and drawings. As the Lacuna technicians prepare Joel for the procedure, he is 
asked to respond in turn to each to the objects he has assembled. Mierzwiak explains: 
“We'll use these items to create a map of Clementine in your brain.” Joel’s response is 
recorded, and as this “map” of his brain is created, these objects become metonymic of 
Clem, as constructed by Joel’s gaze, and are subsequently “removed” from his subjectivity, 
hence bringing an end to a potential intersubjectivity with Clem.  
It is also of note that Joel, Clem, Stéphane, and Stéphanie are all constructed as 
creative individuals, and many of the objects the viewer comes to relate to each are 
creations of that character. For example, Joel draws and paints, Stéphane “invents” (he 
constructs a “one second time machine”), Clem makes “potato-head” characters, and 
Stéphanie constructs a model forest-within-a-boat. In every instance these objects originate 
from the constructed subjectivity of these characters, and exceed those initial bounds to 
become nodal objects which function in the space between characters. It is Stéphane who 
                                                 
406 The telephone itself suggests another form of translation which engenders a liminal space. It transmits 
sound telegraphically, connecting voices across space. It captures the frequencies and timbre of spoken sound 
waves and translates the aural into electrical current; it passes this current across the liminal space between 
voice and ear, and retranslates this current into sound. It is not the speaker’s voice that is heard but a 
reproduction. It decodes and recodes. 
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makes the suggestion that Stéphanie construct a forest in her model boat, and they plan to 
collaborate on a short film, which, if it did materialise within the diegesis, would become a 
shared object, originating from both of them. Similarly, most of Joel’s drawings are of 
Clem; they are his creation but they take her image. This might be read as an attempt at 
possession, as reflected in the key narrative trope of Joel’s attempt to fight the Lacuna 
procedure and maintain his psychic possession of Clem. In these drawings and paintings, 
her image becomes filtered through his gaze. This is highlighted in a scene following 
Clem’s undertaking of the Lacuna procedure, in which she sees anew a drawing 
representing her as a skeleton. “You made me look thin,” she says wryly.  
The objects created by Clem and Stéphanie are notable in that, despite each text’s 
assertion of the protagonists’ subjectivity above all other and the attempt to possess their 
respective love objects (and especially in Joel’s apparent success of this in Eternal Sunshine), 
the sheer fact of their creation necessitates an originating subjectivity. Both Clem and 
Stéphanie need to exist beyond Joel and Stéphane in order to create in their own right. This 
to some extent mitigates accusations of misogyny in Eternal Sunshine, though it must be 
noted that Stéphanie’s creations are much more prominent than those of Clem, more 
esteemed by the protagonist, and also integral to the narrative.  
 The most prominent object in The Science of Sleep is Stéphanie’s model horse. 
Stéphane notices the horse on a visit to Stéphanie’s apartment. She tells him its name is 
Golden the Pony Boy407, though later she confesses the horse had no name until he asked 
her: 
 
STÉPHANIE: You know I named Golden the Pony Boy after you. I improvised his name 
when you saw him for the first time. He didn’t have a name.  
 
Golden the Pony Boy is territorialised by Stéphanie (she makes reference to having bought 
him) and she names him, and subsequently he is territorialised by Stéphane in that he is 
named after him.  Therefore he becomes shared territory; he cannot be territorialised 
                                                 
407 The horse was made by the film’s “Animals and Accessories Creator” Lauri Faggioni. After sending 
Gondry the finished horse, the director asked her what he was called; she replied that his name was 
“Heaven,” the name she gives to all her model horses, and signed off her note with a line from Coppola’s The 
Outsiders, “Stay golden, Ponyboy,” (modified from, “Stay gold,” in S.E. Hinton’s source novel) (Hinton 1967; 
Coppola 1983). Gondry misunderstood and thought the horse’s name was Golden Ponyboy (Buchanan 
2006). Ponyboy refers here to Hinton and Coppola’s fictional character, and to Gondry himself, as Faggioni 
affectionately addressed him. So, Golden the Pony Boy is further deterritorialised in that beyond the filmic 
diegesis he is (accidentally) named after Gondry himself.  
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absolutely as more than one party has a territorial stake in him; he becomes deterritorialised 
at the moment he is named, when he becomes a shared object.  
His deterritorialised status is tested when Stéphane breaks into Stéphanie’s 
apartment and installs a series of motors within him which allow him to gallop. (Here, 
Golden the Pony Boy becomes-other, from a static object to a mimesis of life). Stéphane’s 
intervention with the horse is an invasion; he breaches Stéphanie’s territory and imposes 
his own upon this object, without her permission. Stéphanie is at first offended and upset – 
by Stéphane’s intrusion and his “surgery” upon Golden the Pony Boy – but she later 
reveals she loves these changes to the horse, and admits to Stéphane that the horse was 
partly his already.  
 
Extraterritorial space 
Alongside the instability of these objects, Gondry explores the stability of space through a 
range of techniques. Eternal Sunshine employs set design and editing techniques to reshape 
spaces from Joel’s wakeful world into new configurations in his dream-space. Here spaces 
“bleed” together; Joel walks through the aisles of a bookshop into the house of his friends 
Rob and Carrie; in a single sequence he runs with Clem across the frozen lake, through a 
train station, under bedsheets, through a theatre. This fluidity of space is a key trope of the 
dream diegesis in Eternal Sunshine, and the disruption of spatial continuity becomes 
commonplace.  
A more persistent disruption of space occurs in scenes at the beach, where the 
presence of the sea represents an oblivion which threatens the presence of the object-Clem 
within Joel. The image of the shoreline, utilised extensively as a liminal, extraterritorial 
space in The Rings of Saturn, becomes equally prominent here, in the setting of Montauk, at 
the eastern tip of Long Island – an extremity of land against a vast body of water. In the 
pre-title sequence, Joel walks the beach, the far point of the island, the furthest he can 
travel. The sea laps at the shore, the threshold between land and sea shifting constantly and 
elastically. The beach is awash with snow and there is a blurring in terms of texture – like 
sand, snow is powdery (Montauk’s very light-coloured sand assists in creating a semblance) 
and like the sea, snow is a form of water (crystallised ice). In Gondry’s winterscape of 
Montauk, the two-dimensionality of the screen obscures any essence of substance; the 
snow is water-becoming-sand-becoming-beach-becoming-sea. Snow is also present in the 
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air as it falls, and serves to make the line of the horizon indistinct, presenting an uncanny 
environment of no distinct lines where we would expect such distinctions to orientate 
ourselves. This lends an unformed, anticipatory air to these early scenes; we expect, or at 
least hope, that order will emerge. Here, sand might be snow and the sea might be the sky. 
With no perceptible difference between these things, each is impossible to pick out, to 
name, and place in a particular order.  
This resonates with the pre-linguistic and the Lacanian order of the Imaginary. 
Dylan Evans description of the Imaginary has clear ramifications with these early scenes: 
“the order of surface appearances which are deceptive [and] observable phenomena which 
hide underlying structure.”408 The viewer observes only what is presented on screen, within 
the mise-en-scene (temporally as well as spatially), and not beyond. This image of Montauk 
is first seen two and half minutes into the film’s running time, when the viewer, like the 
infant prior to the acquisition of language, is still struggling to understand what is what. 
There is however a suggestion that a structure exists behind these deceptive surfaces, and 
that it will be uncovered. As aspects of character and narrative begin to coalesce and take 
form in the viewing mind, the viewer’s anticipation of order is slowly rewarded.  
Evans also asserts that the basis of the Imaginary is the formation of the ego in the 
mirror stage409, which again suggests that a formation is imminent. In place of ego, we 
might implant supplant the conjunction of Joel and Clem and the formation of their 
relationship, which is in a sense the ego, or central focus, of the film. This appears to 
reaffirm the Platonic ideal that the romantic genre insists and re-insists upon – that Joel 
and Clem actually are two halves of a single whole. They recognise each other and form an 
identification, much in the same way that the infant does as it identifies with its own 
image410. Here there is another kind of mirroring – a doubling, as Joel and Clem have met 
like this before – on the beach at Montauk, and as precipitating a romantic relationship.  
The extraterritorial quality of the beach is stretched to an absolute threshold in 
Joel’s final (and thus, very first) memory of Clem, in which they meet for the first time on 
the beach at Montauk at the party of a mutual friend. As dusk falls they break into an 
empty beach house; Clem is forthright, Joel somewhat more trepid. As he recalls their 
incursion into this house, his dream-space brings about a final spatial distortion as the sea 
                                                 
408 Evans 1996: 82. 
409 Evans 1996: 82. 
410 Evans 1996: 115. 
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begins to encroach upon the house while he and Clem are still inside. It is as if either the 
shoreline has advanced beyond its usual tidal limits, or the house itself has moved closer to 
the sea. As the scene progresses, waves break upon the edges of the house, and then begin 
to crash beneath it, shaking its foundations. The house begins to collapse, a section at a 
time, into the sea.  
The viewer infers that the house itself is an embodiment of this memory of Clem, 
and that as it falls into the sea, the memory of Clem is obliterated, piece by piece, from 
Joel’s mind. It also recalls the breaching of thresholds at Dunwich, as recounted by Sebald 
in The Rings of Saturn. At Dunwich the tidal surge destroys the town (“All night the waves 
clawed away one row of houses after another. Like mighty battering rams the roofing and 
supporting beams adrift in the water smashed against the walls that had not yet been 
levelled,”411) and while the beach house at Montauk does not suffer such violent 
destruction, it does, like the houses of Dunwich, pass through a phase of being partly of 
the land, partly of the sea. This house, the embodiment of what remains of Joel and Clem’s 
relationship, balances upon a threshold between the certainty of land (existence) the 
oblivion of the ocean (non-existence), until ultimately it is claimed by oblivion.  
The stakes do not seem so high in the spatial arena of The Science of Sleep. Here space 
becomes subject to territorialisation; in the internal diegesis this is in the dichotomy of 
dream-space and wakeful space, the dream-space an exaggerated version of reality, 
reterritorialised by dream, with its brighter colours, more acute angles, and apparently 
thicker air, and the threshold of this space represented by the Stéphane-TV studio. In the 
external diegesis territorialisation occurs in the space of other subjectivities – those of 
Stéphanie and Christine, Stéphane’s mother, which either refuse entry to territorial space, 
or encompass and nullify Stéphane’s own territorial space.  
The space of both Stéphane’s and Stéphanie’s apartments, both owned by 
Christine, represents one such problematic space. The film opens as Stéphane moves back 
into the apartment, into his childhood room. It is cluttered with artefacts of his youth – 
toys, drawings, posters. His bed itself is a model racing car. He makes no move to 
reconvene his room to his adult needs (he does not put childish things away) and settles 
into this childhood space. This appears to be a mutual deterritorialisation. The room itself 
effects a deterritorialisation upon Stéphane; it deterritorialises his adult self by introducing 
into his consciousness a space from his past (alternatively, this might be considered a 
                                                 
411 TROS: 158. 
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reterritorialisation, a reclamation of Stéphane’s subjectivity by his own childhood self). This 
resonates with Turner’s descriptions of adolescent liminality, though in reverse. Stéphane 
appears to be regressing to a pre-adolescent state, an idea reflected in his attempts to 
communicate with Stéphanie, which certainly lack a sexual maturity; rather than attempting 
to seduce her, he wants to play games with her, and his gauche attempt to steal a kiss is 
indicative of an adolescent (or pre-adolescent) sexual naivety.  
Yet Stéphane also effects a deterritorialisation upon this space. He is an adult, and 
his adult body imposes itself upon this space. The bed is too small for him but he sleeps in 
it nonetheless. His ambitions and desires have altered since childhood; in two telephone 
conversations he conducts from his bed, he complains to his mother how needs a creative 
job, and converses with Stéphanie, attempting to communicate his love and desire to her. 
He conducts his adult life in this space, deterritorialising it from the grasp of childhood.  
While this was his family home, it is now his mother’s apartment. She is temporarily 
absent, yet she owns the apartment, and the apartment next door into which Stéphanie 
moves (in Stéphanie’s first meeting with Stéphane, Stéphanie refers to Christine as, “My 
asshole landlady,” unaware that she is talking to her landlady’s son). Stéphanie’s moving in 
is another such deterritorialisation – a very formal one, which we would expect is 
constituted by a lease or rental agreement. The space of Stéphanie’s apartment assumes a 
liminality with her presence – she is a temporary occupant and so has a stake in its territory, 
yet it remains the property of Christine. Stéphane violates this territory when he breaks into 
the apartment to modify the talismanic “Golden the Pony Boy”. Upon discovering his 
intrusion, Stéphanie is upset; he has entered her apartment, a space which is hers, and his 
mother’s, but not his. This is a more brutal deterritorialisation; he has entered without 
permission, his intrusion is unexpected and disrespectful.  
This is a very literal application of the concept of territorialisation, concerning as it 
does the relationship between people and space, the command each has over that space, 
and how this shifts, is violated, or thwarted. To summarise the territorial progression of the 
space, it is at the outset the territory of Christine Miroux; it is deterritorialised by the arrival 
of a new tenant, Stéphanie, and further deterritorialised by Stéphane’s intrusion. This sets 
up a complex territorial economy, which, to a degree, governs what may occur within it.  
Ultimately it has disastrous consequences for Stéphane’s desire for Stéphanie. 
Christine returns home and decides to move back in to her apartment alongside Stéphane. 
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The space is again reterritorialised; Stéphane is no longer alone in the apartment, and it is 
no longer his own unimpeachable space. He is uncomfortable with her presence; upon the 
announcement of her moving back in, he scowls and exits the apartment without a word, 
and soon after decides to leave. This coincides with the disintegration of his relationship 
with Stéphanie, and it is as if this maternal space begins to exceed and enclose his desire.  
 
Summary  
Through the construction of interior and exterior worlds, Eternal Sunshine and The Science of 
Sleep introduce the potential for remarkable evocations of the liminal in extended moments 
of hypnagogia, which, in The Science of Sleep, become prolonged and eventually all-
consuming, a notion which carries forward to the following chapter, in which I discuss the 
construction of a narcoleptic protagonist. The liminal is also evoked in the spaces between 
each protagonist and the object of his desire. The Science of Sleep thus becomes the more 
radical text in its refusal to bow to tropes of genre, yet the conclusion of Eternal Sunshine 
perhaps offers a more open liminal space in its acknowledgement of uncertainty.  
Sebald’s liminal motif of the shoreline is revisited in Eternal Sunshine at the site of 
Montauk and in the space of the beach house. The sea is at first indistinct and then 
threatening, its otherness bearing a potential oblivion. The interplay of territory in The 
Science of Sleep, in particular the “home” space of the characters apartments, precipitates a 
discussion of home and the nomadic in My Own Private Idaho, which, as with the precarious 
beach house, takes as its focus the risk and potential of liminal space.  
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Four 
 
Gus Van Sant 
My Own Private Idaho 
 
my consciousness began to dissolve at the edges, so that at times I could hardly have said 
how I had got there or indeed where I was. 
W. G. Sebald The Rings of Saturn412  
 
Mike, the protagonist of Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho, suffers from narcolepsy, a 
condition which causes him to fall asleep with little or no warning. Narcolepsy also causes 
hallucinations during apparently wakeful states, leading the sufferer to confuse dream and 
reality. This confusion is reflected in the film’s narrative, which is multifarious and 
fragmented, held together solely through its focus on the protagonist. As in the case of the 
narrator of The Rings of Saturn, Mike’s consciousness is somewhat frayed; his narcolepsy 
manifests in dramatic seizures and is represented via hypnagogic reveries, which often take 
as their focus his lost mother, Sharon. These reveries disrupt the continuity of his wakeful 
experience and subjectivity, and as such he often has no idea of where he is or how he 
came to be there. He is always in the periphery of the hypnagogic; his subjectivity comes to 
be constructed across a continuum of consciousness – sleep, wakefulness and hallucination 
– which Van Sant refracts through multiple modes of filmic grammar – time-lapse 
photography, Super-8 film, posed stills, title cards, and cutaways to pastoral idylls. I will 
argue that the protagonist’s fragmented subjectivity comes to be represented by these 
modes, which work in conjunction to produce an intrasubjective polyphony.  
Mike lives on the streets of the Pacific Northwest, where he works as a prostitute 
and, at times, lives in a derelict hotel amongst a group of “street denizens” who speak 
(sometimes but not always) in a Shakespearean demotic, drawn from the Henriad. The 
Shakespearean comes to characterise one of several narrative threads, with the character of 
Scott, son of the city mayor, filling the role of Prince Hal. Scott, who often acts as Mike’s 
                                                 
412 TROS: 210.  
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protector, is soon to inherit, and the Falstaffian Bob Pigeon expects wealth and privilege by 
association, but following a police raid on the hotel, the street denizens disband. Mike and 
Scott travel to Idaho where Mike declares his love for Scott, who does not reciprocate. 
They then visit Mike’s brother, Richard, and it is revealed that Richard is also Mike’s father 
from an incestuous union with their mother. Mike and Scott set off in search of her – first 
to an Idaho hotel, then to Italy. They fail to find her, but Scott meets and falls in love with 
an Italian woman, Carmella. He abandons Mike to return to the U. S. and marry Carmella, 
and to assume his now-deceased father’s political identity. Bob Pigeon approaches the new 
Scott, but is disavowed. He dies soon after, and the narrative concludes with Mike, alone 
on the road in Idaho; having failed to find his mother, or have Scott reciprocate his love, 
he surmises that he will never break free from his circuitous fate.   
This chapter first aims to address the question of liminal subjectivities through an 
account of narcolepsy. It will consider how narcolepsy functions in the film and serves to 
condition the text, in terms of the political, and of narrative and structure. I aim to explore 
how Van Sant establishes a haecceity in his protagonist, with discussion of precedents set 
in his previous work, and to outline how a particular polyphony is installed in the text, with 
an account of contributing visual and narrative modes. Within the text, I see these images 
reflected in motifs of home, rites of passage, the nomad, and the extraterritorial, and I note 
an emerging tension between the outcomes of these liminalities – “successful” 
reaggregation is set against perpetual liminality, and the political comes to the fore as the 
liminal exposes power structures which grant access to or debar particular outcomes.  
The film revisits textual subjectivities and liminal motifs of previous chapters, 
notably the construction of interior space from Gondry, the nomad and extraterritorial 
from Sebald, and rites of passage and the carnivalesque from Murakami. Moreover, there 
are differences to be noted in how Van Sant deploys modes and motifs; in contrast to all 
the other texts discussed, My Own Private Idaho is a remarkably open text. This openness 
sustains both positive and negative readings. As embodied in its fragmented protagonist, 
openness may be a lack of definitive direction, which leads to nowhere in particular. On the 
other hand, it never compromises to the notion of the definitive; it remains open and fluid, 
and thus the liminal space between text and viewer may yield a much wider and more 
generative engagement.  
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Critical work on Van Sant 
Much attention has been paid to Van Sant’s use of the Henriad, as documented in José 
Ramón Díaz Fernández’s annotated bibliography of films in which Shakespeare and 
adolescence intersect413. Similarly there is a body of work which locates the film as a text of 
gender and queer studies, as in the papers I cite from James Morrison and Matthew 
Tinkcom, which respectively consider the film in light of New Queer Cinema414 and its 
representation of masculinities415. More applicable to my project, is the work of Stuart 
Aitken and Christopher Lukinbeal416, who take an interdisciplinary approach, combining 
the discourse of film studies and geography, opening up discussions of space and 
transience.  
I have found some of the most insightful work to be academic reviews of the film 
(and of Van Sant’s other films). Harvey Greenberg’s reading of the film417 has been 
invaluable in shaping my approach and leading me towards other critical texts, and 
similarly, Steve Vineberg’s review of Drugstore Cowboy418, Devin McKinney’s of Gerry419, and 
Megan Ratner’s of Paranoid Park420, provide some of the most interesting critical work on 
Van Sant.  Two interviews with the director also prove especially fruitful; an interview with 
Graham Fuller from 1993, which is published alongside the film’s screenplay421, and an 
audio conversation with fellow director Todd Haynes, which coincided with the film’s 
release on DVD by the Criterion Collection422.  
Most of all, I am very grateful to Paul Arthur and Naomi C. Liebler for their paper 
on the theme of liminal rites in the film423, which I cite extensively. It offers a rich and 
rewarding appraisal of how both Mike and Scott negotiate the liminal, and it has been 
central in crystallising my thoughts on the matter, and providing points of departure for my 
own discussion.  
                                                 
413 Díaz-Fernández 2008.  
414 Morrison 2006.  
415 Tinkcom 2005. 
416 Aitken and Lukinbeal 1997; Aitken 1998.  
417 Greenberg 1992. 
418 Vineberg 1990.  
419 McKinney 2003.  
420 Ratner 2008.  
421 Van Sant 1993.  
422 Van Sant and Haynes 2005.  
423 Arthur and Liebler 1998.  
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In addition to critical work on Van Sant, I draw on neuroscientific discourse in my 
preface on narcolepsy; especially of note is the work of J. Allan Hobson424 and Andreas 
Mavromatis425, which provides excellent grounding for the discussion.  
 
Narcolepsy  
I suggest that My Own Private Idaho makes no claim on a centred or stable textual 
subjectivity in that it has no singular narrative thread, politics, nor is it of any singular filmic 
genre. A nominal centre is provided by the protagonist (as represented by River Phoenix’s 
performance) and by his narcolepsy, and these facets come to form the centripetal dynamic 
which holds the textual subjectivity in place against the centrifugal forces of an array of 
radically conflicting modes. The configuration of the protagonist and his narcolepsy comes 
to condition the entirety of the text; it could be said that narcolepsy presents a model for no 
definitive centre. Stuart Aitken suggests that Van Sant uses narcolepsy “to destabilize our 
sense of what constitutes a fundamental sense of identity,”426 and it must also be stated that 
the device of narcolepsy radically destabilises the notion of a stable textual subjectivity.  
The film opens with a static close-up of a dictionary definition of narcolepsy: 
 
nar·co·lep·sy \`när-kə-`lep-sē\ n {ISV. fr. Gk narkē}: a condition characterized by brief 
attacks of deep sleep. 
 
This image might be read as a title in itself; its placement at the very front of the narrative 
conditions the viewer’s reading of all that follows. Paul Arthur and Naomi Liebler compare 
this image to the following title card, which reads “Idaho,” announcing the setting of the 
first scene, and suggest that narcolepsy might equally be read as a location427. The opening 
scene depicts Mike, alone on the road in Idaho, talking to himself and observing the 
landscape, before succumbing to a seizure and falling asleep; thus, the first few minutes of 
the narrative lead the viewer to conclude that this dictionary definition refers to Mike. 
Harvey Greenberg suggests that My Own Private Idaho is: 
                                                 
424 Hobson 1989.  
425 Mavromatis 1987.  
426 Aitken 1998: 172. 
427 Arthur and Liebler 1998: 26. 
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essentially informed by Mike’s soporific/stoner sensibility. His neurological disorder 
enables an eerie yet exhilarating sense of dislocation and narrative slipperiness.428  
 
Mike’s narcolepsy is represented within the diegesis via Phoenix’s performance, manifesting 
in dramatic seizures as he twitches and falls to the ground; it conditions the jagged and 
expressionistic approach to storytelling, which jumps from one time or location to another, 
depending on when and where Mike falls asleep and wakes, and moreover it is reflected in 
the great breadth of filmic modes which Van Sant deploys to evoke Mike’s very specific 
relationship with consciousness. These facets constitute the particular sensibility and 
narrative slipperiness Greenberg writes of; it might be said that this is narcolepsy rendered 
as textual effect.   
Narcolepsy is a form of hypersomnia. It was identified by J. B. E. Gelineau in 1880, 
but the first accounts were reported three years earlier by Westphal – the physician cited by 
Foucault as instating the notion of the homosexual as a “species”429. I am unable to find 
the source of Van Sant’s dictionary citation of narcolepsy, but the OED defines it as thus: 
 
narcolepsy, n. Med. 
A sleep disorder, often of genetic origin, characterized by frequent brief episodes of sleep 
during the day and disturbed nocturnal sleep, often with cataplexy, sleep paralysis, and 
hypnagogic hallucinations.430  
 
This statement says both less and more than Van Sant’s dictionary definition. It already 
carries within it some prescribed notions of sleep; it presupposes a normative sleep which 
adheres to a circadian structure. It positions “sleep during the day” as a “disorder” and 
nocturnal sleep as a site of stability which may be disturbed. Also, it does not specify that 
these episodes of sleep are necessarily beyond the subject’s agency, nor does it address the 
manner in which this sleep approaches the subject (in My Own Private Idaho, sleep seems to 
approach Mike in the form of an ambush). The most interesting new details here are the 
related effects of the condition, such as cataplexy (a loss of muscle tone often prompted by 
strong or sudden emotion such as laughter or anxiety) and especially hypnagogic 
hallucinations, an aspect of narcolepsy Van Sant explores to a great extent.  
                                                 
428 Greenberg 1992: 23. 
429 Foucault 1984: 43. Correspondingly, early cases of narcolepsy were considered the result of repressed 
homosexuality or excessive masturbation (Tuller 2002). 
430 “narcolepsy, n. Med.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University 
Press. 16 Jun. 2000 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00321139> 
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If untreated, narcolepsy renders the individual at a severe disadvantage for 
participating in waking life. It places the subject at odds to a circadian framework; sudden 
attacks of daytime sleep may cause problems for the individual not only in maintaining 
employment, but at a base level in maintaining a level of self-vigilance necessary for 
personal safety. It can lead to dependence upon others, as in the case of Mike, who comes 
to rely on Scott as a protector. In these instances, Mike’s body is rendered prone and 
vulnerable; his subjectivity is displaced and, without agency, he becomes an object, open 
and defenceless to a gaze which may prove dangerous, especially given his circumstances of 
homelessness and prostitution.  In this sense Mike is akin to Eri in Murakami’s After Dark, 
in that his lack of wakefulness puts him at a disadvantage to the more nefarious elements 
of waking world, be this a hostile environment or a hostile gaze. 
Within the diegesis, narcolepsy is not discussed in the context of neurological or 
medical discourses. The first time Mike suffers a narcoleptic attack witnessed by others, 
Scott offers an explanatory statement:  
 
SCOTT: Narcolepsy, doctors are saying, is brought on by certain chemical reactions in the 
brain. Comes about in situations of stress. 
 
Following this statement, Mike’s narcolepsy is taken as given, and no attempt is made to 
address the practicalities of managing the condition. Such management is not beyond the 
realm of possibility – while the condition is undeniably debilitating, many people live with it 
and cope to a greater degree of success than Mike. However, such notions are neither 
explored nor acknowledged within the diegesis431.  
While I would argue that the film takes no singular political stance, it might be said 
that the multiple stances it does take may be aggregated into a rhetorical position regarding 
questions of homelessness and exploitation at a particular moment in American history. 
The configuration of narcolepsy and homelessness (and prostitution) places Mike in a 
particular social context. The viewer bears witness to his interaction with other characters, 
                                                 
431 Some deleted scenes made available with the film’s 2005 DVD release explore this to some degree. One 
scene shows Mike wake in a hospital; we don’t know why he is there – for treatment of his narcolepsy, or as a 
first step away from the streets, perhaps both, perhaps neither. Most likely Mike doesn’t know; as with other 
instances of waking, he appears not to know where he is, asking a nurse, “Do you live here?” As the scene 
concludes the viewer ascertains that Mike does not intend to stay and is eager to get back to the street. (Van 
Sant 1991[2005]).  
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and to the responses of friends and, more often, strangers to his narcoleptic attacks. The 
political tone of the film is coloured by these responses; almost all are cold; as soon as Mike 
is no longer conscious he is no longer of use and is to be disposed of. Early in the narrative 
we see him collapse in the company of a female client, Elena, whose reaction contains a 
hint of fear, of being somehow implicated in his collapse or culpable for his 
unconsciousness, and tainted by the illegality he represents. His lack of consciousness also 
offers opportunities for exploitation, as in the film’s closing moments when his shoes and 
possessions are stolen by two passing men. Mike is aware of this danger; he asks Scott, 
“How much do you make off me when I’m asleep?” to which Scott replies, “No Mike, I’m 
on your side.” These reactions to Mike’s narcolepsy present a kind of social litmus test and 
articulate a rhetorical question, the answer to which Van Sant underscores with his choice 
of music. Eddy Arnold’s song Cattle Call432 plays over the opening credits, evoking and 
simultaneously undercutting nostalgia for the bygone west, with its denotation of literal 
cattle and connotations of the herd of street hustlers whose number includes Mike. The 
score also features a repeated refrain from America The Beautiful433, which similarly works to 
underscore both the evocatively photographed landscape434 and, with searing irony, the 
problematic of Mike’s position within that landscape (Amy Taubin comments that, “it 
functions ironically to connect the betrayal of familial love with the betrayal of the 
American dream”435). 
The use of narcolepsy to highlight issues of exploitation is unapologetically pointed, 
though arguably oblivious to its own complicity. The sharp edge of this politics manifests 
in the closing moments of the film, which see Mike, alone and asleep on the open road, 
robbed of his shoes and possessions, and then lifted into a car and driven away by a person 
whose face the viewer never sees. In Van Sant’s screenplay the person is Scott436 and in an 
excised scene it is Mike’s father/brother Richard437. In the diegesis of the original film, the 
identity of this person is not disclosed; it could be Scott, Richard or another benevolent 
figure, or it could be someone of great threat. The rhetoric is reiterated a final time as, prior 
to the closing credits – over which plays The Pogues’ The Old Main Drag438, a ballad of 
homeless youth and abasement – the screen cuts first to black and then to a title card 
                                                 
432 The song was popularised by Eddy Arnold in the early 1950s; it was written by Tex Owens in 1934.  
433 First published 1910; lyrics Katharine Lee Bates, music Samuel A. Ward.  
434 Van Sant uses two cinematographers on My Own Private Idaho, John J. Campbell and Eric Alan Edwards. 
435 Taubin 1992: 13. 
436 Van Sant 1993: 187. 
437 Van Sant 1991[2005]. 
438 Written by Shane MacGowan, 1985. 
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which reads: “Have a nice day,” employing a customer service demotic with cold irony. 
While open to criticisms of bluntness, lack of subtlety, and even crassness, this moment 
nevertheless conveys an anger which adds a further final layer to the textual subjectivity, 
beyond the subjectivity of the protagonist and seemingly at odds with the aesthetic of the 
preceding film. It might be read as Van Sant asserting an authorial voice; as a parting shot it 
seems resigned, an almost redundant afterthought, though it signifies an attempt to locate 
the film squarely in a social context. 
While Van Sant attempts to manage this aspect of the film’s politics, he has been 
criticised for his complicity in the processes that construct these problems. Travis 
Mackenzie Hoover argues that Van Sant romanticises Mike’s narcolepsy and his 
homelessness: 
 
One doesn’t look at the film and see the nightmare of an unprotected life: one sees young 
people enjoying themselves, being irresponsible and living without parental authority. It 
doesn’t seem like such a hard-knock life.439  
 
There is weight to Hoover’s argument – the casting of two recognisable Hollywood stars in 
the lead roles lends the characters a glamour that would have been absent if Van Sant had 
cast his original choices of Mike Parker and Rodney Harvey in the roles of Mike and 
Scott440. Parker in particular would have given the film an altogether different air – he is 
one of the real street hustlers who relates his experiences to camera in a scene included, 
Van Sant argues, to add an air of authenticity to the social milieu depicted441.  It may be 
argued that Parker as Mike would have leant the film a greater degree of authenticity; 
however, the casting of real street hustlers signals a problematic issue. For all the 
authenticity these actors bring to the film, their inclusion implicates Van Sant, a self-
identified middle class man who insinuates himself into a very different milieu. The 
question of Van Sant’s background and its position in relation to the subject matter of his 
films is addressed in interview with Graham Fuller: 
 
                                                 
439 Hoover 2005, in Reverse Shot 21; <http://www.reverseshot.com/article/my_own_private_idaho_0> 
accessed 26 September 2010.  
440 Van Sant and Haynes 2005.  
441 See Van Sant and Haynes 2005.  
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GF: Where does your affinity for street kids and junkies and hustlers come from and why 
do you seek to tell their stories? Is that in any way a reaction to your own middle-class 
upbringing? 
GVS: It's certainly very much apart from my own upbringing. I think it's that Mala Noche, 
Drugstore Cowboy, and My Own Private Idaho had settings that were unfamiliar enough to me 
that they seemed like fairytale land . . . All three of them are close to each other, but far 
away from the public, from the viewers, in the sense that Star Wars or pirate adventures are 
far away from them. It's a storyteller's technique to remove you from everyday life into a 
new area, so parables can be had.442 
 
This suggests that Van Sant presupposes a viewer who is not of the world he films, a 
dangerous supposition which is not only myopic but of concern in the suggestion that this 
world is a site for “parables”. It would seem to suggest that social reality is not the subject 
of My Own Private Idaho (or Mala Noche443 or Drugstore Cowboy), merely an exotic backdrop444. 
Regardless of its experimental aesthetic, My Own Private Idaho is a commercial film and its 
gaze, intentionally or not, objectifies those whose sexual objectification it takes as a 
narrative focus. Equally it could be argued that by allowing Parker and Green a voice to 
communicate their experiences – in a commercial film no less – Van Sant is overturning 
such notions of exploitation.  
 Beyond the political, the deployment of narcolepsy has ramifications for how the 
protagonist’s subjectivity comes to be represented and positioned within the text, which 
brings me to a key component of my reading of the film. The representation of narcoleptic 
subjectivity seems to demand formal experimentation; one wonders whether Van Sant took 
this as a challenge to effectively represent a particular kind of consciousness, or whether his 
use of contrasting modes, already evident in his previous work, in turn suggested 
narcolepsy. This refers back to Greenberg’s account of the film’s “narrative slipperiness”445, 
a notion constituted by the correlation of the manner in which the textual subjectivity 
appears to approximate the subjectivity of the protagonist, a “drawing together” of text and 
protagonist, as occurs in Gondry, and Van Sant’s multifarious approach to the task of 
storytelling and representing the world in which the story exists.  
                                                 
442 Van Sant 1993: xxviii. 
443 Van Sant 1985. 
444 Hoover considers Van Sant’s position with reference to Fassbinder’s Faustrecht der Freiheit (Fassbinder 
1974): “I wonder what [Fassbinder] would have made with the relationship between Van Sant and the young 
hustlers at whom he gazes, with the director perhaps taking as much from his charges as Fassbinder’s Eugen 
took from Fox.” Hoover 2005; Fassbinder 1975.  
445 Greenberg 1992: 23. 
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I suggest that that through the correlation of protagonist and modes, the film 
constructs a particular narcoleptic subjectivity, blurring the boundaries of reality and 
hallucination, and destabilising the categories of sleep and wakefulness. This is my 
foremost suggestion for why Van Sant designates narcolepsy to his protagonist; the 
condition provides an expedient model with which to explore notions of consciousness, 
transience, and nomadism. Stuart Aitken and Christopher Lukinbeal suggest that, “Mike’s 
neurological disorder enables Van Sant to muddle time, space and place,”446 while Mariana 
Martin goes so far as to ask:  
 
Could Idaho all be Mike’s dream? Perhaps, but if so, this might be the first film to utterly 
banish all psychoanalytic meaning from the realm of the sleeper, and instead allow the 
strange, involuntary, and half-remembered to reign supreme and unchallenged.447 
 
In terms of narrative, narcolepsy is deployed as a device to both hinder and progress. 
Whenever Mike suffers a narcoleptic attack, he is cut short in whatever he might be doing 
or saying – his agency is hindered. However, his narcolepsy often serves to move him 
forward; Van Sant positions the viewer with Mike, and as such the narrative interface is 
determined by his consciousness, so that when he wakes in a new location a new narrative 
sequence is initiated. Greenberg notes that: 
 
Whenever Mike falls out, Van Sant's camera winks out of existence, too. Events unfold in 
jump cut. We recurrently awaken with Mike as if the world were newly invented, under 
clouded circumstance in obscure locales.448   
 
A line from Van Sant’s screenplay further elucidates this idea; of his narcolepsy, Mike 
comments, “It’s kind of like time travel,”449 suggesting a temporal and spatial transit, which 
in turn suggests that Mike’s positioning in the universe is entirely arbitrary – his movements 
are ultimately beyond his will. While narcolepsy becomes the primary means of narrative 
progression, it subverts the notion of a linear, progressive narrative. The narrative leaps 
effected by narcolepsy are apparently random: from collapsing alone on a road in Idaho to 
                                                 
446 Aitken and Lukinbeal 1997: 360. 
447 Martin 2005, in Reverse Shot 21; <http://www.reverseshot.com/article/my_own_private_idaho> accessed 
26 September 2010.  
448 Greenberg 1992: 23.  
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waking in a hotel room in Seattle; from collapsing on a suburban street in Seattle to waking 
in Scott’s arms in Portland; from collapsing in a hotel room in Rome to waking on a plane 
at Portland Airport. This device is akin to deus ex machina; it interjects, unanticipated, and 
affects a decisive narrative shift. Arthur and Liebler draw attention to this deployment as: 
 
a formal device with which to bridge spatial and temporal transitions (when Mike wakes up 
he is invariably in a new location). It is, moreover, not just a marker but a complex bearer 
of meaning, a signifier of transition as thematic substance of the work.450  
 
 Crucially, the idea of narcoleptic subjectivity also extends beyond modes of 
storytelling, into modes of representation. One indicator of narcolepsy, as the OED 
definition testifies, is “hypnagogic hallucination”. This is elucidated by J. Allan Hobson, 
who suggests that narcoleptic hallucinations depend on the REM sleep processes451. In 
non-sufferers, REM sleep does not occur until around ninety minutes after sleep onset; 
however Hobson suggests that in narcoleptics the REM process operates during sleep and 
wakefulness: 
 
Since the REM sleep process is building during the wake state – causing the excessive 
daytime sleepiness – it is little wonder that a dream image may be generated and 
experienced as an hallucination before the narcoleptic loses awareness of his 
surroundings.452 
 
This underlines the notion that a narcoleptic subjectivity may be radically at odds with an 
objective reality; hallucinations may be mistaken for reality as the projections of the 
narcoleptic’s mind appear authentic and supplant experiences of the real world. The 
narcoleptic’s ego will endeavour to integrate and rationalise these experiences, engendering 
a dislocated and precarious subjectivity in which ego boundaries are loosened and the 
reality principle is overthrown. Here, subjectivity becomes mutable, defined as much by 
hallucination as by experiences of objective reality, which connects it to the hypnagogic, 
suggesting that the narcoleptic experience is in many ways akin to a perpetual hypnagogic 
state – a potentially unending liminality with no obvious exit or hope of reaggregation.  
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This idea is carried forward into Van Sant’s treatment of narcolepsy as an irritant to 
the notion of wakefulness as the home of subjectivity.  Not one of the states of 
consciousness in which Mike is depicted could be classified as “home”; neither sleep nor 
wakefulness nor any manifestation of hypnagogic hallucination offers the stability that the 
term suggests. As the film moves across and between modes and narrative threads, it 
becomes impossible to designate any particular moment to sleep, wakefulness or 
hallucination. Greenberg points out that even the most apparently naturalistic or wakeful 
scene “may well be another of Mike’s stupefied reveries.”453  This strategy appears to assert 
that no state of consciousness is privileged and that each and every state is valid; each 
makes its own claim upon being a reality, and thus a sense develops that these states must 
be understood as co-existing micro-realities, no one less valid than the next.  
This idea is especially applicable when the states in which Mike is depicted appear 
to be radically disconnected, for example, in the two very distinct worlds denoted by the 
contrasting registers of contemporary and Shakespearean speech. These worlds co-exist 
within the diegesis of the film, but appear to represent two opposing realities; we might 
consider it improbable that such modes of speech could coexist within a single paradigm 
defined by character, location and epoch, but a pluralistic approach to the representation of 
realities allows each to exist discretely, and as contrasting facets of a meta-reality. To 
borrow a device from the previous chapter, it might be said that the sum of these distinct 
realities comes to constitute the “whole-Mike”.  
 
Textual subjectivities 
Van Sant, like Gondry, deploys a wide range of filmic modes in constructing the 
protagonist and his world. However, whereas Gondry uses modes to construct two self-
signifying spaces of wakefulness and dream, Van Sant’s use of modes adheres to no binary 
structure, and instead opts for a more diffuse economy of multifarious indistinct states. 
Aitken and Lukinbeal suggest that:  
 
                                                 
453 Greenberg 1992: 24. 
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through the depiction of Mike’s narcolepsy, Van Sant subverts the distinction between 
internal and external space. This distinction permits space and scale to appear “natural.” 
Time and space circulate, collapse, and are turned inside-out.454 
 
Whereas both Eternal Sunshine and The Science of Sleep appear to achieve a stability at surface 
level, there is a radically – and compellingly – unstable textual surface to My Own Private 
Idaho. In terms of filmic modes and narrative devices, My Own Private Idaho appears more 
heterogeneous; it features a raucousness of filmic modes, which unlike the comparatively 
smooth transitions of Gondry’s films, achieves a textually jagged surface. These modes can 
be designated into three main categories, dialogue, visual, and structural, though some may 
be categorised as two or even all three of these. Taking my lead from the previous chapter, 
I will discuss these modes in relation to the construction of the protagonist, exploring how 
the subjectivities of protagonist and text become drawn together, the narcoleptic 
fragmentation of the former corresponding to the jagged surface of the latter.  
The modes Van Sant employs include time-lapse photography, Super-8 film, posed 
shots which mimic still photography, title cards, and cutaways to pastoral idylls. The film’s 
dialogue functions in a similar multifarious manner; contemporary dialogue cuts to 
Shakespearean and scripted dialogue to improvised, and a breaking of form to 
documentary interviews with Mike Parker and another street hustler, Scott Patrick 
Green455. The switch between these modes may be said to “jar” the viewing experience, 
though to differing degrees. For instance, the interjection of time-lapse shots are brief and 
do not interrupt the narrative, whereas the Shakespearean and documentary aspects 
represent a much greater rupture. The collision of these modes with the fictional and 
naturalistic sections draws attention to the device of polyphony, which in turn brings to 
light the less prominent modes, such as the time-lapse, which must too be considered an 
aspect of the text’s polyphonic subjectivity.  
As in literary texts, the polyphony may manifest as a clamour of disruptive, 
destabilising force, apparent in both content and form, or it may manifest as a performance 
of polyphony, a self-signifying flirtation with multiple voices which ultimately does not 
destabilise the text and reasserts a unified centre, assimilating that dissenting otherness into 
a singular, monological whole. While Gondry’s films may fall into the latter category, My 
                                                 
454 Aitken and Lukinbeal 1997: 359.  
455 The veracity of these interviews is documented in Van Sant and Haynes 2005; see page 159.  
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Own Private Idaho is, in a textual sense at the very least, of the former category, in that its 
text consists of a polyphony of voices with no definitive narrative ploy or tenet. 
Todd Haynes argues that the shift between modes in My Own Private Idaho does not 
result in a lack of cohesion: 
 
There’s something that’s so cohesive about it . . . The visual style that predominates, and 
also the sense of being in [Mike’s] head, suspended in some dream state where daydreams 
keep slipping into real life. There’s no solid reality that the film establishes. There’s no 
sense of pure naturalistic reality.456 
 
I strongly agree that the film creates no solid reality, though I would argue a “pure 
naturalistic reality” is in fact one of the modes that Van Sant deploys, for example in 
intimate scenes between Mike and Richard, and Mike and Scott. I would not however argue 
that this naturalism represents an objective reality but rather one of Mike’s subjective 
realities – the naturalism hinting that it is perhaps one he experiences as more authentic 
than others (conditioned as it is by these particular relationships). I would also disagree 
with the thrust of Haynes’ argument that the film achieves a sense of cohesion. Haynes 
uses this term to defend the film from criticism that it is too dispersed; however I do not 
believe that such a comment constitutes negative criticism – the textual subjectivity is 
radically dispersed and this produces a difficult and uneven text, which is thus compelling 
and visceral. Its polyphony is in some senses its greatest success – it succeeds in the 
seemingly impossible task of representing a fragmented narcoleptic subjectivity.  
 
The text and the protagonist 
My assertion that Van Sant’s polyphony of modes represents a narcoleptic subjectivity rests 
upon the construction of the protagonist. As I argued in the previous chapter, Gondry 
constructs his protagonists through the evocation of their inner worlds. Here I argue that 
Van Sant achieves a similar, though deeper effect through denying a clear inner/outer 
dynamic for his protagonist and instead representing him across a continuum of 
consciousness. Again, I suggest that this occurs through an embedding of the protagonist, a 
drawing together of the subjectivity of the protagonist and that of the text.  
                                                 
456 Haynes & Van Sant 2005. 
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It is perhaps useful to begin by discussing the construction of protagonists in Van 
Sant’s previous films. Walt, the protagonist of Mala Noche, is constructed through voiceover 
– most of the film’s dialogue is a voiceover narration from Walt’s point-of-view, which 
skews the textual subjectivity to his perspective. Here the division of narrator and narrated 
is relevant, as discussed in relation to Sebald. Walt appears as an object within the diegesis, 
portrayed by the actor Tim Streeter. The voiceover, again by Streeter, is in the first person, 
and refers in the past tense to an I, thus, as in Sebald, the I that refers is other to the I that 
is referred to.  
Similarly, in the opening scene of Drugstore Cowboy the protagonist Bob delivers a 
first person monologue in voiceover, which refers to a previous self. Here the dynamic is 
complicated as we see Bob in the present – a close-up of his face, as he recalls a moment in 
the past, which we also see as the film cuts between the close-up of Bob and Super-8 
footage of Bob with three other people, who we ascertain are his “crew” – the friends with 
whom he robs drugstores. Here the I that speaks is also the I that is represented in the 
close-up; we infer that the voiceover is an internal monologue occurring in the 
protagonist’s mind as we are watching him in the close-up of his face. Yet there is another 
I, the object in the Super-8 film, a doubling which mirrors that of Joel’s body at the 
intersection of diegeses in Eternal Sunshine. The conjunction of these two modes with the 
voiceover positions the Super-8 footage as internal to Bob, as being the focus of an internal 
gaze, accessible only to Bob and the viewer.  
My Own Private Idaho, at first glance, presents a much simpler dynamic. The opening 
scene similarly exploits notions of the gaze to establish the subjectivity of its protagonist. 
Mike, alone on an empty highway in Idaho, looks into the landscape and sees a face 
looking back at him – “a fucked-up face,” as he describes it – constructed by distant foliage 
and the shape of the highway itself. Greenberg sums it up: “He curls his fingers before his 
eye, the camera obligingly irises in.”457 Here Van Sant takes the camera directly to Mike’s 
point of view and bringing the gaze of both the viewer and Mike into direct alignment – we 
are placed not just in close quarters but directly behind his eyes. What marks this from the 
use of point-of-view shots in Gondry is the correspondence of Mike curling his fingers 
before his eye and the subsequent shot which irises in. Van Sant draws attention to the 
device, as if to let the viewer know how this particular pair of eyes works – that through a 
process of re-framing, it sees things that are not necessarily of an objective reality, and 
                                                 
457 Greenberg 1992: 24. 
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given the positioning in this very first scene, that the viewer will be placed behind these 
eyes again and again as the narrative moves forward. This would seem to represent a step 
on from Drugstore Cowboy in the drawing together of textual and personal subjectivities. 
Here Van Sant aligns the viewer’s gaze with Mike’s gaze unequivocally, clearly denoting 
him as the protagonist and imposing an identification with Mike upon the viewer 
(correspondingly, the fucked-up face gazes back not just at Mike, but at the viewer too).  
This apparently straightforward construction is soon complicated. While Van Sant’s 
screenplay features sequences in which Mike speaks in voiceover, referring to himself both 
in the present and the past458, this device was excised from the text of the film itself. When 
Mike speaks, it is always within the diegesis. He is often heard speaking aloud when alone, 
or to himself. This speech is not directed to another character, it is an articulation of his 
internal monologue, akin more to Joel’s voiceover in the opening sequence of Eternal 
Sunshine than to the voiceovers of Walt or Bob. It is privy to Mike and the viewer alone, 
and yet he never addresses the viewer, and his dialogue in no way anticipates an audience. 
This would seem to position Mike in closer proximity to the viewer than either Walt or 
Bob. Whereas Walt and Bob talk to, or at, the viewer, Mike, like Joel, does not institute the 
dichotomy of speaker and listener and avoids the boundary between protagonist and 
viewer that such a device creates.  
However, unlike Joel, we see Mike’s lips move when he speaks. His voice remains 
diegetic; it never enters the fabric of the text by means of voiceover. There is no division of 
the narrating subject and narrated object as in Mala Noche, Drugstore Cowboy, or in Sebald’s 
novels. Mike’s speech exists within the diegesis, therefore he is both the narrator and the 
narrated, and from the perspective of the viewer, he is both the I that speaks and the I that 
is referred to. Mike only becomes truly analogous when the camera takes his point of view, 
in the irising-in shot, which lasts for only a very brief moment before Mike appears in 
frame again and the viewer is placed back in opposition, and we are able to identify 
ourselves against Mike, rather than with him, or as him.   
Further divisions add to this problematic, notably in the instances in which we see 
Mike succumb to sleep. Despite Greenberg’s assertion that “[w]henever Mike falls out, Van 
Sant’s camera winks out of existence too,”459 the camera does document Mike succumbing 
to sleep, and from a definitively exterior viewpoint. Here the viewer is not inside Mike’s 
                                                 
458 See citation from the screenplay below. 
459 Greenberg 1992: 23. 
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head but at a distance, observing the displacement of wakeful subjectivity from a body 
which becomes a passive object. The transition is objectified, and the moment is repeated 
every time Mike succumbs to sleep. It is also of note that Phoenix’s performance in these 
moments is somewhat fetishised – we are invited to watch as he twitches and jerks until 
finally he lays dormant, and we look on, compelled, and implicated through looking460.  
The documentary sections affect a similar distance from the protagonist (and, with 
regard to the politics highlighted by Hoover, similarly implicate the viewer). Here, a 
Barthesian reality effect disrupts the viewer’s suspension of disbelief, as it asks the viewer 
to “believe” to an even greater degree. It wrenches the viewer from the notion of being 
inside the mind of a fictional character, and confronts us with documentary. Furthermore 
the content of this documentary is shocking and disturbing – sexual violence and 
exploitation. The subsequent return to a fictional diegesis thus presents another wrench 
which, depending on viewpoint, reaffirms or undermines the film’s politics. In such 
moments, the textual subjectivity comes to be marked against the protagonist. It steps away 
from and exceeds the protagonist, achieving a further fragmentation.  
 
Polyphony 
The manner in which the film’s multiple modes function alongside each other in the 
singular entity of the text presents a polyphony akin to that which Bakhtin sees in 
Dostoevsky461. It is impossible to cite the film itself to demonstrate the polyphonic effect, 
so I offer an excerpt from an unfilmed expositional sequence of Van Sant’s original 
screenplay, which shows how the director intended to plant particular modes alongside 
each other.  
 
MIKE 
This is nowhere. I'll bet that nobody is ever going to drive down this road. I'll be stuck here 
forever. 
 
Mike looks at the road stressfully. The road looks back. He looks at the road his eyes 
growing heavy. The road looks back... 
 
                                                 
460 Arthur and Liebler comment that Phoenix “brings a remarkably graceful vertigo to the depiction of these 
seizures,” (Arthur and Liebler 1998: 28-29), resonating with that particular symptom of one of Sebald’s 
narrators.  
461 “A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid 
voices,” Bakhtin 1984a: 6. 
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Mikes yawns. 
      
MIKE'S VOICE OVER 
I don't know when it was I recognized I had this disease. 
 
Mike looks like a backwoods character who fits into the terrain. Mike makes strange 
movements, like he is having a sort of epileptic fit, then yawns like he is very tired, again. 
      
MIKE'S VOICE OVER 
Sometimes I'll be in one place, and I'll close my eyes... 
 
MIKE CLOSES HIS EYES. THEN A WHOLE RITUAL OF EVENTS HAPPENS, HIS 
EYES TURN BACK IN HIS HEAD AND HE BEGINS TO SHAKE ALL OVER. 
THEN ALL GOES BLACK. 
      
MIKE'S VOICE OVER 
When I open them again, I'll be in a completely different surrounding. 
 
When Mike opens his eyes, he is in downtown PORTLAND, OREGON. 
      
A LOUD BUS drives by Mike's view in the city. He is asleep, then wakes enough to see 
other UNKNOWN KIDS rifling his pockets in a doorway, as Mike sleepily looks on. 
      
SUBTITLES 
It's kind of like time travel. It's kind of good. 
      
MIKE CLOSES HIS EYES AGAIN, AND WHEN HE OPENS THEM HE IS BACK 
IN THE COUNTRY. BUT THIS TIME A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TERRAIN. 
LIKE A LONG TIME HAS PASSED. HE IS ALSO WEARING DIFFERENT 
CLOTHES. 
      
MIKE CHECKS HIS WATCH AGAIN. He looks happy at the passage of time.462 
 
 
This sequence follows Mike very quickly through states of consciousness as he comments 
upon each transition reflexively and via various modes: diegetic dialogue, non-diegetic 
dialogue (voiceover), and subtitles. Mike communicates to the viewer at many different 
textual levels in quick succession, serving to definitively embed his subjectivity within the 
text. We hear his voice when he speaks, we hear his voice when he doesn’t speak (as if the 
soundtrack of film has become a conduit for telepathy), and lastly we see his words on the 
screen as text. It is as if his subjectivity has mastered the text; he is in control of all 
channels, yet he remains a visible presence on screen via the signifier of his body, at once 
object and subject. This reflects Taubin’s assertion that:  
Mike is the film’s “governing consciousness” . . . The filtering of narrative through 
Mike’s snoozing subjectivity gives coherence to the film’s remarkable 
heterogeneity.463 
                                                 
462Van Sant 1993: 110-111.  
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The sharp contrast of modes in such a brief, economical sequence also denotes a 
Bakhtinian polyphony (equally, a Bakhtinian analysis can be applied to the play of modes 
throughout the film itself). Here these modes do not appear to be in conflict; there is no 
dialogue as such between modes, each mode conveys an aspect of a singular expositional 
statement. There is however a divergence in form.  
I suggest an alternative reading to the idea of a mastery of form, that these multiple 
modes represent a fragmentation and dispersal; that while these modes may emerge from 
the same source, they soon become irreconcilable. In this sequence Mike uses three 
different modes of address, each mode representing a particular moment of consciousness, 
perhaps the only means of communication available to him at that moment. In this reading, 
these modes do not function as a coalesced omnipresence but as individual missives from 
disparate states of consciousness. The polyphony here suggests not so much an ease of 
communication but of the necessity to communicate, through whatever form may be 
possible, and in turn the generative possibilities of these modes of communication.  
Two resonant comparisons are Haynes’ film, I’m Not There464 and Todd Solondz’s 
Palindromes465, both of which feature a singular protagonist represented through the 
performances of multiple actors, who take on the role in sequence, so as to represent 
different facets of the protagonist and/or to destabilise the viewer’s perception of that 
protagonist. Van Sant’s film achieves a not altogether different textual effect to Haynes’ 
and Solondz’s films, in that it features a protagonist portrayed by a single actor and 
fragmented through a polyphony of filmic modes.  
This polyphony is comparable to the similar deployment of modes in Gondry, and 
to the “stage-managed” polyphony of Sebald. The Sebaldian narrator draws external voices 
into the textual subjectivity; its other voices take command of the narrative, often, as I have 
noted, with no grammatical indication, so that the transition between voices is rarely 
signposted, even deliberately obfuscated. The otherness these voices represents is then 
“absorbed” by the textual subjectivity, which renders it akin to the voice of the narrator, 
effecting a homogenisation, a flattening of the surface of the text.  
In contrast, the textual subjectivity of My Own Private Idaho engages with an 
otherness which is predominantly generated within the protagonist. The textual subjectivity 
                                                                                                                                               
463Taubin 1992: 12. 
464 Haynes 2007.  
465 Solondz 2004. 
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does not absorb – it sets out from a starting point of irrevocable fragmentation. Although 
approaching polyphony from a counterpoint, this may at times appear to mirror the textual 
mastery of Sebald’s novels, but in light of Haynes’ comment that the film depicts “no solid 
reality,” as the viewer experiences the persistent clash of modes, it becomes clear that there 
is no centre from which such mastery may emerge. While Mike is represented by a singular 
actor in a sustained performance (a recognisable and stable presence on screen), there is no 
definitive centre to the character’s subjectivity. Rather than drawing otherness in, his 
fragmented otherness is refracted outwards via a polyphony of intrasubjectivities. To revisit 
the centripetal/centrifugal dynamic, we might say that in contrast to the centripetal 
Sebaldian subject, Van Sant constructs a centrifugal subject – a polyphony of representative 
modes which radiates outward from a nominal, illusory centre. 
 
Visual modes 
This refraction of subjectivity plays out in modes which come to stand for particular 
aspects of the protagonist, such as memory, home, alienation. As in Drugstore Cowboy, 
Super-8 film is used to represent the space of the protagonist’s memory. The use of Super-
8 within otherwise 35mm (or digital) cinema has come to be a commonly used trope to 
signify memory and nostalgia, and to denote home movies. Wim Wenders made notable 
use of this device in Paris Texas466 in which the protagonist Travis is shown a home movie 
which features his missing wife, Jane. In My Own Private Idaho, Van Sant uses Super-8 film 
to similar effect though more extensively, to depict moments from Mike’s childhood, in 
particular those featuring his missing mother, Sharon. He cuts brief clips into scenes in 
which Mike recalls or is reminded of his childhood; for instance, when his gaze falls upon a 
line of rooftops, the film cuts to a Super-8 shot of his childhood home, then back to a shot 
of Mike as he reacts to the memory. On another occasion with Scott, Mike’s dialogue 
explicitly references home as he tries to recall whether his mother’s house was blue or 
green; the film again cuts to Super-8 footage, which appears to answer his question, as 
Mike says in voiceover, “No, it was green. It was green. How could I forget that?” Thus, 
these shots come to be constructed as Mike’s memories of his childhood, and of his prior 
family unit of himself, Sharon, and Richard. The scene with Scott aside, these are deployed 
                                                 
466 Wenders 1984. Aitken and Lukinbeal compare My Own Private Idaho to Wenders’ film, noting that both 
revolve “around the hopelessness of an American nomad’s search for self and family in a landscape of 
unreflexive icons,” (Aitken and Lukinbeal 1997: 361).  
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adjacent to narcoleptic episodes, always prior to, as if to suggest that these memories are a 
trigger for the character’s narcolepsy.  
Here, as in Drugstore Cowboy and Paris Texas, the visual construction of memory 
connotes a loss. The footage, watched or experienced from the present, holds within it 
something that is no longer present; in Paris Texas it is Travis’s wife Jane, in Drugstore 
Cowboy it is Bob’s crew, and in My Own Private Idaho it is Mike’s mother. In Drugstore Cowboy 
Bob’s accompanying voiceover recalls his time with these former friends – he has chosen 
to move on from that lifestyle, though in the close-up we see a smile on his face, as if in 
response to these memories. In all three films the Super-8 footage comes to represent a 
happy, bygone time, and consolidates the position of the protagonist as the psychic link 
between the two contrasting film stocks.  
In each instance the footage connotes a record of presence. However, whereas 
Wenders cuts his Super-8 footage with 35mm footage of his characters watching their 
home movies, Van Sant uses Super-8 to effect an alienation. The apparatus is concealed; 
the viewer never sees the Super-8 camera or projector, and thus the footage comes to stand 
directly for the protagonist’s memory. The images play out for the viewer and for Mike, but 
for no-one else; all other characters are excluded from this; the objective document of this 
film comes to signify the subjective memory of the protagonist. This constitutes a 
conflation of textual and personal subjectivity; it serves to bond the protagonist to the very 
texture of the film – with no apparatus, and no third party, the protagonist himself comes 
to be the screen of this projection. To a degree this footage also effects an identification of 
the viewer with Mike. As much as it comes to stand for Mike’s memory, the viewer is 
nonetheless aware that it remains an article of film within the diegesis, and infers that this 
footage was filmed by the characters; Sharon in particular looks directly into camera and 
performs for an anticipated audience. While her gaze can never reach beyond the camera, it 
is nevertheless directed outward – towards Mike, and towards the viewer. As with the 
irising-in on the face in the landscape, this brings together the viewing positions of Mike 
and the viewer – the viewer’s gaze, and Mike’s psychic gaze, fall upon the same images. 
 Another device which allows access to Mike’s inner world is represented by a 
paradigm of visual modes which I read as corresponding to Mike’s narcolepsy. These 
include shots of open fields and farmhouses, often bathed in golden light, and which are 
positioned in the text often seemingly as non-sequiturs, or adjacent to sequences which 
show Mike succumbing to sleep. In such instances these shots may be read as hypnagogic 
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hallucination – a comforting dream image corresponding to the title of the film – interior 
to the protagonist, and embodied with an essence of “home”. Similarly, Van Sant twice 
uses slow motion shots of salmon jumping upstream – in the opening title sequence, and 
immediately prior to the final scene. This would seem to refer directly to the notion of 
returning home (to procreate and die in the case of salmon; for uncertain reasons in the 
case of Mike).  
Also within this paradigm are time-lapse shots of fast-moving clouds over a rural 
landscape. These shots are placed adjacently to scenes of Mike falling asleep or waking, and 
as such are directly suggestive of hypnagogia, though also carry the notion of time-passing, 
and of the “time travel” referred to above. In conversation with Van Sant, Todd Haynes 
uses the term “narcoleptic subject” in reference to these time-lapse shots, which he cites as 
fundamental to the filmic construction of that particular subjectivity467. Van Sant responds 
with an explanation of how these shots came to function in the film, describing first how 
he’d intended to represent Mike’s narcoleptic episodes:  
 
We thought it was going to go black. We thought that something was going to happen 
[but] during the edit we were realising it doesn’t mean that. And then the time-lapse really 
helped to explain his inner mind . . . We kind of shoved them into the middle of scenes, 
right into his head.468  
  
Van Sant introduces another intriguing visual mode in My Own Private Idaho through the use 
of title cards which designate location and also serve to divide the film into discrete “acts” 
(I will discuss below how these acts correspond to a Shakespearean structure). A notable 
feature of these cards is their colour; each features the name of the location (Idaho, Seattle, 
Portland or Roma) in white text on a coloured background (blue, green, red, or mauve). 
Each location presents a shift in focus and tone, for instance, the Portland sections are 
notable for the large number of characters (other sections are limited to six characters at 
most), and this sudden throng invokes a carnivalesque air, which coincides with the use of 
Shakespearean dialogue and structure, and which might be read as representing a particular 
kind of consciousness in the protagonist. The central Idaho and Rome sections contain the 
narrative threads of Mike’s unrequited love for Scott, and the search for his mother, while 
the two other Idaho sections which bookend the narrative, and which perhaps might be 
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read as a prologue and epilogue, feature Mike alone, speaking to himself. All of these 
sections are different in terms of narrative style and content; each has a particular essence, 
be it the Shakespearean and carnivalesque, the monologue and dream images of Mike’s 
interior world, or of particular narrative threads. As such the different colours of the title 
cards might be read as signifying not just a change in location, but a tonal shift, or 
gradations of Mike’s consciousness, or a shift in reality. 
The film features two scenes depicting sex, both constructed via a series of staged 
“stills”, that is, shots of held poses filmed in real time (less than one second each) and 
placed in succession. The artificiality of this is highlighted by slight movements in the 
actors as they try to remain completely motionless, and a decisive movement in the final 
shot of the latter scene, as Scott closes his eyes – a self-signifying moment of artifice. This 
technique adds nothing further to our understanding of Mike’s consciousness but it does 
effect another destabilisation of textual subjectivity – it jars the viewing experience and 
provokes questions of its purpose. This purpose may serve to effect an alienation which 
reflects that of Mike and Scott in their role as prostitutes, or it may have no purpose but to 
achieve that destabilisation, to refuse a standardised filmic representation and to unsettle 
the viewing experience.  
 
Dialogue, narrative, and structural modes 
The subsequent modes I discuss are primarily related to the use of dialogue, and to the 
narrative structure and textual surface of the film. The dialogue is drawn from four sources 
– there is dialogue scripted by Van Sant, dialogue improvised by the actors469, candid 
documentary monologues, and Shakespearean text appropriated (and approximated470) 
from Henry IV Parts One and Two, and Henry V471. Much critical work has been dedicated to 
the Shakespearean aspect of the film472, however I find the documentary section to be a 
much more radical intervention in form. In this section, filmed in a Portland Chinese 
                                                 
469 The viewer may not be able to differentiate between dialogue that is scripted and that which is improvised. 
We can only know this through accounts of Van Sant’s filmmaking process (Van Sant 1993; Van Sant and 
Haynes 2005).  
470 It is important to note that in these sections, the dialogue spoken is not always from Shakespeare; it is 
sometimes an edited, contemporised version, and often it is a stylised approximation, with no direct 
antecedent. 
471 Shakespeare 2002; 1981; 1995.  
472 José Ramón Díaz-Fernández provides an (at the time) exhaustive bibliography of critical texts dedicated to 
the Shakespearean aspect of the film, numbering forty-three in total, several I which I draw from (Greenberg, 
Arthur and Liebler, Tinkcom). Díaz-Fernández 2008: 102-106.  
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restaurant, Van Sant constructs a scene of his street-kid characters talking, joking, fighting, 
and laughing. He intercuts these staged moments with two “talking head” pieces from 
“actors” Mike Parker and Scott Patrick Green, who describe their experiences of street 
hustling. These monologues are presented as interviews; Parker and Green’s gaze falls 
somewhere behind or alongside the camera, as if responding to an off-screen interviewer, 
and we infer from the content, tone, and manner of address that the incidents they describe 
are not of the fictional world of the film, but of their own lives.  
This break of form recalls the reality effect of the photographs and documents of 
Sebald’s novels – artefacts from an ostensibly real world placed within a fiction to unsettle 
a boundary of facticity and fictionality. Here the device is all the more startling for the fact 
that, unlike Sebald’s novels, the film does not masquerade as memoir or documentary, at 
least not beyond this scene. Whereas Sebald constructs his narrator as close to 
interchangeable with the author, the viewer of My Own Private Idaho knows that Phoenix 
and other recognisable co-stars are not street hustlers. In this scene, the viewer becomes 
aware that Parker and Green, who share the screen with Phoenix, are street hustlers. This is 
further complicated by the fact that Parker’s character is given a fictional name – Digger – 
and appears in several other scenes, all of which are scripted (some by Van Sant, some by 
Shakespeare) and all of which elicit a very different kind of performance from him, in line 
with that of the other actors with whom he shares the screen. As prefaced, Van Sant states 
that the Chinese restaurant scene was included to inject an authenticity into the film: 
 
Mike Parker and Scott Green [were] sort of our street advisors. They were being 
interviewed in this scene because I was so paranoid and I felt really bad that we didn’t have 
the right extras in the room. Our extras department just got friends of their... kids out of 
regular school. So they didn’t look like what they were supposed to. But I knew that Scott 
and Mike had histories that, you’d be able to just cut to the chase, if you just interviewed 
them. And to get this verisimilitude from the street within the film.473  
 
It seems naive to assume that the presence of this scene would achieve an authenticity, the 
“verisimilitude from the street,” which in turn might condition the rest of the film. I read 
this scene as highlighting the fictionality and the lack of authenticity of all else in the film 
through its (very troubling) disruption to the textual surface, though I find the formal 
intervention to be hugely compelling. It corresponds to Bakhtin’s ideal of a genuine 
                                                 
473 Van Sant and Haynes 2005.  
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polyphony which allows other voices an autonomy; of all the texts, this instance presents 
the most forthright example of an autonomous otherness. That Van Sant states its 
inclusion is in the pursuit of authenticity somewhat undermines this, but it remains a bold 
gesture.  
 The most commented upon shift in modes is the film’s appropriation of narrative 
threads and dialogue from Henry IV Parts One and Two, and Henry V. In this schematic, the 
Prince Hal role is fulfilled by Scott, son of the Mayor of Portland, who has cast off his 
privilege and responsibility to live with “street denizens”. A Falstaffian figure, Bob Pigeon, 
is introduced, and Mike is temporarily cast as a Poins-like sidekick474. The appropriation of 
Henry IV Part One does not progress beyond the tavern scenes and Gads Hill robbery; the 
film features no cipher for Hotspur (other than a brief reference to a cousin of Scott’s who 
appears to be a pretender to the crown) and rather than heading to war, Mike and Scott 
take off in search of Mike’s mother, initiating a new narrative thread. The film only returns 
to Shakespeare late in the narrative as Scott disavows Bob Pigeon, in a mirror of Henry IV 
Part Two, Act V, Scene V, and then as Jane Lightwork (the recast Mistress 
Quickly/Hostess) gives an account of Bob’s death, a mirror of Henry V, Act II, Scene III.  
 These sequences constitute yet another layer of “reality” to the text; they are 
incongruous, which leads the viewer to ponder to what degree they are a facet of Mike’s 
subjectivity. Mike is not a central player in these scenes, yet he remains the primary focus of 
the camera, as we observe him observing the relationship that plays out between Scott and 
Bob. On two occasions, Mike is excluded completely – in a duologue between Scott and 
Bob, and another between Scott and his father. One wonders if these scenes might be read 
as a dream sequence, with Mike promoting the object of his affection to centre stage, and 
latterly playing out the heartbreak of Scott’s rejection vicariously through Scott/Hal’s 
rejection of Bob/Falstaff.  This reading is somewhat substantiated by Marianna Martin’s 
suggestion that Keanu Reeves’ performance of Scott achieves “a blankness into which 
almost anything can be projected.” She suggests that, “Van Sant makes use of [this 
blankness] to terrifying effect in Idaho. Scott is an empty canvas . . . Scott is all surface . . . 
and no more”475. Such a reading would certainly substantiate the notion of Mike’s dream 
states elevated to realities by virtue of a narcoleptic subjectivity. Yet equally, this reading 
                                                 
474 In one sequence, which corresponds to the preparation and execution of the Gads Hill robbery, these 
roles appeared to be switched, with Scott becoming Poins and Mike becoming Hal.  
475 Martin 2005, in Reverse Shot 21; <http://www.reverseshot.com/article/my_own_private_idaho> accessed 
26 September 2010. This also ramifies with the description in After Dark of Eri as being like a blank screen 
(AD: 128-129). 
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suggests itself in order to “smooth” the textual surface, to attempt a definitive explanation 
of sequences which would otherwise constitute a sharp incongruity and jagged textual 
surface.   
Shakespeare is also present in the film’s structure, which takes the form of five acts, 
along with an opening prologue and closing soliloquy, which are announced by the 
aforementioned title cards. Only two of these acts, what would be Act II and Act V, 
feature Shakespearean narrative and dialogue, yet the structure imposes itself nonetheless, 
with the Italian Act IV in particular resembling the brief and intense surge of narrative 
often a feature of the corresponding act of Shakespeare’s plays. Within this structure, other 
narrative tropes operate to subvert expectations of genre. Mike’s unrequited love for Scott 
subverts aspects of the romance genre in that Mike’s love is rejected as soon as it is stated, 
yet remains an unresolved narrative thread, and also in that rather than being purely of the 
romantic, it approaches a liminal space between friendship and romantic love. It may also 
be considered a subversion of heterosexual norms in that at the time of the film’s release, a 
gay love story, albeit thwarted, featuring two headlining actors was uncommon in American 
cinema476.  
A second subversion of generic tropes takes place in the search for Mike’s mother; 
he follows her trail from location to location, finding always that she has moved on to the 
next – a pattern which the conclusion of the narrative brings to a nominal end but which in 
theory could go on in perpetuity. Other resolutions seem similarly nominal, especially those 
appropriated from Shakespeare – Scott’s rejection of Bob (Hal’s of Falstaff) and the deaths 
of both Bob and Scott’s father (the King). The reliance on an extra-textual source lends 
these moments an air of inauthenticity or arbitrariness, as if staged – given the viewer’s 
potential familiarity with these moments in Shakespeare, the restaging here does not 
invigorate in the manner of unforeseeable narrative progressions. Notably, Mike only 
observes these resolutions – none of them centre on him, suggesting again that these 
moments might be narcoleptic projections.  
A single moment which may be read as resolutive for Mike occurs in the parallel 
funeral scenes of Bob and Scott’s father, which take place simultaneously at the same 
cemetery. Mike, attending Bob’s funeral meets the gaze of Scott, attending that of his 
                                                 
476 Prior to My Own Private Idaho, perhaps only Dog Day Afternoon (Lumet 1975), Kiss of the Spider Woman 
(Babenco 1985), and Torch Song Trilogy (Bogart 1988) match it in terms of the prominence of both the film and 
its stars. 
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father. Scott’s father’s funeral takes place on higher ground so Scott is positioned as 
looking down on Mike, over the brow of a hill. Yet Scott’s gaze is marked by an almost 
blank passivity which seems to acknowledge a threat. This threat is posed by Mike’s gaze, 
which dares to meet Scott’s eye, looking up at him defiantly and accompanied with a wry, 
purposeful smile. This is the parting moment of these two characters; it proves somewhat 
resolutive in that it marks a decisive shift in the relationship from the film’s early scenes. 
Yet it remains a moment rife with ambiguity – is Mike’s gaze a claim of authenticity over 
what might be seen as the fraud of Scott’s esteemed new identity? Or is it a sheer 
unquenchable anger at betrayal? It could be either, or neither, or both, or more. 
 
Intersubjectivities 
I present a final note on subjectivity, to redirect the refracted textual subjectivity away from 
Mike alone and toward a space between Mike and Scott. As noted, the film contains some 
sequences in which Mike is not the most prominent player, notably the Shakespearean 
sections. Ostensibly he remains the protagonist – as noted, we observe him observing – but 
the main catalyst of these scenes is Scott. I have argued that this may be a projection of 
Mike, a promotion of his love object centre stage, to be gazed upon. However, an early 
scene offers an intriguing counterpoint to this reading.  
As Scott carries Mike’s sleeping body from Elena’s house (a notable first detour 
from Mike’s subjectivity; he is asleep and the viewer follows the events surrounding his 
sleeping body), Scott’s dialogue slips away from a naturalistic register; he does not quote 
from Henry IV so much as construct a pastiche of a Hal soliloquy, in a register that is a 
hybrid of the contemporary and the antiquated: 
 
SCOTT: I grew up in a neighbourhood like this. And my dad. He has more fucking 
righteous gall than all the property and people he lords over, and those he also created. 
Like me, his son. I almost get sick thinking I am a son to him. You know you have to be as 
good as him to keep up. You have to be able to lift as big a weight. You have to be able to 
throw that weight as far, or make as much money, or be as heartless. 
 
It is not so much the shift in register that is of note – this is not the Shakespearean dialogue 
that characterises the Portland sections, more of a gesture towards it. It is the shift in 
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Reeves’ delivery from an airy naturalism to assertive and purposeful, approximating a self-
conscious “ham” performance of Shakespearean soliloquy.  
 This is the first moment of a jarring between modes, and the viewer must wonder 
what precipitates this shift. A possible explanation is offered by Van Sant’s close-up of 
Mike’s sleeping face as Scott speaks, followed by a shot of rural Idaho – a mode already 
established as representing Mike’s hypnagogia – at which time Scott’s voice becomes 
extradiegetic, and modulated by an echo, as if to signify that we are now within Mike and as 
such Scott’s voice is heard through the filter of Mike’s subjectivity. This is a nodal moment 
of intersubjectivity. It offers a visual image of the private Idaho of the title – with the 
emphasis on private, internal to Mike – while on the soundtrack we hear Scott, or rather, 
Scott-becoming-Hal.  
This intersubjectivity is further explored as Scott mentions his own neighbourhood, 
bringing to the fore the notion of home, which resonates with the images of Mike’s 
imagined ideal of home in the dream image. Scott is rebelling against a home he has access 
to, while Mike is seeking a home he is prohibited from. Intriguingly, later in the narrative, 
Mike takes Scott to Idaho and Scott becomes an object in the landscape we so closely 
associate with Mike and his internal world. This corresponds to the question of whether 
Mike “casts” Scott as Hal; by bringing him to Idaho, is Mike drawing Scott further into the 
layers of his subjectivity? Greenberg suggests that Mike and Scott are alternately 
“embedded” in each other’s stories477, recalling a term I use to describe how the 
subjectivities of text and protagonist are drawn together. I dispute that Scott has enough of 
his own “story” for Mike to become embedded in, but the terminology resonates – two 
subjectivities are drawn together, momentarily.  
 
Liminal motifs 
My Own Private Idaho presents a set of liminal motifs related to the tensions between 
“home” and what lies outside of that designation, and the liminal rites of passage, through 
which the main characters do or do not pass. Both of these concepts are structured along 
binaries – of whether one is within or excluded from home, or whether one is successful or 
unsuccessful in negotiating the rites of passage. Both lead towards a secondary binary of 
stability or instability, that is to say, whether one is designated a stable subjectivity through 
                                                 
477 Greenberg 1992: 23. 
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the space of home or “maturity”, or whether one is designated an instable subjectivity 
through nomadism, perpetual liminality, and the extraterritorial.  
 
Home 
The theme of home is brought to the fore early in the narrative, at first obliquely in the 
opening sequence through the idyllic images of Mike’s hypnagogia, which feature the Idaho 
landscape, his mother, and a wooden house, and then moments later in the image of the 
same wooden house falling from the sky and crashing into the road. Arthur and Liebler 
suggest this image is a reference to The Wizard of Oz478, “recast[ing] Dorothy’s grateful 
homecoming line, ‘There’s no place like home,’ in demonstrating that for Mike there’s no 
home, any place.”479 The reference aside, this image, in its demonstrative destruction of an 
image of home, appears to set the precedent that home is, for Mike, always out of bounds.  
 Home is discussed more overtly in the scene in which Scott talks of the 
neighbourhood in which he grew up, as the viewer again sees images of rural Idaho from 
Mike’s dream-space – his imagined and always elusive ideal of home. Mike and Scott’s 
relationships to the concept of home come to function as a binary rhetoric which 
underscores the film’s politics – as stated, Scott is rebelling against a home he has access to; 
Mike is seeking a home he is prohibited from. This is explored more explicitly and at 
greater length in an exchange between Mike and Scott as they camp out in the Idaho 
wilderness. Scott recounts what he said to the family’s maid on the day he ran away from 
home (“You had a maid?” Mike asks in disbelief) and in bitter contrast Mike laments that 
he had no normal family to abandon:  
 
MIKE: If I had a normal family and a good upbringing then I would have been a well-
adjusted person.  
SCOTT: Depends on what you call normal. 
MIKE: Yeah, it does. Well, you know, normal, like... like a mom and a dad, and a dog and 
shit like that. Normal. Normal. 
SCOTT: So you didn't have a normal dog? 
MIKE: No, I didn't have a dog. 
                                                 
478 Fleming 1939. 
479 Arthur and Liebler 1998: 29. 
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SCOTT: You didn't have a normal dad? 
MIKE: Didn't have a dog or... or... or a normal dad anyway. That's all right. I don't feel 
sorry for myself. I mean, I feel like I'm... I feel like I'm, you know, well-adjusted. 
SCOTT: What's a normal dad? 
MIKE: I don't know. 
 
Mike’s lack of home or stable origins is compounded by the search for his mother, 
and his palpable yearning for familial comfort. As mentioned, the opening and closing 
scenes are separated from the body of the film by a repeated image of salmon jumping 
upstream, returning to the site of their birth. Mike is explicitly linked to these fish through 
the salmon-coloured jacket he is seen wearing in the Idaho and Italy sections of the film, as 
he searches for his mother480. This desire for origins, family, and specifically his mother 
appears to be inextricable from his narcolepsy; indeed the first fifteen minutes of the film 
feature three instances in which his narcolepsy is directly linked to his mother. First, in the 
opening sequence on the road in Idaho; his seizure is not precipitated by an image of his 
mother, but she appears as an aspect of his hypnagogia, his head resting in her lap as she 
tells him, “Don’t worry. Everything’s going to be all right. I know. It’s okay. I know you’re 
sorry. I know.” So strong is this desire for what he is prohibited that it is as if the mere 
reminder of his mother causes him to enter hypnagogia so that he may achieve that 
reunion; in Seattle he sees a woman in the street who resembles his mother and appears to 
enter a trance. Van Sant cuts to the vision of his mother as before, and then back to Mike 
who remains standing though appears semi-conscious and disorientated as pedestrians 
jostle past him. Next he is picked up by Elena, a wealthy middle-aged woman who also 
bears a resemblance to his mother; as she begins to undress him the film cuts to Super-8 
footage of his mother, and then back to Mike as he suffers another seizure.  
It is clear that these correlations of Mike’s sleep and his mother are not 
coincidence. Matthew Tinkcom observes that, “Mike faints when he looks at the landscape 
of the prairie (richly associated with his mother) and when he finds himself in a sexualised 
interaction with an (older) female client,”481 and Christopher Morris suggests more directly 
that Mike’s narcoleptic episodes are incited by, “Mike’s longing for his mother . . . or for 
                                                 
480 Van Sant states explicitly that this was his intention: “He’s the salmon, swimming against the current that 
is his life, trying to reach his roots,” (Van Sant 1993: xliii).  
481 Tinkcom 2002: 241. 
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the womb.”482 I would argue that Mike’s longing is not for the womb so much as the 
“home” that the space of the mother represents; in psychoanalytic terms this could be the 
breast, the womb, or simply the proximity of the mother’s body. Greenberg comments that 
Mike is “a festival of oral-stage pathology, ego-devastated by a childhood whose vastly 
traumatic dimensions Van Sant keeps sketchy,”483 and it is of note that in the scene at 
Richard’s trailer, Mike looks at a photograph of his mother and then places it in his mouth, 
an act which appears to lull him to sleep in a much gentler manner than we have witnessed 
up to this point. Beyond this particular instance, the image of his mother proves both 
soothing and stressful to Mike in the simple fact that each instance is a manifestation of the 
lost object, and a revisiting of the loss – the most traumatic loss – of the primary object. It 
serves as an emotive device, bonding the viewer to Mike in a straightforward identification: 
the viewer shares the common denominator of the primary object, and identifies with pain 
of losing that object, as well as the fleeting promise of a reunion, soon dashed.  
 Beyond the specificity of Mike’s longing for Sharon, it is clear that he searches for a 
more general sense of “home”. The OED defines home as:  
 
A dwelling-place, house, abode; the fixed residence of a family or household; the seat of 
domestic life and interests; one’s own house; the dwelling in which one habitually lives, or 
which one regards as one’s proper abode. Sometimes including the members of a family 
collectively; the home-circle or household.484 
 
Particular phrases stand out here; “the fixed residence,” “habitually,” “one’s proper abode,” 
“one’s own house.” There is an emphasis on stability (“fixed”), singularity (this is one’s 
home because one does not live elsewhere) and on belonging (one owns the site of home). 
Home may be left behind, but it can always be returned to. If it exists in the first instance, 
it will always exist; even if destroyed, the concept or essence of the particular home lives 
on. In Mike’s case, there is no stable first instance. We understand from dialogue between 
Mike and Richard that Sharon was placed in an “institution” when Mike was an infant and 
that he resided there with her. Richard claims this was because she murdered her lover, 
though his story is undermined by cliché and melodrama (prompting Scott to comment, 
                                                 
482 Morris 2003: 38. 
483 Greenberg 1992: 23. 
484 “home, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 16 Jun. 
2000 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50107348> 
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“Come on man, how corny,”) and a little later we arrive at a more likely reason – Mike is 
the product of an incestuous union between Sharon and the adolescent Richard. The incest 
secret – never confirmed in the diegesis, as Richard refuses to acknowledge Mike’s 
accusation – forever destabilises the notion of home for Mike. It seems to render that 
stability impossible. Yet he continues to search for Sharon, for the mother figure of his 
dream, to offer some semblance of home, though this conclusion is not reached within the 
bounds of the narrative.  
One wonders if his near-liaison with Elena in the film’s opening minutes is what 
precipitates his search; as she approaches him in the bedroom – the image of his mother no 
less – the incest secret is revisited, problematising the idyllic dream-union he achieves in 
hypnagogia, instead placing him in Richard’s position. In panic, he exits the moment by the 
only means available to him – by falling asleep. Thus, Mike’s narcolepsy may be seen as 
reflecting an uncanny tension in his relationship to home. Narcolepsy is uncanny – it is of 
the body yet beyond the agency of the subject. The recurrence of Mike’s narcoleptic 
episodes makes it a familiar and sometimes welcome experience, in that it effects a 
hallucinatory reunion with his mother. Yet it is beyond mastery; it is always alien, always 
other.  
The tension between home and transience is central to another text set in Idaho – 
Marilynne Robinson’s novel Housekeeping485, in which the narrator, Ruth, observes in her 
Aunt Sylvie a tension between the desire for a perpetual transience and the duty she has to 
provide a home for her two young nieces – to “keep house”. Ruth observes that Sylvie’s 
desire to escape the burden of housekeeping is seen by others – her sister Lucille, and the 
townspeople in general – as close to mental illness. However, Sylvie’s wanderlust becomes 
contagious to Ruth, who ultimately comes to experience the same tension of home and 
not-home, the ties – both positive and negative – of a stable, fixed, and certain point, and 
the potentiality of motion, of nomadism, of perpetual becoming. Housekeeping and My Own 
Private Idaho are inextricably bound by location and theme486, though each text approaches 
that tension from opposite directions. Ruth and Sylvie first “keep house” and then 
abandon it for transience, whereas Mike is transient and yearns for the stability of home.  
                                                 
485 Robinson 1980.  
486 The link is also noted by Maggie Galehouse, who titles her paper on the theme of transience in Robinson’s 
novel, Their Own Private Idaho (Galehouse 2000).  
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Megan Ratner notes that questions of home continue to be of great interest to Van 
Sant. Of Van Sant’s 2007 film Paranoid Park, she writes: 
 
Van Sant poses questions about the place of home in America . . . For all these young men, 
the only comfort is being on the move, including, in many ways, leaving home.487 
 
This would seem to suggest that “not-home” may be a necessity (as it comes to be for Ruth 
and Sylvie in Housekeeping). It also suggests a potential threat to the supposed safety of 
home – the idea that comfort is to be had only in transience unsettles the stability of home, 
implying perhaps that this central tenet to the concept of home is in fact illusory. In 
discussion of Gerry (2002), Devin McKinney notes that this tension is: 
 
 
the largest theme of Van Sant’s career so far – the desperate wayfaring of handsome boys 
at the fringes, searching out the terms of manhood.488 
 
This suggests also the necessity of leaving home, to enter into the liminal rites of passage, 
as modelled by Victor Turner. McKinney’s claim rings true – this model is equally 
applicable to Good Will Hunting, Gerry, and Paranoid Park, and in a looser sense to Drugstore 
Cowboy, Elephant and Last Days489 also.   
 
Rites of passage 
What would be Act IV in a Shakespearean structure sees Mike and Scott travel to Italy in 
search of Mike’s mother. This is notable as the only part of the film located away from the 
Pacific Northwest, and it is geographically and tonally very distant from the rest of the film. 
Something of this distance, and difference, engenders a particular liminal space for both 
characters, and acts as a catalyst for change in their relationship.  
Mike follows his mother’s trail first to an Idaho hotel, and then on to a rural Italian 
smallholding. Here Scott meets a young woman, the farmer’s niece Carmella, who informs 
him Sharon left the farm long ago. Mike is distraught and keen to leave as soon as possible; 
Scott, however, begins a relationship with Carmella, and they return to Portland together, 
                                                 
487 Ratner 2008: 30. 
488 McKinney 2003: 44. 
489 Van Sant 1997; Van Sant 2002; Van Sant 2007; Van Sant 1989; Van Sant 2003; Van Sant 2005.  
169 
 
while Mike returns to Rome and works the streets as a prostitute, returning to Portland 
some time later. 
 The text constructs Italy as a transitional space for both characters. For Scott the 
trip marks the culmination of the rite of passage of his time on the street, and constitutes a 
particular rite in itself: he departs for Italy as Hal and returns to Portland as Henry. Mike’s 
transition is marked by an increment of absence: when he returns he is homeless, as before, 
though now he is also without Scott, his protector and love object. Moreover, his quest to 
find his mother has reached an inconclusive end: he is rootless and will remain so, 
achieving a perpetual, unhappy, liminality. 
Language is key to the liminality that both characters experience, and to the change 
it effects, again in the polyphony of filmic modes in these scenes, and in the linguistic space 
between English and Italian. As an English speaker with no Italian, my way into this 
section of the film is through identification with English speakers Mike and Scott, two 
characters confronted with a language initially unintelligible to them. Here Scott 
demonstrates an aptitude for effortless transition; he approaches Italian with much greater 
ease than Mike, who appears reluctant to engage with the language – to the point of 
stubbornness. The English print of the film contains no subtitles for the Italian dialogue, 
which leaves an English-speaking viewer somewhat alienated from the Italian characters. 
The language is rendered an external object and I, like Mike and Scott, struggle to enter 
into a negotiation with it. The title card carries the first hint that immersion in the language 
will be total. The viewer is by now familiar with the cards that preface previous sections of 
the film. Rather than reading, ‘Rome,’ as might be expected of an American, English-
language film, the title card reads, ‘Roma.’ This choice suggests two readings. The first 
places it as a refusal to capitulate to the English language, prefacing the alienation the 
characters and viewer will face. The second suggests a self-conscious exoticism, a fetishised 
Europeanness, which invites a reductive reading of Carmella as a cipher of exotic 
otherness. It is also of note that the Italian ‘Roma’ provides an anagram of ‘roam’ in 
English, intersecting the translation with a pun, and underscoring the transient nature of 
the characters and filmic grammar. 
The film’s first view of Rome is a close-up of Mike waking, followed by shots of 
Roman street hustlers who, it emerges, Scott has asked to look after Mike while he finds a 
taxi. We see these men from Mike’s point of view; they closely resemble his acquaintances 
in Portland – one even wears a salmon coloured jacket much like Mike’s own. They speak 
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in what is to Mike an entirely indecipherable language. A reverse shot of Mike shows his 
panic and confusion, and as he stumbles across the Piazza del Popolo he pulls his jacket up 
around his throat, like an animal out of its natural environment seeking to protect itself. 
The scene recalls the incident in Vertigo when Sebald’s narrator is overcome in the cathedral 
in Milan by a strange sense of disorientation (“I was unable even to determine whether I 
was in the land of the living or already in another place.”490) While Sebald’s narrator 
eventually recognises the language being spoken around him and is able to locate himself, 
Mike is unable to recognise let alone comprehend the Italian language.  
Given Mike’s mutable subjectivity and particular relationship to consciousness, it 
follows that he is likely to be adept at familiarising himself with new environments quickly: 
usually he is able to glean his location by finding something familiar in his surroundings. 
Thus it seems contradictory that in Italy he remains disengaged from his surroundings and 
makes no attempt to decipher the language. He shirks the attention of the hustlers and 
stumbles away across the piazza; Van Sant shoots his point of view directly into harsh 
sunlight, which creates a lens flare. As in Eternal Sunshine and The Science of Sleep, this affects 
an obfuscation; Mike stares into something which blinds him; any reference point he might 
grasp for is obliterated. This device, which manifests itself as scattered light in rings and 
circles across the lens, draws attention to the lens itself, to the subjectivity of the camera 
and consequently the protagonist. 
Mike’s subjectivity is confounded in a field of alien objects: the spires of Santa 
Maria in Montesanto and Santa Maria dei Miracoli, the Italian language and unfamiliar 
faces. He is unable to comprehend or interact with any of these things and they remain 
external objects. His subjectivity is not encroached upon but is rendered redundant; it 
requires discernable objects to interpret and interact with but finds instead a vacuum. This 
scenario is reminiscent of dream: a tableau of images which may correspond abstractly to 
each other yet to the subject remains cryptographic. It seems that Mike is unable to access 
systems of meaning that seem effortless to others. As prefaced, he does not speak Italian, 
his love for Scott is not reciprocated, and he fails to find his mother, a family, or home. 
While some discourses remain unavailable, he stubbornly refuses to negotiate with available 
systems, such as the Italian language, which, were it not for his passivity, he could engage 
with. Since this displacement is Mike’s primary state of being, he has no fixed status to be 
displaced from. In contrast, Scott has actively sought a displacement in forsaking his life of 
                                                 
490 V: 115. 
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privilege and taking to the streets; it may be this deliberate displacement that lends him the 
agency to negotiate with otherness.  
With this section of the film, Van Sant sets up a juxtaposition which illustrates 
clearly the different trajectories taken by Mike and Scott. On arriving at the farm, Scott is 
approached by Carmella. Their conversation is hesitant; each has only a shaky grasp of the 
other’s language. Scott’s negotiation with the Italian language is a necessity if he is to 
communicate with Carmella, and his attempt to understand this new language comes to 
facilitate the development of a relationship. Simultaneously, Mike scours the property for 
his mother: Scott and Carmella’s dialogue is inter-cut with two shots of Mike entering a 
dark room as he looks for his mother. In both shots the camera is positioned deep in the 
room looking out, an external doorway centre-frame the only source of light. In the first 
shot Mike is seen entering the room, silhouetted against the doorway. In the second shot 
he is deep in the room, passing the camera and moving further into darkness as he calls out 
to his mother. 
The juxtaposition of Scott’s conversation with Carmella, as he speaks hesitantly in a 
new language, with Mike’s desperate, impatient search for his mother leading him into a 
dark, womb-like room, presents a binary of progression and regression. Mike’s regression 
has a limited distance to run: on discovering his mother is no longer in Italy, he breaks 
down and recalls his childhood memories to Scott, before expressing a desire to return to 
American immediately. Van Sant once more deploys Super-8 footage of Mike’s childhood, 
which reaffirms the complicity between Mike and the viewer. Here however, it finds an 
opposition in the complicity that develops in the exchange of English and Italian between 
Scott and Carmella, a device which serves to exclude Mike. After his initial search of the 
farm building fails to find his mother, Carmella attempts to tell him that Sharon has left, 
but her words are misconstrued. In this instance Scott is aware of the misunderstanding but 
complicit with Carmella. This inhibits him from correcting Mike immediately, and Mike 
heads off in search of his mother again, leaving Scott once again alone with Carmella.  
Whereas Mike’s exclusion from the street hustlers’ conversation in Rome is 
through his incomprehension of Italian, his exclusion here is more pointed. At the dinner 
table Carmella teaches Scott Italian words as lovers’ play; Mike is present but excluded. 
Prior to Carmella’s appearance, Mike and Scott are somewhat bound together by Mike’s 
narcolepsy and consequent dependence; they are presented as a unit through a string of 
consecutive sequences – we see them double-cross Bob, steal a motorcycle, and travel first 
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to Idaho, then to Italy. In addition to his dependency, Mike’s motivation in the partnership 
is made clear in the scene in which he declares his love for Scott. Scott’s motivation 
however is less clear; he accompanies Mike on this long trip, and acts as protector on many 
occasions, yet abandons Mike readily. His attachment shifts with ease to Carmella. As he 
learns a new language, Scott transforms from Hal into Henry, and abandons Mike as Hal 
abandons Falstaff, suggesting that his acquisition of this new language facilitates access to a 
new discourse of privilege, responsibility, and stability. 
Mike remains outside of this discourse. There is only one instance in which he 
learns an Italian word, and rather than allowing him access to this new discourse, it serves 
as an acknowledgement that he is excluded. He finds Carmella crying; she holds a chestnut, 
and teaches him the Italian word for it: la castagna.  
 
CARMELLA: If it was bigger, you could eat.  
MIKE: I understand. 
 
She then confesses she has fallen in love with Scott. The chestnut, not yet ready to be 
eaten, might be read as representing Scott, still in his liminal phase, not quite yet a man, not 
yet ready for the relationship Carmella represents. However, the inevitability that the 
chestnut will ripen implies that he will complete his transition and reciprocate Carmella’s 
love, in turn forever excluding Mike. 
For Scott, the Italian trip is a successful rite of passage: in Italy his identity is in 
flux, and his return to America signifies a new stability and fixed identity. He has left 
behind the slums of Portland, having already declared that when he turns twenty-one, he 
‘wants no more of this.’ It is only when he leaves the liminal space of Italy that his 
transformation becomes complete. En route he learns of the death of his father – the 
Prince becomes King – and in every subsequent scene he wears an immaculate suit and is 
accompanied by Carmella, who from this point on is reduced to a cipher, a public symbol 
of Scott’s heterosexuality and rejection of his previous life. The catalyst for this shift in 
Scott remains invisible, and presents a kind of narrative aporia. He falls for Carmella, 
acquiring a love object which displaces his identity away from the queer street-culture he 
previously inhabited, yet this does not explain, in terms of pure character motivation, why 
he so quickly abandons Mike. It could be read as a necessary outcome of the liminal 
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excursion to Italy: once the liminal state is entered into, it must be exited – it insists upon a 
transition.  
The outcomes of this liminal phase appear to be dependent on an economy of 
inclusion and exclusion. Inclusion (Scott) leads to a successful negotiation and exit of the 
liminal space, while exclusion (Mike) results in a failure to achieve a fixed position, and 
permanent displacement. Arthur and Liebler suggest that: 
 
[Mike is] counterposed with Scott’s calculating, self-confident appropriation of the liminal 
as a holding zone for re-entry into the dominant order. Lacking both the desire and 
material props for reintegration, Mike is consigned to society’s structural margins. Scott, on 
the other hand, manipulates his outcast status toward the refinement of a ruthless 
corporate acumen.491  
 
The nomad 
For Mike, the Italian section does not constitute a rites of passage. He does not find his 
mother; he does not move forward to a new or stable subjectivity. He returns to Portland 
and re-enters the milieu of homeless youth, and, as the film closes, he is alone on the road 
in Idaho, as in the opening scene. He turns on the spot; a tracking shot circles him and is 
intercut with a corresponding reverse shot which pans across his point-of-view of the 
landscape. The contrast from the handheld camera movement of the opening scene at first 
suggests an apparent stability – the camera moves, but smoothly, and to a recognisable 
reverse-shot trope. Yet the way in which the camera circles comes to enclose Mike; this 
circularity emphasises the ongoing repetitions of his existence, especially when taken in 
conjunction with his speech: 
 
MIKE: I am a connoisseur of roads. I’ve been tasting roads all my life. This road will never 
end. It probably goes all... around... the world.  
 
As stated by Arthur and Liebler, “Mike . . . remains ‘stuck’ in an ambivalent, degraded but 
sanctified, Imaginary.”492 
                                                 
491 Arthur and Liebler 1998: 29-30. 
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  The Deleuzoguattarian nomad offers a model for considering Mike beyond 
Turner’s rites of passage. Mike is nomadic in that he is never reterritorialised, he remains 
“stuck” in an economy that “[acknowledges] the difficulties of remaining in a perpetual 
liminality,”493 while also offering an alternative to the strictures of reterritorialisation. This is 
reflected in his narcolepsy, which constitutes a perpetual series of becomings through states 
of consciousness, with the promise that no new state will offer any stability. Morris 
suggests that: 
 
“successful” assimilation into the social order – as is the fate of Scott, at the end – should 
be seen for what it is, just another performance.494  
 
This resonates with the Deleuzoguattarian model, which would view Scott’s assuming of 
his new identity as, at best, arbitrary, or at worst, inauthentic and fraudulent, though with 
the disclaimer that his previous identity, the rich boy slumming with streetkids, is equally 
fraudulent. The contradictions and performativities of Scott’s new identity are well 
illustrated in his disavowal of Bob Pigeon:  
 
SCOTT: I don't know you, old man. Please leave me alone. When I was young and you 
were my street tutor, an instigator for my bad behaviour, I was planning a change. There 
was a time when I had the need to learn from you, my former and psychedelic teacher. 
And although I love you more dearly than my dead father, I have to turn away. Now that I 
have, and until I change back, don't come near me. 
  
The opening statement here is quickly repudiated as Scott acknowledges Bob as his former 
teacher, yet his claim that Bob was an instigator of his bad behaviour attempts to sidestep 
culpability, and his claim of, “I was planning a change,” plants the seeds of his 
metamorphosis in his previous identity – his reterritorialisation began long before the trip 
to Italy, before he met Carmella, before his father’s death or Mike’s declaration of love. 
This recalls Martin’s notion of Scott as a blank screen upon which identities are projected. 
At all of these previous narrative points, Scott’s manifest identity has been arbitrary, 
possibly fraudulent.  
 How does this compare to Mike’s nomadism, which appears authentic, if 
undesired? Scott is a cipher passing through arbitrary positions; each position appears 
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stable yet conceals the fact that it is illusory. Is it possible to trust that any one of Scott’s 
guises is real, or should we suspect that he would continue to metamorphose? In contrast, 
we might say that Mike’s external nomadism conceals an unexpected stability, in his role of 
“searcher” – can the inertia of the road itself (and of the unending narcoleptic transitions) 
offer a stability through familiarity? Arthur and Liebler suggest that by: 
 
splitting the figure of ritual subject, [Van Sant] sends one authorial proxy into the corporate 
domain of “grown-up” power while suspending his troubled yet free-wheeling other half in 
a state of permanent liminality, an unsafe haven of anti-structure and fluid identity set 
against the rewards of fixed status.495 
 
Thus Scott and Mike present two kinds of nomad, one characterised by inauthenticity, the 
other by authenticity, and moreover, one characterised by power and choice, and the other 
by the lack of it. Scott is perhaps closer to the Sebaldian nomad, fascinated by the 
extraterritorial yet always a tourist passing through, the stability of a fixed home lurking 
somewhere beyond the diegesis. In contrast, Mike is a true inhabitant of these margins, and 
is bound within them.  
 
The non-place and the extraterritorial  
We might consider the milieu to which Mike ultimately returns to be more genuinely 
nomadic than the elite, if illusory, position that Scott assumes, in that it represents a 
communitas defined against social hierarchy – a differentiation that Arthur and Liebler 
note is most clearly expressed in the funeral scene, in “the chasm between structure and 
anti-structure”496:  
 
Within view of this assembly, captured in a smooth tracking shots and balanced 
compositions, a ragtag band of miscreants dance and chant their “leader” into the ground 
in an accelerating frenzy of grief and anger, their univocal chance of Bob-Bob-bob 
counterpointing the traditional Christian funeral service. Van Sant cuts back and forth 
between the measured interment and the almost pagan ceremony whose formal motifs 
consist of jerky handheld movements and disorienting camera angles.497 
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In contrast to that of Scott, Van Sant locates Mike’s world as a site of carnivalesque. Arthur 
and Liebler describe this as, “an instinctive democratic community of outlaws,”498 and 
argue that this liminal status allows Mike “to enact sexual, moral and legal infractions 
prohibited in persons of fixed status.”499  
 
Against the protocols of the state funeral, the counter-cultural (in both senses) hijinks of 
Bob’s motley crew instate an irrepressible, carnivalesque corruption of “subjugated 
knowledge.”500 
 
The notion of this “subjugated knowledge” being controlled and channelled into specific 
sanctioned rituals, versus the carnivalesque freeing of that same knowledge into a raucous 
cacophony, presents a distinction akin to that between marshalled and clamorous 
polyphonies.  
 This carnivalesque milieu brings into conflict two contrasting notions of space – 
Augé’s non-place501, that which lies beyond anthropological categorisation, and the 
extraterritorial, that which lies beyond territorialisation. On first glance, these concepts 
would seem to have much in common, yet the non-place tends to close down the 
possibilities of space, its focus on transitional space denying that which remains in 
perpetual liminality, whereas the extraterritorial comes to be a generative space of such 
perpetual liminality, in that it disallows reterritorialisation.  
 The spaces in which we see Mike frequently fall into the category of the non-place: 
the highway in Idaho, the Chinese restaurant, and on the street in Seattle and Portland. 
Often we see him in spaces akin to the non-place, such as the temporary space of hotel 
rooms and flophouses, which like the non-place, exist beyond fixed or stable notions of 
place. Mike’s makeshift tent on the roof of a building in Portland offers a subversion of 
these notions of place – the tent is akin to the hotel room, a temporary anthropological 
space, yet it is parasitic to the building upon which it sits; it is supplemental, a structure 
upon a structure, subverting the territory of the building. Similarly, the space of the derelict 
hotel which serves as a liminal home to Bob and his followers is subverted in its moniker 
of “Jane Lightwork’s house”. We might speculate as to whether or not Jane owns the deeds 
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to the building, but the diegesis tells us it is hers – it is referred to as her house. However, 
the police are able to raid it without a warrant, and we suspect that others not of this milieu 
would not be welcome. Perhaps Jane’s house is somewhere between non-place and 
reterritorialised space.  
 These ideas are revisited in Paranoid Park. The film takes its name from a derelict 
space which has been reterritorialised by skaters and homeless youth. It is depicted as being 
far from a non-place – it is always busy and loud, characterised by the voices of those that 
inhabit it. It is a carnivalesque space, reminiscent of that depicted in My Own Private Idaho, 
though here it is definitively designated by that which eludes Mike – home: 
 
ALEX: So where do you guys live?  
SCRATCH: Right here, man. 
ALEX: At the skatepark?  
JOLT: This is our fucking home.502  
 
This scene from Paranoid Park is also of note for the character of Scratch, who is portrayed 
by Scott Patrick Green, one of the real hustlers from My Own Private Idaho, and for the 
activity of skating, which Ratner suggests demonstrates a “quest for perpetual motion a 
corollary to the Lost Boys feeling of Paranoid Park,”503 an idea which resonates with 
nomadism (and the corollary Lost Boys feeling of My Own Private Idaho). 
 My Own Private Idaho and Paranoid Park appear to challenge the notion of the non-
place by positioning their characters in these spaces and claiming it as a new 
anthropological space – reterritorialising it as “outsider space”. This seems to demonstrate 
that such categorisations are subjective. The social order to which Scott aligns himself may 
choose to designate these spaces as non-places to disavow the existence of what is 
contained within. When Jane Lightwork’s hotel is raided as the police search for Bob, one 
policeman is heard to say, “If we’re looking for a fat man why don’t we just get one under 
the bridge?” which seems to highlight the interchangeability of those within Bob’s milieu to 
those of an external social order. Equally, as attested by Bob Pigeon’s ejection from the 
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upmarket restaurant in which he accosts Scott, the non-place exists for this milieu also, in 
the designation of a space from which they are debarred.  
 Perhaps the non-place finds its clearest expression in My Own Private Idaho in the 
site of hypnagogia. As I have asserted throughout, this is a primary site of liminality – a site 
which is passed through, which necessitates deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations. 
With its narcoleptic protagonist, My Own Private Idaho problematises what I have until now 
taken as an inherent liminality, in that it is a transitional site – it is always temporary, always 
passed through. Hypnagogia is not such a non-place for Mike; he can never escape it. It is 
an extraterritorial site, in that although it is Mike’s, it is uncannily beyond him, and can 
never be claimed.  
 
Summary 
My Own Private Idaho converges with and departs from Sebald, Murakami, and Gondry, 
consolidating approaches to the liminal, and further opening up discussion of textual 
subjectivities. As stated, it is very much an open text; it relies upon the viewer’s investment 
in Mike and resists any singular narrative thread, mode of filmmaking, or representation of 
reality, which makes for an invigorating and disconcerting viewing position.  Though it pre-
dates Gondry’s films, My Own Private Idaho offers a more radical and diffuse economy of 
diegeses. Van Sant’s influence can be seen clearly in The Science of Sleep, as Stéphane’s 
subjectivity comes to resemble that of Mike, in its dazed and disoriented lack of stability. 
One wonders if Eternal Sunshine too owes a debt to Van Sant in its appropriation of such 
states; it appears to redeploy Van Sant’s economy of fragmentation into a more discrete 
and hierarchical system of sleep and wakefulness, while remaining aware of the potentiality 
of the liminal space in between. 
The film appears to offer a more democratic representation of states of 
consciousness than seen in Murakami’s novels, in which characters often vanish from the 
diegesis when they cross to the other side. In contrast Mike is represented across a 
continuum of consciousness. It is difficult to clearly define each state and thus impossible 
to privilege one state above another to place in a hierarchy of consciousness. After Dark is 
closest to this in its representation of Eri. Like Mike she is depicted across a continuum; at 
the opening and close of the novel she is depicted as asleep, but in between her state of 
consciousness is neither awake nor asleep but other to both. After Dark and My Own Private 
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Idaho also share a particular appraisal of sleep in depicting the sharp disparity of the 
sleeping subject and the sleeping body as object. Murakami’s device of approximating a 
film camera creates a gaze which falls upon Eri’s sleeping body, and the description it gives 
is of her body alone; her wakeful subjectivity is displaced. Similarly in My Own Private Idaho, 
sleep renders Mike’s body a vulnerable object, prone to the gaze of others. Unlike Sumire 
in Sputnik Sweetheart, when Mike’s subjectivity departs the physical plane, he leaves behind 
the artefact of his physical body, and the viewer must witness the consequences of this 
rupture between subject and object.  
Like Vertigo and The Rings of Saturn, My Own Private Idaho is conditioned by a 
deliberate instability. It sets out with an apparently centred and singular narrative voice (a 
first person narrator in the case of Sebald, a singular protagonist in the case of My Own 
Private Idaho) but in each case the subjectivity becomes unstable as the narrative voice is 
interrupted and subverted. This instability engenders a polyphony; Sebald draws multiple 
subjectivities into the voice of the narrator, while Van Sant fragments the subjectivity of 
the narrator into multiple voices. It may be said that this device is what lends My Own 
Private Idaho its compelling instability; it asks us to invest in its protagonist then insists upon 
constructing him as so fragmented as to be beyond knowing. Bakhtin’s notion of a plurality 
of consciousnesses comes to be embodied in a single character.  
On a final note, I refer to Arthur and Liebler’s summary of the film, which draws 
clear parallels from the experience of viewing My Own Private Idaho, to the “threshold 
experiences” that Turner identifies in his rites of passage: 
 
There is no legible dramatic or ideological hierarchy to Idaho’s mash of discursive codes. 
Nonetheless, recalling the oneiric condensations prevalent in liminal rites, it is possible to 
address the film’s categorical collisions as themselves redolent of a liminal order meant to 
induce in the consciousness of film viewers a tolerance for unresolved contradictions and 
receptivity to unconventional role-playing. It is just this quality of mental activity that is 
deemed essential to the threshold experiences of ritual-centred societies.504  
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Conclusion  
 
For a thesis so set upon uncertainties, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the 
preceding chapters. At this juncture, I am reluctant to direct the reader to any particular 
conclusion, especially as the reader may have made observations that have passed me by, or 
drawn conclusions of their own which exceed mine, or even reconfigure my arguments.  
However, there is value in drawing my own conclusions, and indeed I think it 
necessary to assess the patterns I have identified for what I might consider to be the 
“substance” of the discussion. It is also very much worthwhile to summarise the shape of 
my arguments, to look again at my critical orientation in light of the discussion, to consider 
what are the most urgent concerns and observations, and to ask what is the dominant 
poetics of the thesis. I hope that this reconsideration serves to reassert rather than merely 
repeat, and that in bringing these critical concerns together a final time, I can direct new 
light on to the discussion.  
 
Betwixt and between 
The first observation I have drawn from these texts, and which has been my starting point 
for most subsequent discussions, is that each text features a series of oppositions of 
haecceity and otherness. These oppositions are sometimes tangible and sometimes oblique, 
but form repeated patterns across the texts. In Sebald, there are oppositions between the 
German and English languages, between word and image, author and narrator, narrator 
and narrated, and facticity and fictionality. In Murakami, the most prominent opposition is 
between this side and the other side. In Gondry, there are oppositions between the 
protagonists and their love objects, and the protagonists’ internal and external worlds. In 
Van Sant, I begin to see a greater selection of pluralities as well as oppositions, between 
different registers of speech and filmic modes, and as in Sebald, facticity and fictionality. 
Between each opposition lies a space of liminality; these are temporal spaces, ontological 
spaces, textual spaces, spaces of knowledge and meaning, of consciousness, and of 
subjectivities. Each space represents an uncertainty, an instability, a disruption, or 
fragmentation. 
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All four sets of texts thrust their narrators and protagonists into these spaces of 
liminality. These characters pass through the liminal, become temporarily entangled, enter 
and then retreat, or become permanently bound within. There are many such instances in 
Sebald, often reflecting the theme of consciousness; to take a memorable example from 
each text, The Rings of Saturn offers its narrator’s reflexive account of his shift in 
consciousness505 while viewing Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lesson506 and van Ruisdael’s View 
of Haarlem and Bleaching Fields507, and the narrator of Vertigo sudden experiences a sudden 
loss of knowledge of where he is, or if he is508. In My Own Private Idaho, Mike is bound 
within a hypnagogic liminal, and Stéphane has a similarly slippery relationship with 
consciousness in The Science of Sleep, which develops progressively and disorients the viewer 
along with its protagonist. Sumire in Sputnik Sweetheart is perhaps the exception. Her 
progression from one point of intensity to another is not so negatively marked; she is 
transitory but happy, the agent of her own destiny. Indeed, her transit to the “other side” is 
mark of her will to attain the object of her desire. That she seemingly returns at the close of 
the novel suggests even a mastery of the liminal.  
I note further differences in the representation of liminal engagement, which seek 
to either open up or close down the potentiality of liminal space. In the case of Sumire, 
passing along a continuum of liminal points is valorised, and restabilisation perhaps 
considered failure; elsewhere, a straightforward transition through the liminal (culminating 
in a restabilisation) is considered successful (Kafka in Kafka on the Shore, or Scott in My Own 
Private Idaho). These discrepancies reveal a politics of the liminal, and instigate a discussion 
of the power structures of the liminal. Such structures are further exposed in consideration 
of a third kind of text, in which becoming bound within the liminal is beyond 
categorisations of success and failure, but rather is controlled by agencies far removed from 
the subject. For all of these characters, even Sumire, a particular relationship with the 
liminal makes the world – the objective world of certainties – a very precarious place. They 
are not of this world yet they must exist within it. This vulnerability plays out in anxieties, 
panic attacks, narcoleptic seizures, which in turn jeopardise romantic relationships, physical 
safety, and indeed, sanity.  
 
                                                 
505 TROS 82-3.  
506 Rembrandt 1632. 
507 van Ruisdael 1665.  
508 V: 115. 
182 
 
The focalising lens  
In the preceding discussion I delineate sites of instability that characters pass through and 
sites of instability that the narrative voice itself passes through. This latter issue intersects 
with questions of how a textual subjectivity is produced, that is, how particular modes are 
used to construct a narrator or protagonist and to position that narrator or protagonist as a 
point of engagement for the reader or viewer. This privileged subjectivity is not equal to, 
but simulates a synonymy with, the textual subjectivity. There are particular ruptures in this 
simulated synonymy; these are more notable in the filmic texts through the on-screen 
presence of the protagonist within the world of the film in the performance of an actor 
(correspondingly, the films also achieve a closer synonymy when constructing shots from 
the protagonist’s point of view). In the literary texts, this notion of rupture is highlighted in 
Sebald’s account of Beyle, presenting himself in a scene from an apparently paradoxical 
viewpoint509, and through the reflexive manner in which the narrators of both Vertigo and 
The Rings of Saturn contend with their own representation within the recollected memory of 
the narrative voice.  
The idea of narrators and protagonists as a point of engagement for the reader and 
a lens on to the worlds they exist in also suggests another point made by McHale in his 
delineation of epistemological and ontological poetics. In his reading of Faulkner’s Absalom, 
Absalom!510, he identifies a modernist (epistemological) device in “the focalization of all the 
evidence through a single ‘center of consciousness’.”511 That McHale designates such a 
focalisation as epistemological is of interest; it suggests again the idea of characters 
negotiating with the world in which they must exist, attempting to “know” this world 
through the focalisation of subjectivity. I see this in the simulated first person narratives of 
all three films, the “I” of the narrative voice, the observing “we” of After Dark (which 
presents itself as a lens quite literally), and the focalisation of, respectively, Nakata and Mari 
in the third person sections of Kafka on the Shore and After Dark. In these texts the notion of 
a centre of consciousness is itself unstable – always present in the narrator or protagonist, 
but always illusory. Likewise, such a focalisation is likely to be distorted, fragmented, or 
indeed, kaleidoscopic.  
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With this focalising lens in mind, it is possible to consider how this privileged 
subjectivity is placed in opposition to, or among, other voices operating in the text. 
Polyphonies and intersubjectivities begin to appear. The narrator of The Rings of Saturn 
draws other voices into the text, which intermingle with his own, undifferentiated, until the 
point at which he is unsure whether he is in fact his friend, Michael Hamburger512. In 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind we see the protagonist’s sleeping subjectivity interact with 
his lost love, only for her wakeful subjectivity to respond. In contrast, we also see 
subjectivities in isolation. In The Science of Sleep, Stéphane’s apparent intersubjectivity with 
Stéphanie is illusory, and in My Own Private Idaho, the brief moment of intersubjectivity with 
Scott notwithstanding, Mike’s narcolepsy renders his subjectivity insular, though refracted 
into an internal, intrapsychic polyphony. Mike provides a fascinating counterpoint to the 
Sebaldian narrator; while the two share so many similarities, there is a great contrast in the 
manner in which their subjectivities are constructed, Mike via a polyphony of filmic modes 
radiating outward, and Sebald’s narrators drawing other voices inwards. This recalls 
Gondry’s repeated use of Spin Art in The Science of Sleep, first centrifugally, then 
centripetally, and its suggestion of subjectivities mapped on to processes of both 
divergence and convergence. 
 
Homecomings 
The delineation of the centrifugal and centripetal in Van Sant and Sebald offers a further 
viewpoint, which ramifies with the power structures of the liminal. It presents a dichotomy 
of engagement and disengagement, best illustrated in the passage in which the narrator of 
Vertigo “loses himself” in Milan Cathedral, and the scene in which Mike wakes at the Piazza 
del Popolo. The narrator of Vertigo is able to orient himself through his comprehension of 
the Italian language, whereas Mike’s incomprehension of the same language serves to 
disorient him. This discrepancy in the facility to engage presents implicit questions of why 
the liminal is more perilous for some than for others, and of the contributing factors in this 
dichotomy. These questions hint too at the realignment of my own critical orientation, 
towards questions McHale would posit as epistemological rather than ontological: “How 
can I interpret this world of which I am a part? And what am I in it?”513 This in turn 
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reiterates the question: How much are these liminal subjects a part of the world, and how 
does the world recognise these subjects? 
 Perhaps this question can be answered by considering the survival of these 
characters with such complex or problematic relationships to the liminal. How does each 
text close, and in what circumstances does each leave its protagonist? Sebald’s novels 
conclude with the narrator journeying toward home, a home that is referred to within the 
text, but not often discussed at length. Kafka on the Shore concludes with Kafka returning 
home to assume an adult responsibility, and in After Dark Mari returns home (though will 
soon depart for China) and Eri returns to the “home” of wakefulness from her prolonged 
sleep. Sputnik Sweetheart concludes with Sumire’s return from the other side, with the reality 
or permanence of this open to debate. Eternal Sunshine ends with an uncertain homecoming 
– a new beginning and within it the acknowledgement of another, inevitable, ending. The 
Science of Sleep concludes with Stéphane about to leave home once more, yet confoundingly 
falling into a panicked and chaotic sleep. This hints at the conclusion of My Own Private 
Idaho, which sees Mike, alone on the road in Idaho, addressing himself once again: “This 
road will never end. It probably goes all around the world.” On the last four words he 
collapses into sleep, as if understanding the reality his words represent.  
While Sputnik Sweetheart and Eternal Sunshine tease with an uncertainty, these latter 
two films frustrate in a refusal to offer the protagonist any kind of homecoming. These 
conclusions do not suspend the protagonist in a transience rich with potentiality. Both are 
stranded; Stephane still has hopes for a relationship with Stephanie, hopes which are once 
again dashed, and Mike has lost everything, except perhaps the meagre prize of a moral 
superiority over Scott. The conclusions of these films posit the perpetually liminal as a 
negative space, yet the protagonist continues to survive within this space. There is a shift in 
emphasis from conclusion to process. There is also a question of how far the process can 
sustain itself, and if this is not to be in perpetuity, how it will finally conclude. I have 
mentioned Van Sant’s later film Paranoid Park as an example of when “not-home” becomes 
a necessity and Megan Ratner’s suggestion that for Van Sant’s characters, “the only 
comfort is being on the move.”514 Here, stability is found in movement rather than stasis, 
proposing a solution for the liminal subject; rather than surviving in a world of which it 
cannot be part, it institutes a new world. Such a “solution” is paradoxical; it poses 
immediate questions of whether such stability mimics the same modes of territorialisation 
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as stasis, or risks the same inhospitalities which have rendered the previous world 
impossible. 
 There remains a tension between the home we have and the home we desire. 
Mike’s fraught collapse at the close of My Own Private Idaho suggests he has not accepted his 
perpetual transience, and he retains a desire, or rather, a need, for something else. An 
intervention is required, which perhaps occurs in the very final moments of the film as his 
sleeping body is scooped up from the road and driven away by a stranger – a final 
uncertainty, of whether he is being transported to safety or further peril. This necessity of 
some kind of intervention, some exit from the liminal, some homecoming recalls the 
fisherman on the beach in The Rings of Saturn, who the narrator describes as “the last 
stragglers of some nomadic people [having] settled there, at the outermost limit of the 
earth, in expectation of the miracle longed for since time immemorial, the miracle which 
would justify all their erstwhile privations and wanderings.”515 The dry tone of the 
narrator’s observation suggests that we will be left waiting.  
 
In dreams begins responsibility 
In Kafka on the Shore, Oshima cites Yeats’ Responsibilities516, a citation I failed to heed when I 
began this project. Where other academic disciplines are bound by ethics, my research in 
literature, film, and critical theory did not seem to require to such guidance. On the 
contrary, I relished the idea of a research without ethics, in which I could pursue a utopia 
of hypnagogic reverie unbound. I hesitate to suggest that I have found such an ethics, but 
owing to the intervention of Sebald, my research has intersected with a critical strategy 
which I came to realise was astringent, erudite, searing, chilling, mournful, and equal to all 
of these, responsible. 
The Rings of Saturn concludes with the notion of the soul leaving the body, an 
acknowledgement of mortality but also of an afterlife.517 Sebald’s collection of writers, 
writings, histories, and catastrophes acknowledges the fact of death, the fact that these 
events have passed, yet in bearing witness, he bestows an afterlife. He reiterates, and 
creates meaning and significance anew by placing his finds in new constellations. There is a 
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politics to this critical strategy, a bearing witness to injustice. This is present too in My Own 
Private Idaho, in the interviews with street hustlers, the foregrounding of marginal space, and 
the film’s parting shot, after witnessing poverty, homelessness, and misery, of “Have a nice 
day.” This anger is palpable, and there is a sense that it is not superficial but deeply felt. 
Sebald’s anger similarly profound, and even more sharply deployed. Two chapters of The 
Rings of Saturn conclude with the narrator at boiling point, yet still somehow unwaveringly 
erudite. After offering an account of how Roger Casement was destroyed by the British 
Government (a systematic destruction reminiscent of Kafka) he recounts how Casement’s 
body was in 1965 exhumed for repatriation to Ireland, “presumably scarcely identifiable 
any more, from the lime pit in the courtyard of Pentonville prison into which his body had 
been thrown.”518 Even more blisteringly, he ends the previous chapter by reminding us that 
Kurt Waldheim’s voice was recorded and sent into space aboard Voyager II, “for the 
benefit of any extra-terrestrials that may happen to share our universe, words of 
greeting...”519 Here Sebald’s lightness of touch is coruscating; that a man so closely 
associated with genocide becomes an ambassador for humanity is to Sebald both an 
atrocity and also terribly appropriate.  
My conclusions offer nothing so bold, but I take from Sebald (and Van Sant) a hint 
of the patterns I should look for. It is this observation which opened up a new dimension 
in my critical approach. I discovered that to make this project worthwhile to myself 
required a new mode of questioning, a search for networks of meaning, which like many of 
the quests undertaken by the protagonists of these texts, would ultimately resist definitive 
resolution. Not that this matters; the impetus remains regardless, and though it seems 
almost facile to suggest that the substance here lies in process rather than resolution, it is 
appropriate nonetheless. Also, it is disingenuous to say there have been no resolutions; in a 
sense I have passed through a similar liminal passage to the protagonist of Kafka on the 
Shore, who emerges from his own quest with a new sense of responsibility. In another sense 
I am more Mike in My Own Private Idaho – bewildered and frustrated, but hopefully not so 
lost. I place a certain amount of faith in my Sebaldian aspirations to guide me out of the 
chaos, or at least allow me a clearer view.  
I stated in the Introduction that I take from Sebald the maxim that even when we 
cannot have faith in humanity, we can have faith in literature; it allows us to identify 
patterns in the chaos, and to see the possibility of connection. This is something I see at 
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work within the texts: Kafka’s progression through the liminal is accompanied by literature 
– he hides out in a library and spends his days reading. In After Dark, Mari reads an 
unidentified book whenever she has a moment to herself, and in Sputnik Sweetheart the 
narrator and Sumire forge a friendship through their shared love of literature. Similarly, My 
Own Private Idaho engages at length with Henry IV, and in Gondry’s films the characters find 
faith not in literature but in the art they create. In a text I discarded from the thesis, 
Jonathan Coe’s The House of Sleep520, the characters find faith in cinema as well as literature.  
 
Oscillations 
This faith in film, literature, and art is reflected in my search for meaning, for substance to 
my discussion. As I identified this shift in my critical orientation, I sought to make sense of 
it by locating it within critical discourse, by examining both my initial critical strategies and 
the aspects of Sebald that I have co-opted. I considered this alongside accounts of shifts in 
critical discourse, notably McHale’s assessment of the emergence of a postmodernist 
poetics from modernism, and latterly, the re-emergence of aspects of modernism within 
postmodernism. In recognising that my critical strategies are not defined by a 
postmodernist poetics, I must also recognise that postmodernism is a substantial influence 
to my research. I see this tension reflected in examinations of this re-emergence of 
modernist poetics, and current attempts to find a new critical language to account for this. 
Efforts to define this modernist-postmodernist tension under banners of post-
postmodernism or metamodernism are perhaps unwieldy, yet this critical discussion is 
necessary. In their paper Notes on metamodernism, Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den 
Akker identify “trends and tendencies [which] can no longer be explained in terms of the 
postmodern . . .  characterized by the oscillation between a typically modern commitment 
and a markedly postmodern detachment.”521 They continue:  
 
by oscillating to and fro or back and forth, the metamodern negotiates between the 
modern and the postmodern . . . this oscillation [is not] a balance however; rather, it is a 
pendulum swinging between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles.522 
 
This would seem to ramify with my observation of pluralities rather than binaries in Van 
Sant, and perhaps not coincidentally, Vermeulen and van den Akker cite Gondry as the 
                                                 
520 Coe 1997.  
521 Vermeulen and van den Akker 2010: 2. 
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filmmaker whose work most clearly expresses what they consider to be a metamodernist 
poetics523. I have identified this particular poetics (phrased as a lacuna or open question, in 
texts of the last twenty years), which is not to say that such a poetics did not exist 
beforehand, rather that the contemporary moment brings particular instabilities to the fore, 
and that writers, filmmakers and theorists are finding new ways to explore and articulate 
these, and are doing so more often. It would of course be remiss not to note how these 
tensions between particular poetics offer a very appropriate final example of a liminal 
destabilisation of subjectivity.  
In closing, and in lieu of a final analysis, I offer the suggestion that perhaps the 
success of the Sebaldian mode of questioning is that, despite all, it does not flounder in 
liminal uncertainty. It seeks out stability, and indeed, each narrative closes as its narrator 
journeys towards home. These narrators may be rife with a perpetual uncertain anxiety 
which will not be assuaged by such a return, but attempting to find the metaphorical shelter 
of home offers a gesture towards stability. It is of course absolutely appropriate that these 
returns occur just out of frame, after the conclusion of the narrative; and the Sebaldian 
narrator remains forever suspended just short of home. This ramifies with the the 
previously discussed scene from The Science of Sleep, in which Stéphane and Stéphanie 
converse on the telephone, Stéphane in bed and on the edge of sleep. He asks Stephanie to 
continue talking as he falls asleep, as he believes it is possible to communicate from within 
sleep.  
 
STÉPHANE: I feel that I’m falling down into a black hole. 
 
STÉPHANIE: You know that you could never see someone fall in a black hole. Because 
the image of the traveller who passes the horizon would slow down till it would remain 
stuck in the same position, the state he was when he crossed the line.  
 
As Stéphanie speaks, Stéphane falls asleep. 
 
STÉPHANIE: Stéphane? Are you here? 
 
STÉPHANE: No, I’m there! I'm there... 
 
STÉPHANIE: Tell me, tell me. Describe all you can see.  
 
This scene sums up, as well as any, the paradox at the heart of the thesis – of subjectivity 
entering into the liminal, and of attempting to bear witness to this impossible space. 
                                                 
523 Vermeulen and van den Akker 2010: 1. 
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